This article was originally included in our Fall 2024 edition.
In the 19th century, Britain and China met in two key places: (1) In the British West Indies white planters imported Chinese indentured labor, and (2) In China British and Chinese troops fought over the legalisation of the opium trade. Both meetings, aided by the combination of three different theories of state building: humanitarianism (equivalent to, in the case of the British Empire, humanitarian capitalism), the free market, and Social Darwinism cemented Britain’s empire. This paper first provides background and definition of humanitarianism and Social Darwinism; then, it considers the reasons behind the import of Chinese labourers to the West Indies; and finally, it examines how the Opium Wars reflected and reinforced Britain’s imperial strategies. Ultimately, this will be an exploration of how the interactions between humanitarian capitalism, Social Darwinism, and Adam Smith’s theory of the free market justified efforts to consolidate the British Empire’s hegemony in the 19th Century.
Humanitarianism
Skinner and Lester argue that the expansion of the term “humanity” to include those outside of the white, primarily Anglo-Saxon race, came at the end of the 18th century, when British subjects became “preoccupied with the morality of their society and the need for atonement.” 1 Prior to this, perceived differences based on race, morality, work ethic, etc., set apart the “virtuous” British from the “uncivilised” global south. Humanitarianism, thus, required overcoming these prejudices and recognizing “moral responsibility for and causal connections with distant strangers,” especially those who didn’t look like you. 1
Humanitarian reasoning served as the face of the British abolition movement, and while, for many, national atonement was the intent, reframing the workings of this activity on the macro scale as a strategic tool of imperial policy helps us see the connections between advocacy and state and empire building. Humanitarianism, political administration, and economic gain were thus inherently intertwined; activism was not external to government.
Social Darwinism
With emancipation, came fears of the decline of the Anglo-Saxon race. Charles Darwin’s 1859 publication On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection provided reactionaries and proponents of racial hierarchy a scientific, although misapplied, rationalisation for the successes and failures of different races (here, “races” as ethnic groups or state-belonging). 2 Darwin’s theory of natural selection was applied to the human race and, to a certain extent, humanitarianism was forgotten. The White British Empire’s actions were dismissed as natural or preordained, and the state re-emphasized the British Empire and British superiority. As Helene Lewis put it, “[I]n late 19th century Victorian England, the Über Mensch was an Englishman.” 2
The publication of The Descent of Man in 1871 exacerbated these ideas, and the work was utilised by Social Darwinists as further justification for the pursuit of merciless political policies, both at home and throughout the empire.2 Although this wasn’t a complete return to pre-humanitarianism ideas, it was certainly a renewal of them — in a new form.
The Chinese in the British West Indies: Indentured Labour
Following the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, and the subsequent abolition of slavery in 1833, plantation owners in the British West Indies requested the import of indentured labour to compensate for the shortages created by the emancipation of the Black enslaved population. 3 Although profit loss was the sole concern for the plantation owners, it was considerations around trade and empire-building that persuaded politicians and state officials to approve Chinese indentured labour. Ultimately, 7,904 Chinese labourers were transported to the British West Indies between 1838–1866. 3How did plantation owners, politicians, and humanitarians agree on the same solution?
Thomas Carlyle’s 1849 essay “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question” sheds a light on the first two — plantation owners and politicians. By this time, more than half a century after the 1776 publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, it was clear that trade was vital to the growth of both the importing and exporting states. In his essay, Carlyle laments the use of West Indian land for subsistence farming — specifically pumpkins, which were consumed locally by Black emancipated farmers — and criticises the lack of sugar export from the islands. 4 He highlights the decline in trade as having thrown the white British population into poverty—on both sides of the Atlantic: “West Indian Whites… are far enough from happy; West Indian Colonies not unlike sinking wholly into ruin: at home too, the British Whites are rather badly off; several millions of them hanging on the verge of continual famine.” 4 To some extent, Carlyle’s complaint aligns with Smith’s theory that trade fosters mutual advancement; yet, what is of note is Carlyle’s determination that “the Negroes are all very happy and doing well.” 4 Here, we gain insight into the attitudes of plantation owners toward the free blacks.
An early form of Social Darwinism took shape: stereotypes built on the understanding that different races had different temperaments could be disseminated or learned. China had a history of opening and closing its doors to foreigners, the British included.5 As such, the British had developed a sense of fascination with the Chinese people, which led to the following stereotypes of the Chinese: they loved earning and spending money; they were dedicated to, and skilled at, farming; and their constitution ensured they would be able to withstand the West Indian climate.3 In short, the Chinese worker was the ideal capitalist machine.
On the other hand, the free Black worker was considered lazy, irrational, and unproductive. Following emancipation, the Black population started to be able to prioritise their own interests, and many of whom chose to stay in agriculture elected to pursue subsistence farming. By the mid-1840s, plantation work, now paid, declined by more than 50% when compared to pre-emancipation levels. 3 Despite the centuries of labour that enslaved Blacks had endured — and that Whites profited from — now that labour was no longer given freely, and in some cases not at all, the West Indian Black and Creole population earned themselves the title of “lazy.”
In Carlyle’s essay, we see the British state’s perception: “Not a square inch of soil in those fruitful Isles, purchased by British blood, shall any Black man hold to grow pumpkins for him, except on terms that are fair towards Britain… Not a pumpkin, Quashee, not a square yard of soil, till you agree to do the State so many days of service.” 4 Here, the British State is positioned as the ultimate moral and economic authority, continuing to demand obedience and service despite no longer having “ownership” over the Black population. Further, the description of the West Indies as “fruitful Isles, purchased by British blood” frames the land as British property, earned solely through British sacrifice, thus disregarding the blood spilled by both the native and the Black enslaved populations. Finally, the reference to subsistence farming, such as forbidding Black people from growing pumpkins, highlights the broader anxieties around economic activity and trade. The value of the British West Indies lay in its ability to produce and trade cash crops, primarily sugar, and subsistence farming was viewed as unproductive and a threat to British interests.
Referencing a worker strike in British Guiana in 1848 that protested against a 25% wage cut, Christopher Bischof writes that “the problem was not that [the Black population] had not embraced capitalism. Rather, it was that, from the planters’ perspective, they had embraced the wrong form of it.”3 Smith’s Wealth of Nations declares “The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour.”6 In other words, dividing work into specialised tasks increases each worker’s productive potential, ultimately leading to greater output. This became the rational way to work. According to Bischof, the British applied “moral worth” to this work, seeing the modern free market as compelling “labourers to work for their bread, giv[ing] them opportunities to do so, and reward[ing] them if they worked especially hard.” 3 Subsequently, politicians and plantation owners considered it irrational and lazy that the emancipated Black population refused to abide by the laws of the division of labour and the free market.
Humanitarians, too, were persuaded by components of Social Darwinism. The same stereotypes of the Chinese that appealed to the plantation owners appealed to humanitarians: They were eager to earn money and so would not hesitate in demanding fair and timely pay. 3 In this way, abolitionists felt that indentured labour by the Chinese would not be a return to slavery. In contrast, abolitionists were against Indian indentured labour, which they felt was “coerced,” given India’s place in the British Empire. 3
Politicians, for their part, were heavily convinced by the economic argument espoused in Carlyle’s essay. However, the ties between humanitarian capitalism, perception, and empire-building should not be understated. The end of the slave trade painted the British Empire as a humanitarian empire, and humanitarian capitalism emerged as a key part of British international diplomacy. Not only was Britain’s interest in exporting abolition, and thus humanitarian capitalism, rooted in the resulting expansion of its soft power, but it also ensured that other trans-Atlantic empires faced higher costs, ensuring that Britain’s economy wasn’t the only one struggling. By the 1840s, the Slave Trade Department was established—a section of the Foreign Office dedicated to “anti-slavery diplomacy.” 3As such, West Indian agriculture wasn’t allowed to fail, nor was it allowed to continue exploiting labour: a “public failure of humanitarian capitalism” would erase the perception of Britain as a champion of freedom, undermining its international relations. 3
Ultimately, economic elements, racial stereotypes, and humanitarianism together drew plantation owners, politicians, and abolitionists to the same decision — a want to replace, and teach, the Black workers. And the solution came in the form of importing labour from across the world.
The British in China: The Opium Wars
As defined earlier, Social Darwinism’s rise to popularity came alongside humanitarianism’s decline—the Colonial Office, as well as the British public, were reemphasising “settler development and self-government,” despite the cost to natives. 7 The Empire’s war against China over opium sales was a part of this.
China had always had a contentious relationship with foreign merchants, placing restrictions on their movements within and access to the country. By the time of the Qing dynasty in 1644–1911, foreign merchants were officially confined to trading ports, the cities were prohibited. 5 This allowed China, India, and Britain to become increasingly interlinked. By the 1830s, the East India Company’s (EIC) opium trade with China generated over 20 million silver dollars in annual profit, accounting for about one-fifth of the Indian government’s revenue. 5 When the EIC’s monopoly over the opium trade ended in 1833–34, it reflected the growing belief in the idea that monopolies were stifling progress, aligning with Smith’s theory that free and expansive trade is a key driver of economic growth.6 Britain and Britain’s government in India expected that the end of the monopoly would generate increased revenue, and China’s actions didn’t give them a chance to make that a reality.
The trade and cultivation of opium had been made illegal in China in 1796, due to its crippling effects on the Chinese people. However, smugglers and corrupt local officials worked together to hinder this policy. Finally, in 1839, Governor of Canton Lin Zexu blockaded American and British bases, confiscated over 20,000 chests of opium, and destroyed them in a public display. 5 According to the British, free trade was an inalienable right, and the Chinese government had interfered with the demand for and the supply of opium. Ultimately, the British felt their pride, property, and revenue were at stake.
The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 ended the First Opium War and served as an explicit nod to Britain’s preoccupation with trade. Articles 4–7 of the treaty, unfair to China, forced the nation to pay 21 million dollars to compensate for various losses. 8 However, perhaps more significant, are Articles 2–3: first, for trade, British subjects were permitted to reside in the five ports of Canton (Guangzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), Foochow-fu (Fuzhou), Ningpo (Ningbo), and Shanghai (Shang-hae); second, also for the purpose of trade, the island of Hong Kong was ceded to the Empire as a port to “careen and refit their Ships, when required, and keep Stores for that purpose.” 8 The resolution of the First Opium War provides evidence that opening China to free(er) trade was, at heart, the aim of the war.
Combining British encroachment into China in the First Opium War with the failure of the Chinese indentured labour in the West Indies to meet British expectations, by the time of the Second Opium War, perceptions around the Chinese were changing. The Chinese went from being “quiet, civil, and obliging” to corrupt, treacherous, and even barbaric.5 Their “races” were ranked, with one “race” described as “ugly, with thick yellow skins; all alike, dirty and odoriferous.” 5 On the Origin of Species had just been published, and Social Darwinists used it to justify the actions of military officials in the country — after all, Britain had a responsibility to liberate the Chinese from themselves.
Conclusion
These 19th-century interactions between the British and the Chinese in the West Indies and China demonstrate the extent to which humanitarianism, trade, and forms of Social Darwinism drove the British Empire’s expansion. In the West Indies, Chinese indentured labour was seen as a solution to the island’s declining economy, and when combined with racial stereotyping, helped to cement Britain’s reputation as a humanitarian empire. In China, the Opium Wars served as an indicator of Britain’s insistence on trade as a motivator of growth, and Social Darwinist ideology rationalised the subjugation of the Chinese people as the natural order. Ultimately, humanitarianist ideals bolstered Britain’s reputation, Social Darwinism reinforced its empire, and the pursuit of the free market legitimised its actions. Thus, the 19th Century solidified British hegemony—to the detriment of other populations.
Work Cited:
1. Routledge Skinner, Rob, and Alan Lester. 2012. “Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40 (5): 729–47. doi:10.1080/03086534.2012.730828.
2. Lewis, Helene. “CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL DARWINISM: A Brief Outline of Social Darwinism and its Influence on 19th Century Britain and Elsewhere.” The Journal of Psychohistory 44, no. 2 (Fall, 2016): 154-161. http://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/chapter-2-social-darwinism-br ief-outline/docview/1826244783/se-2.
3. Christopher Bischof, Chinese Labourers, Free Blacks, and Social Engineering in the Post-Emancipation British West Indies , Past & Present, Volume 231, Issue 1, May 2016, Pages 129–168, doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtw015
4. Thomas Carlyle, “Ocassional Discourse on the Negro Question,” cruel.org/econthought/texts/carlyle/carlodnq.html.
5. Louise Tythacott, “British Travels in China during the Opium Wars (1839–1860): Shifting Images and Perceptions” in Britain and the Narration of Travel in the Nineteenth Century, 191–208. Routledge, 2016.,
6. Adam Smith, “Chapter 1” in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3–8. Edinburgh, 1776.,
7. Catherine Hall, “Prologue” in Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830-1867, 23–65. The University of Chicago Press, 2002.
8. “Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking), 1842.” US–China Institute USC, December 28, 1842. china.usc.edu/treaty-nanjing-nanking-1842.
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