This article was originally included in our Fall 2024 edition.

In February of 2022, Russia illegally invaded Ukraine, declaring war on the territory. Despite Russia’s frequent threats against Ukraine throughout the 21st century, many scholars were shocked at such confrontational behavior. In reality, Russia’s actions come as no surprise—the signs began with protests against NATO expansion since the 1990s¹, and ended with Russia’s history of lashing out against Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. If Russia was a toddler who stole all the toys in the sandbox, the U.S. and E.U. failed at their jobs of parental oversight. By pursuing a policy of appeasement, defined as giving in to the demands of a belligerent nation, the West leaves only itself to blame for Moscow’s ongoing attacks on democracy and sovereignty.

Russia has long desired expansion. Yet, since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, Western great powers held the erroneous notion that Russia was diminished to a “minor power”.² Russia’s global position is critical to this analysis: throughout the 1990s, the U.S. led a unipolar world order that marginalized Russia, so Moscow felt it had no choice but to take drastic action to restore its former hegemony. ² Unfortunately, Russia found its first target in Georgia in 2008, which it illegally annexed in only five days. 

Georgia was a small Eastern European nation that was previously part of the Russian Empire before 1918. For all intents and purposes, it was an inconsequential country in international affairs. Indeed, in deciding whether or not to intervene, then-President Bush’s national security adviser asked, “are we prepared to go to war with Russia over Georgia?” ³ The answer was a resounding no—Georgia was not meaningful enough for the United States to battle over, and Russia was not considered a great power to be concerned over. America would have rather appeased Moscow with a policy of leniency than risk its resources. Matthew Bryza, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, explains that Georgia held a symbolic significance—when Russia provoked a war and went unpunished, it greenlighted the government to continue illegal expansion. ⁴ By not challenging Russia, the U.S. sent a message that Russia could expand unchecked.

The Obama administration mistakenly pursued a “reset” policy of Russo-American relations after taking office in 2008, extending the Bush approach of military inaction. Specifically, this appeasement involved applying weak sanctions on Moscow and denying Georgia weapons after its annexation. The U.S. and E.U. imposed sanctions on Russia after its occupation of Georgia, yet, none “damaged the Russian economy even remotely.” ² Worse than the ineffective gesture, the West voluntarily removed its sanctions after a short time without Moscow even asking. Moreover, the U.S. and Georgia had previously established a security partnership, but immediately after its invasion, Russia made public and diplomatic demands that the United States stop supplying weapons to Georgia. ² Washington complied, and by not providing Georgia with arms, the U.S. officially displayed that it would honor Russia before its Georgian alliance. The international community at large learned that Russia could act as dominant as it wished, and in return, America would favor Russian interests. The very term “reset” grants a blank slate. Rather than resist Moscow’s aggression, the U.S. publicly reconciled with Russia, which further incentivized and emboldened its expansionist ambitions. Russia’s experience with Georgia wet its palette for more—Western appeasement made Moscow’s foreign policy more aggressive as it shifted to pursue Crimea. Ultimately, any Western failure to respond to expansion provides “an incentive to further erode the international system.” ⁵ Such influence radicalized Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin; one of his former diplomats went so far as to state that the West’s policy of appeasement made Putin “delusional.” ² Georgia was a beta test, and six years later, Russia annexed Crimea. The West sanctioned Moscow, but the tangible effects of the economic wrist-slap were irrelevant—Putin’s domestic approval ratings actually improved because Russian citizens perceived the West as a villain for punishing their economy. ⁶ Meanwhile, Russia used the 2014 sanctions as an opportunity to find new customers for its fuel exports—China and Russia developed a highly interdependent relationship based on trading oil. ⁷ Western attempts to punish Moscow were negligible at best, and at worst, actively bolstered the regime. If appeasement in 2008 was rooted in leniency, Western relationships with Russia were soon fueled by fear. Successful invasions of both Georgia and Crimea made Russia a credible and formidable hegemon. Moscow had every reason to believe it could attack Ukraine in 2022 without major backlash—after all, it already did so twice before. Policies of appeasement since 2008 laid the foundation for hostile targeting of Ukraine in the status quo. Thus, Russia can no longer be ignored, accommodated, or “reset.” 

In a 2023 reflection, former-Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili stated that the overarching lesson of Georgia’s annexation is never to pursue appeasement; it is a “time bomb.” ⁸ Aggression left unchecked in the short term will yield worsened conflagration in the long term. ⁵ While there is no going back in time, there is still an opportunity to defuse said continuously ticking time bomb. Considering Washington’s failure to maintain sanctions on Moscow or provide Georgia with arms after its 2008 annexation, in addition to minimal financial repercussions for invading Crimea in 2014, the West cannot continue to reward Russia’s belligerence. Three years into a lethal war, many legislators in the U.S. have grown fatigued. Military and humanitarian aid that was once a “broad river” has diminished to merely “a few drops.” ⁹ Meanwhile, many Western citizens understandably do not want to continue funding a fight viewed as an ocean away, when they face glaring problems in their home nations. Others simply want to stop violence and move toward negotiations in favor of peace. But, it is imperative to remember that Ukraine is only a microcosm of Russia’s intentions. Although this war may have reached the three-year mark, it is part of a 17-year-long trend of Russian aggression. From 2008, to today. Fighting for Ukraine by providing aid is more than just a symbol of solidarity with one democratic nation, it is symbolic of finally choosing resistance over appeasement. Today, the buck stops with Ukraine.

Works Cited

1. Lieven, Anatol. “Russia Has Been Warning About Ukraine for Decades. The West Should Have Listened.” TIME. January 25, 2023. https://time.com/6141806/russia-ukraine-threats/. 

2. Tchantouridze,  Lasha. “The Aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Appeasement of Russia and the War in Ukraine.” Journal of Peace and War Studies. 4th Edition. (2022): 77-94. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366463582_The_Aftermath_of_the_2008_Russo-Georgian_War_Appeasement_of_Russia_and_the_War_in_Ukraine. 

3. Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2012.

4. Dickinson, Peter. “The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin’s Green Light.” The Atlantic Council. August 7, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/. 

5. Millen, Raymond A. “Stability Challenges and Opportunities Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War.” Marshall European Center for Security Studies, No. 24, March 2022, https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2022-03/StabilityImplications_RussoUkrainianWar.pdf.

6. Nardelli, Alberto, Jennifer Rankin, and George Arnett. “Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at record levels.” The Guardian. July 23, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2015/jul/23/vladimir-putins-approval-rating-at-record-levels. 

7. Altiparmak, Suleyman O., Cameron G. Thies, Shade T. Shutters, and Keith Walters. “Inducing New Bilateral Oil Interdependencies: The Unintended Impact of 2014 US-led Sanctions on Russia.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 6, No. 3, March-April 2023, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371580/inducing-new-bilateral-oil-interdependencies-the-unintended-impact-of-2014-us-l/. 

8. Saakashvili, Mikheil. “Mikheil Saakashvili on the lessons from Georgia.” The Economist. September 1, 2023. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/09/01/mikheil-saakashvili-on-the-lessons-from-georgia.

9. The Economist. “Ukraine’s new enemy: war fatigue in the West.” November 27, 2023. https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/27/ukraines-new-enemy-war-fatigue-in-the-west.

Photo Credit: Zach Rudisin