This article was originally included in our Fall 2024 edition.

The world’s eyes are turning to East Asia, and any prediction that Donald Trump intends for isolation in the pacific theater should be quashed by his choice of Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, a man who has stated that “Communist China is the powerful adversary the United States has faced in living memory.” ¹Such pointed words speak to the mindset that the incoming administration holds towards China. Given Trumps’s other cabinet choices have prioritized a fidelity to his vision, it is almost certain Rubio and Trump are of the same mind. 

So where does that leave Taiwan in an age of growing insecurity? Taiwan has a much vaunted “Silicon Shield,” but Ukraine and the illusions regarding geopolitics that the war has  unveiled have shaken Taiwan. Taiwan has  in the last year reinstated mandatory conscription and  raised its  defense budget to create greater military deterrence. ² The erratic behavior of Russia has proven a critical factor, showing that autocratic states do not always find economic deterrence sufficient to undermine long standing geopolitical and ideological aims. For China, the acquisition of Taiwan serves two strategic aims in the People Republic of China (PRC)’s pursuit of Chinese unity and expansionism. First, the acquisition of Taiwan would further the PRC’s  efforts to bear down on the South China Sea, given its geographic proximity to the conflict zone. Furthermore, the Taiwan strait is a crucial shipping artery for the nations of South Korea and Japan who use the strait for their trade towards Southeast Asia and beyond the Straits of Malacca. Exerting control over Taiwan would allow China to inhibit transit between the two “poles” of Asia, as well as more effectively project power into the South China Sea in particular. Therefore, Taiwan’s strategic significance to China  makes deterrence essential.

Of course, neither Taiwan’s military spending nor the silicon shield are entirely the reason why China has mostly kept itself to threats. It is the United States, which maintains an unofficial-official relationship with the strait,  that shall come to the defense of Taiwan should China attempt to conquer it. The Trump factor then becomes quite an important concept in understanding the immediate future of Taiwan’s policies. They have signaled an intention to purchase a substantial amount of American military hardware, a product of informal discussions with Trump’s incoming administration to demonstrate that Taiwan is willing to pull its weight for American aid.³ The incoming President’s professed animosity towards China stands at odds with this seemingly transactional incoming administration, and highlights what will likely be a substantial dissonance between rhetoric and practice from the Trump administration.

So where does that leave Taiwan? In the place it has striven to escape, ambiguity. Much like Ukraine, its future is in question due to the often erratic policy of the new commander in chief, which means that, regardless of rhetoric, world leaders are having to prepare for every possibility. This is a pressing and historic task for the current president of Taiwan, William Lai. His administration has seen provocations by China from the first day. Regardless of domestic currents, the heir of Tsai Ing-Wen will have to chart a pragmatic course in a period of insecurity, both brought on by the continuing geopolitical fallout of the Ukraine war and a change to a new administration which cannot be predicted easily.⁴

The future of Taiwan can be roughly predicted by watching four major situations. First, the outcome of the war in Ukraine. How Trump chooses to face Russian threats of escalation for allowance of missile launches at Russian territory as well as possible peace talks will factor into Chinese calculations. They will be watching just how much he is willing to risk for the American interest, and how much he is not willing to risk. If China evaluates Trump as more bluster than action, the risk of a Chinese invasion might increase. Secondly, it will be imperative to watch Taiwanese military readiness and the progression of their defense programs. The outcome of these programs will be important to show not only that Taiwan has the means to defend itself, but that it has the political will necessary for resistance to Chinese aggression in a time of increasing division between those who want independence and those who prefer cross-strait relations to spend large amounts of its budget on the military. Thirdly, Trump’s dealings with key players in Asia like the ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea will set the tone for Western support for Taiwanese independence. If the United States is successful in building an effective containment of China through allies, then China will be far less likely to consider Taiwan to be outside of the American aegis. If this is the case, they may be less willing to pursue serious aggression, unless they are becoming desperate  due to internal reasons or  fears of American Power. This brings us to the fourth key consideration: how Chinese internal politics progress in the near future. Xi’s position is relatively secure for now, but were it to ever become less secure, or the economic rise of China were to truly end, the great power aspirations of China might face a closing window of opportunity, which could drive conflict.

The next administration is unlikely to bring less tension as it views China as an economic and political adversary, and productive relationships are not built on such foundations. Due to this possible further chilling of U.S.-China bilateral ties, while I foresee Taiwan having a path towards maintaining good relations with the USA, I also see the possibility that despite this conflict might be driven by the competition between China and the USA over influence in the Pacific.

Works Cited

1.   “The World China Made “Made in China 2025” Nine years later.” Office of Senator Marco Rubio. September 9th, 2024. https://www.rubio.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/The-World-China-Made.pdf

2. Igor Khrestin, “ The Russo-Ukranian War: Implications for Taiwan.” Global Taiwan Institute. June 28th, 2023. https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/06/taiwanese-perspectives-on-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-and-its-implications/

3. Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan considers big US defense purchases as overture to Donald Trump.” Financial Times. November 10, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/7b218d0f-31dc-4b74-b993-797388767b85

4. Jennifer Staats, “Taiwan’s New President Faces Tensions with China and Domestic Divisions.” United States Institute of Peace. June 6, 2024. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/06/taiwans-new-president-faces-tensions-china-and-domestic-division

5. John Ruwitch, “ From Taiwan to technology, China ponders what’s to come under Trump 2.0.” NPR. November 9, 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/11/08/g-s1-33396/from-taiwan-to-technology-china-ponders-whats-to-come-under-trump-2-0

Photo Credit: Stephen Lam