Russia’s Lingering Shadow: A Post-Ukraine North Africa

This article was originally published in May 2024 in our Spring/Summer 2024 Issue 08.

Russia’s fingerprints in Africa remain despite the current war in Ukraine, with the rogue nation continuing to consolidate its economic and military ties in the region. In 2023, the Russia-Africa Summit proceeded on schedule and demonstrated to the world that Russian influence, built up since the early 2000s, was indeed here to stay. These ties have taken the form of both formal and informal partnerships. Some of Russia’s largest arms purchasers came from the African Continent—specifically, Egypt and Algeria. Furthermore, Russian agricultural exports are essential to food security on the continent. Before the attempted Wagner Coup, Russia also maintained an extensive informal network of PMC (private military company) troops to support friendly regimes such as the Central African Republic, as well as juntas in Mali, Niger, and beyond. [1] Empirical evidence of Russia’s sustained influence in North Africa counters the popular belief that Russia’s diplomatic soft power is slipping away in the short term. Yet, it is unclear how much longer Russia can maintain its chokehold over the North African region.

The appeal of Russia as a partner stands out in comparison to its richer Western competitors for its promises of military assistance without the appearance of bending to imperialism that French or American assistance tends to produce. Many of the juntas in the “coup belt”—a North African region defined by its high risk of military coups and civil unrest—have stroked their legitimacy by kicking out French influence, especially in the face of significant security threats from insurgent groups that governments have failed to handle on their own. Despite Russia’s smaller share of African trade than the United States and its Western allies (the difference being 64 billion in American trade to just 18 billion in trade for Russia), it has been able to build up local influence through social media campaigns and what the Council for Foreign Relations has dubbed “memory diplomacy.” In short, “memory diplomacy” refers to Russia’s co-opting of the anti-imperialist rhetoric it stoked while the Soviet Union existed—creating negative discursive ingroups that native North Africans were likely to buy into as a result of their colonial pasts. [2]

This strategy has paid dividends for Russia’s clout on the international stage, which its struggle in Ukraine has weakened. Nearly every African country attended the Russia Africa Summit of 2023. The UN vote for a Russian withdrawal in 2022 saw 17 of 35 abstentions (effectively tacit neutrality in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine) come from Africa. Russia has also managed to obtain military-technical cooperation agreements with nearly every African state and has done the same with energy cooperation to a lesser extent. [3]

This level of influence is impressive for a country that is supposed to be an international pariah. The relationships Russia built are particularly resilient because of the twin benefits of seeming anti-imperialist while keeping autocratic leaders in power. It is no coincidence that Russian aid has been most extensive to military juntas in Mali, and Sudan, both countries where military regimes play off of nationalistic rhetoric to justify their seizure of power from elected officials.

Despite these successes, Russia’s shadow over Africa may be in danger. Trade volumes have declined since 2019. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also failed to poll favorably with the African public, even within Russia’s closest allies there. To make matters worse, the invasion of Ukraine has made Western powers more active in combating Russian economic and military influence. New scrutiny is being drawn to Russia’s designs, meaning their previously uncontested expansion of influence is likely ending. The falling out of favor of Mr. Prigozhin, the founder and head of the Wagner army, has also likely harmed Russia’s influence by depriving the country of one of its most useful assets in the region. [4]

As time moves on, Russia’s commitment to Africa is certain to be tested, as the costs of war in Ukraine and insurgencies from Sudan to Mali take their toll on Russia’s economic resources. However, one thing is certain: Russia cannot outbid the West, in terms of trade. By invading Ukraine Russia has directly confronted Western influence, and in time such a confrontation will likely take center stage in Africa, a continent with vast potential and resources that each great power bloc desires for itself. Time will tell if Russia succeeds in propping up the juntas favorable to it, or if it will fail to bring the stability it and its partners promised. Yet, it is more than likely that Russia’s failure in Africa is only a matter of time. Russia is not a rich country, and thus cannot maintain influence at scale while prosecuting a war that becomes more costly by the minute. Putin in particular has staked his legitimacy on ensuring a return of Russian geopolitical clout. Yet, by investing his resources in too many regions at once he will see lackluster results in all of them. The gradual retreat of Russian influence will likely take years, due to the built-up sentiments and narratives it has promoted. Still, eventually, the West (particularly the United States) and China will move to the foreground of soft and hard power in Africa as it becomes ever more of notice to the leaders of both nations.

Works Cited

[1]Droin, Mathieu and Dolbaia, Tina. Russia is Still Progressing in Africa, What’s the Limit? (Center for Strategic and International Studies. August, 2023).

[2]Ferragamo, Mariel. Russia’s Growing Footprint in Africa. (Council for Foreign Relations, December 2023).

[3]Russia in Africa, an Atlas. (Think Tank, European Parliament. February, 2024).

[4] Zaytsev, Vadim. Second Russia-Africa Summit Lays Bare Russia’s Waning Influence. (Carnegie Endowment, July 2023).

[5] Wesolowski, Kathrin. Fact Check: Russia’s Influence in Africa. (Deutsche Welle, July, 2023).

Photo Credit: Информационное агентство БелТА