This article was originally included in our Fall 2024 edition.

The presence of North Korean troops on the Russian front in Ukraine is suggestive of a shift in Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s foreign policy and toward more active acts of aggression. This is true for both satellite and direct conflicts, as the administration has also pursued a number of strategic positions that threaten unification previously negotiated with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. Changes of this nature indicate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) government is increasingly confident about its national security, due in part to its allies’ military victories and related support. This confidence could be catastrophic for the US and its allies, as the emergence of a competing nationalist world order can only undermine the liberal internationalism promoted by the West. 

Despite an increase in UN sanctions against North Korea that reflect compounding international fear surrounding the Kim Regime’s development of nuclear arms and greater hostility, the Kremlin attended a 2019 summit to strengthen its bilateral relationship with Pyongyang in an arena closed off to the rest of the global community. President Vladimir Putin has maintained that Korean peace talks must be careful and thorough, continuously pointing to the US as a major source of tension between the two Koreas. This rhetoric, combined with Putin’s objection to the UN’s anti-DPRK economic policy (even given their observance of it), is suggestive of an ideological shift in Russia toward greater sympathy for the North Korean cause. This cause, however, has been defined more and more by aggression, as Kim has refused to consider US and South Korean suggestions of a nuclear double-freeze. 

Russian support has transcended Kim’s anti-unification actions.¹ This stance aligns with Russia’s interest in the territory surrounding the Ukraine-Russia border. Though the situations are not entirely comparable, in both cases, Putin pursues domestic economic and political interests while overlooking the potential for disastrous interstate conflict. Moreover, Russia’s successful annexation of Crimea and headway in eastern Ukraine, compounded by faltering military assistance for Ukraine on behalf of its Western allies, raise questions regarding the strength of the liberal international order, particularly through the diplomatic power of the UN and NATO (both of whom denounce Russia’s actions in Ukraine), when faced with Russian opposition. ^2,3 China’s foreign policy stance in the South China Sea has not diminished in severity either, as an increasing number of Philippine ships have been attacked by Chinese naval forces.⁴ Additionally, the UN has condemned the federal government’s treatment of Uyghur Muslim populations in the northwest since learning of the situation, which originated in 2017.⁵ However, the UN’s lack of enforcement power has allowed President Xi Jinping to strengthen the foreign and domestic policy stances he’s had since entering office, often supported by military action. In a similar vein to Putin, these relative victories against Western checks to North Korea’s power exist alongside diplomatic and economic support for the DPRK, most notably through a 1961 mutual defense treaty which in 2021 both nations renewed for an additional 20 years. ⁶ China has openly supported certain UN sanctions and opposed others meant to penalize North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, calling into question whether Xi’s worries about the DPRK’s expansion of its ballistic missile program extend past the implied Chinese domestic threat to the potential for aggression against South Korea. 

The inability of the UN and NATO to combat Russian and Chinese military expeditions, coupled with each nation’s interconnectedness with the DPRK, have contributed to Pyongyang’s rising military might. This development has occurred most notably through the deployment of North Korean troops into western Russia amidst Putin’s ongoing war against Ukraine, and its direct offensive political strategy on the North-South border in Korea, both of which intensify the potential threat of a war of aggression waged by Kim. An estimated 11,000 North Korean troops are gaining “valuable combat and technical experience” in Kursk, in line with the defense pact signed by the two countries earlier this year.^7,8 In May, Kim dropped an estimated 260 balloons worth of waste across eight of South Korea’s nine provinces, a tactic which the North Korean government first implemented during the Korean War. ⁹ This blatant act of aggression is another indicator of the North Korean government’s heightened confidence in its ability to achieve its aims without significant repercussions or push-back from the West. 

The North Korean government’s increasing combativeness during the past few years can be attributed to a parallel increase in confidence regarding the success of North Korea and its allies’ border conflicts despite Western opposition. This trend suggests a potential shift in the global order away from US hegemony and toward a multilateral balance based on the interests of all major nuclearized powers. While this will not necessarily undermine the acting power of the U.N. (as China and Russia are already voting members of the Security Council), it might eventually lead to a NATO-esque alternative stretching across the east that centralizes and strengthens the existing military alliances between China, Russia, and the North.

Works Cited

1. Toloraya, Georgy, and Lyubov Yakovleva. “Russia and North Korea: Ups and Downs in Relations.” Asian Politics & Policy 13, no. 3 (2021). Accessed November 28, 2024. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/aspp.12584?saml_referrer=.

2. Kyslytsya, Sergiy. “Joint Statement Condemning Russia’S War of Aggression Against Ukraine.” The United States Mission to the United Nations, (2024). Accessed November 28, 2024.usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-condemning-russias-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine/#:~:text=We%20reiterate%20our%20resolute %20condemnation,within%20its%20internationally%20recognized%20borders.

3.NATO, Heads of State. “Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government.” The United States Mission to the United Nations, (2022). Accessed November 28, 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.

4. Ratcliffe, Rebecca. “Confrontations in South China Sea Surge, Raising Fears a Miscalculation Could Lead to Conflict.” The Guardian, July 12, 2024. http://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/12/south-china-sea-conflict-philippines-coast-guard.

5.High Commissioner, UNHR. “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’S Republic of China.” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, (2022). Accessed November 28, 2024. http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf.

6. Fong, Clara. “The China-North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations, (2024). Accessed November 28, 2024. http://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.

7. Vergun, David. “North Korean Troops Enter Kursk Where Ukrainians Are Fighting.” Department of Defense News, (2024). Accessed November 28, 2024. http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3968230/north-korean-troops-enter-kursk-where-ukrainians-are-fighting/.

8.Glantz, Mary, Frank Aum, Carla Freeman, and Naiyu Kuo. “North Korean Troops in Russia Show Putin Is Doubling Down on Ukraine War.” Department of Defense News, (2024). Accessed November 28, 2024.  http://www.usip.org/publications/2024/10/north-korean-troops-russia-show-putin-doubling-down-ukraine-war.

9. Ng, Kelly. “North Korea Drops Trash Balloons on the South.” BBC, May 29, 2024. http://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4nn2p32zrzo.

Photo Credit: Roman Harak