This article was originally included in our Fall 2024 edition.

Abhinav Poludasu, BA International Relations (Hons.), King’s College London

In 1989, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously wrote in his essay “The End of History?” that liberal democracy triumphed over all other ideologies and that this spread of liberal governance and free-market capitalism is a “pinnacle” of sorts; emphasising that there will be no more challenges to the liberal democratic order. ¹ However, Fukuyama’s thesis was soon debunked as China, an authoritarian state, rapidly grew in the span of just a few decades to become the biggest challenge to the liberal order, even capable of creating an alternative world order. 

This is now seen in full effect with China flexing its muscles in the South China Sea (Sacks 2022, 2). The South China Sea in its entirety is being claimed by China under the historic and controversial “Nine-Dash Line” ² overlapping with the territorial waters of several countries in the region such as Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China has been using a wide range of tactics to deter any nation from interfering in their claims, from constructing artificial islands to installing military bases on them ³, while constantly intimidating smaller opponents by harassing foreign fishing vessels using China’s Coast Guard. Despite the “Nine-Dash Line” having no recognition of legal validity in the international community, China has continued its activities in the region, in the process undermining the very same institutions that the U.S. created in their effort to create a liberal, democratic order.

For these reasons, the Asia-Pacific region has become a crucial region for the U.S., serving as a potential battleground between the two sides. Recognising the challenges that China poses, the U.S. is now increasingly invested in building what we can call a “Democratic Arc” in order to counter China’s growing dominance in the region. This strategy involves establishing alliances with democratic nations present in the region while enforcing the balance of power favouring democratic governance and shunning authoritarianism. This article will try to delve deeper into this concept of a “Democratic Arc”, explaining its necessity and how it can be implemented.

PART I: WHY IS THE ASIA-PACIFIC SO IMPORTANT?

The Asia Pacific is perhaps the most important region in the world, solely due to its immense significance to the broader implications it has on geopolitics and International Relations all over the world.

For starters, the Asia Pacific is an economic powerhouse, with China, Japan, and South Korea being some of the largest economies in the world and countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia being the fastest-growing economies in the world. These countries also have a fast-growing consumer market, contributing significantly to the global GDP. Thus, all the economic activities that occur in the Asia-Pacific have great consequences for global trade and investment. In particular, the South China Sea is one of the busiest maritime routes in the world, with more than $5 trillion worth of trade going through the route, as per data in 2022. ⁴ These routes are very important for the transportation of raw materials, goods, and energy supplies. 

When we think about the geopolitical aspect, the U.S. and China have engaged in a very intense strategic competition in the area. For many years, the US has been a dominant figure, with its network of alliances keeping peace in the region. However, with China’s new-found claims in the region becoming a real threat, it has become more crucial for the U.S. to preserve these alliances and further build new ones in order to ensure regional stability while also preserving the liberal order in the region. Moreover, China has been modernising and strengthening its military, which also means that the flexing of power will be in full effect in the Asia Pacific. It is no secret that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have substantially expanded, thus giving them the ability to project their power and influence in the region. It should be noted here that China has been rapidly developing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD capabilities) to prevent the US from exercising its freedom of navigation in the region. ⁵ It is certainly a shrewd, yet smart move.

PART II: THE NECESSITY OF A DEMOCRATIC ARC:

Building a Democratic Arc in the Asia-Pacific has become really important to the U.S. due to a multitude of factors, the first on authoritarianism.⁶ Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. enjoyed unchallenged, unchecked dominance for a decade, promoting a liberal order that has prominence to capitalism, free market, and human rights. This was the “End of History” that Fukuyama posited. However, this is now being heavily challenged by China’s authoritarian model, which involves centralised political and economic control while emphasising the non-negotiability of the international community interfering in a nation’s internal affairs, which involves basic freedoms and human rights as well. Actions such as the human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the brutal suppression of protests in Hong Kong simply show that China, now a powerful state, does not intend to follow the norms that go against the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) interests.

This non-compliance now threatens to destabilise security in the Asia-Pacific while also severely tipping the balance of power, which brings us to the second factor: regional security. The Asia-Pacific now is home to the two most important yet dangerous flashpoints in the world: the South China Sea and Taiwan. With China employing a range of intimidation tactics as mentioned in the introductory section, the U.S. has come to realise how an alliance of democracies can help deter this aggression and intimidation to further stabilise the balance of power. The alliance can prove to act as a “counterbalance” to China’s behaviours in the Asia-Pacific, also further asserting that the challenge to a liberal order would be met with consequences.

The third factor pertains to economics. Democracies have transparent economic systems and policies that have been approved by the public and further promote capitalism and the free market. This also means that building a democratic arc to keep the democratic alliance together will help create a stable and predictable economic environment, which makes these countries more investor-friendly. Democratic countries can work together for mutual benefit to create an environment that helps improve trade and investment opportunities and cooperation.

PART III: HOW CAN THE DEMOCRATIC ARC BE IMPLEMENTED?

The previous section illustrated how important forming a democratic alliance in the Asia-Pacific is for deterring China’s aggression and preventing the encroachment of China’s authoritarian system in Asia-Pacific geopolitics. Naturally, the first course of action to build this democratic arc is to deepen its already existing alliances with democratic countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. While these bilateral relationships have been strong since their inception, keeping them as strong as possible will have to be one of the U.S. priorities: when everything else breaks, this alliance holds still in its resistance. For example, the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) must become a formal alliance, with a clear agenda, maintain regular contact with each other, and most importantly coordinate their policies to keep the status quo intact. ⁸ The next step involves creating the next layer of resistance through expanding their network to other democracies in the region, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. While the U.S. and the Philippines have the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) which states that both nations will be required to support each other in the event that either nation is attacked, it is imperative that the U.S. must make a similar, if not identical commitment to upholding the status quo in the region and come to their aid when it is disrupted. There are two facets, however, that if upheld, could be the cornerstone to upholding this arc. 

Economic Dependence

One of the most pressing challenges to the success of the Democratic Arc is the entrenched economic dependence of many Southeast Asian nations on China. As the world’s leading manufacturing hub, China has cemented itself as an indispensable economic partner for countries throughout the region. Its extensive supply chains, large-scale production capacity, and competitive pricing have made it difficult for nations like Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to diversify their economic relationships. ⁹ China’s position as a central trade partner is not merely a matter of convenience; its role in these nations’ economies is profound, as it provides crucial markets for exports, a source of affordable imports, and significant investments in infrastructure and technology.

Southeast Asia’s reliance on China complicates the U.S.-led strategy to form a cohesive democratic alliance to counterbalance Chinese influence:

Source: Asia Society (https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/balancing-act-assessing-chinas-growing-economic-influence-asean)¹⁰

Any move toward closer alignment with the U.S. or other democratic nations risks economic retaliation from China, which has a history of using economic leverage as a tool of coercion. ¹¹ This dependence creates a dilemma for Southeast Asian countries, forcing them to balance their economic interests with their geopolitical alignments. For instance, nations that might share concerns about China’s territorial ambitions in the South China Sea or its increasing influence in regional politics may hesitate to publicly confront China for fear of economic repercussions, such as reduced trade or investments.

To mitigate this challenge, the U.S. and its democratic allies must develop comprehensive strategies to provide alternative economic opportunities for these nations, enabling them to reduce their reliance on China without jeopardising their economies. One of the most effective ways to achieve this is through trade agreements that offer favourable terms to Southeast Asian countries. For example, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), though not directly spearheaded by the U.S., present avenues for collaboration in which democratic nations can play a more active role.

Investment in infrastructure is another crucial component of reducing dependence on China. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has significantly enhanced its economic influence in the region, offering much-needed infrastructure financing to developing nations. However, this often comes with strings attached, such as long-term debt or strategic concessions. By providing competitive alternatives through investment in infrastructure projects, particularly in energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure, the U.S. and its allies can help Southeast Asian countries meet their development goals without falling into China’s debt traps. Japan, for example, has taken a leadership role in offering infrastructure development assistance in the region, and the U.S. can expand its role in similar ways. ¹²

Human Rights 

One of the foundational distinctions between the liberal democratic order championed by the United States and the authoritarian model represented by China is the principle of human rights. While democracies, particularly those aligned with the U.S., prioritise individual freedoms, human dignity, and the rule of law, China has consistently demonstrated its willingness to flout international norms regarding human rights when these clash with state interests. ¹³ China remains largely impervious to external pressures due to its economic and geopolitical clout, as illustrated in the previous section of the article. 

For the Democratic Arc to serve as a credible counterweight to China’s authoritarian influence, the U.S. and its partners must emphasise and uphold human rights as a core value of their alliance. This not only differentiates the democratic coalition from its authoritarian counterpart but also serves as a moral imperative in the global struggle between democratic governance and authoritarianism. However, the pursuit of human rights within the context of the Democratic Arc must be both principled and pragmatic to avoid undermining the broader objectives of maintaining regional stability and countering China’s influence.

At the same time, the U.S. must be vigilant about addressing human rights abuses within its own ranks and among its allies. Hypocrisy in this regard could significantly weaken the credibility of the Democratic Arc. For instance, if the U.S. turns a blind eye to human rights abuses committed by allied nations or fails to address its own shortcomings — whether it be issues of racial justice, police brutality, or the treatment of refugees — China and other authoritarian states could exploit these inconsistencies to discredit the U.S. as a global advocate of human rights, as it did in 2023, criticising the U.S’ moral standing in the Israel-Hamas war. ¹⁴ To prevent this, the U.S. must consistently apply pressure on both its adversaries and allies when human rights are at stake, ensuring that its stance is both principled and fair. Acknowledging and rectifying domestic human rights challenges is not only ethically necessary but also critical for maintaining the moral authority of the U.S. on the global stage.

One effective tool in holding foreign officials accountable for human rights abuses is the Global Magnitsky Act, a U.S. law that allows for sanctions against individuals responsible for serious human rights violations. By applying targeted sanctions against those responsible for abuses, regardless of their nationality or political affiliation, the U.S. can send a clear message that human rights violations will not be tolerated. The use of such measures can be expanded to include more comprehensive sanctions regimes that target specific industries or sectors within countries that engage in systemic human rights abuses.

PART IV: PROBLEMS?

Establishing a democratic arc sounds like an ambitious initiative, but that is because it is. Democratic nations in the Asia-Pacific, while sharing the same vision to counter China, have varied interests in priorities, in line with what the people need at the moment. This makes coordination on agreements and preparing for collective action exceedingly difficult, thus threatening to fragment the alliance. To achieve a common ground and implement such collective action, the U.S. and their allies require time to conduct patient diplomacy, for them to build their consensus on small-scale initiatives, gradually broadening their scope over time. Unfortunately, time is the only resource that the alliance lacks. Democratic backsliding in the region is also becoming a growing issue. Countries like Indonesia (Pepinsky 2024) and Malaysia have been steering away from their democratic values over the past few years, which will certainly work to China’s benefit. The U.S. will need to amp up its support for promoting governance reforms while upholding the freedom to free and fair elections (as elicited in previous sections) in order to ensure that these democracies stay put and do not veer further into authoritarianism.

Finally, there is a significant challenge on the U.S.’ behalf as well, which would be Donald Trump’s ascent to the US presidency. As his previous term illustrated in detail, his administration’s “America First” rhetoric has meant that countries dependent on the U.S. for protection will be forced to fend for themselves if Trump comes back to power again, which will prove to be disastrous news for the Asia-Pacific and the democratic arc. Additionally, Trump’s sketchy stance on human rights violations (domestic and international) and his praise for authoritarian leaders such as Putin and Kim Jong Un, not to mention his blatant disregard for democracy in general, certainly will weaken the U.S. authority to promote democracy anywhere, including the Asia-Pacific. 

The establishment of a democratic arc is a testament to the fact that history is far from reaching its end. At this moment, China has the edge in the Asia-Pacific, which has resulted in the creation of this democratic arc. However, there remains a very solid foundation upon which to build. The liberal order won a long war against the Soviet-led communist order because the appeal of democratic governance and a better standard of living trumped views of socialism. By pursuing the same values and enhancing cooperation among democracies, the U.S. is now presented with another opportunity to defeat a challenge to the existing order, perhaps even making Fukuyama’s vision of no more challenges to the U.S.-led liberal order eventually come true.

Works Cited

1.Fukuyama, F. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 10.

2.Wang, Z. “Chinese Discourse on the ‘Nine-Dashed Line’: Rights, Interests, and Nationalism.” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (2015): 502.

3.Sacks, B. “The Political Geography of the South China Sea Disputes.” RAND Corporation (2022): 20.

4.Moulton, T. “Preventing War in the South China Sea.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (2022): 204.

5. Meraner, F. “China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy.” The Defence Horizon Journal (2023)

6.Odell, R. E. “Chinese Regime Insecurity, Domestic Authoritarianism, and Foreign Policy.” In Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order, ed. N. D. Wright, Air University Press (2023): 123.

7. Park, J. J. “The Persistence of the US-led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: An Order Insurance Explanation.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 13, no. 3 (2013): 342.

8. Envall, H. D. P. “Cooperation: Opportunities or Obstacles?” In The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Towards an Indo-Pacific Order? S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (2019): 6.

9. Perez, J. G. “China’s Bid for Leadership in Southeast Asia.” CIDOB Report (2023): 55.

10. Wester, S. “Balancing Act: Assessing China’s Growing Economic Influence in ASEAN”. Asia Society Policy Institute, 2023. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/balancing-act-assessing-chinas-growing-economic-influence-asean

11.Harrell, P., Rosenberg, E., and Saravalle, E. “Annex: Case Studies of Recent Instances of Chinese Economic Coercion over the Last Decade.” In China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures, 41–49. Center for a New American Security, 2018.

12.Berger, B. H. “ASEAN Connectivity and China–Japan Infrastructure Export Competition: Challenges facing ASEAN Integration.” In Financial Cooperation in East Asia, ed. T. Kikuchi and M. Sakuragawa, 97–105. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2019.

13. Lake, D. A., Martin, L. L., and Risse, T. “Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization.” International Organization 75, no. 2 (2021): 226.

14.Aboudouh, A. “China is fixed on discrediting the US on Gaza War. But this policy lacks credibility and will likely fail.” Atlantic Council, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/china-gaza-hamas-israel-war/