This article was originally included in our Fall 2024 edition.

During the 1950s, United Nations Peacekeepers (UNPKs) were characterized by their flagship blue helmets and commitment to stabilizing conflict zones. However, by the 21st century, blue helmets were increasingly associated with human rights abuses, especially sexual violence, often shielded by immunity from international prosecution. If a UNPK officer commits a crime while “on duty,” the United Nations (UN) turns to several avenues – namely, reliance on bilateral agreements, national jurisdictions, and informal UN regulations. These indirect and weak forms of accountability, and the generous immunity peacekeepers possess, have not diminished the ongoing misconduct crisis in UNPK operations. Since 2007, there have been over 4,400 allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation by UNPKs (Horne et al. 2007, 235). Legal instruments, such as prosecution in a peacekeeper’s national judiciary, exist and are in place, though state discretion has limited these trials. With no international legal system to try peacekeepers, the options for pursuing justice are limiting. UN peacekeepers should not be granted immunity from international prosecution; a comprehensive solution requiring the reevaluation and gradual modification of bilateral agreements to eliminate or restrict peacekeepers’ immunity is necessary. By doing so, the UN can strike a balance between operational effectiveness and ensuring UNPKs are held to the highest standards while serving.

The role of peacekeepers has uniquely contributed to multilateralism between states. The first peacekeeping operation (PKO) occurred in Palestine, where UN Security Council Resolution 50 called for a “cessation of hostilities” between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (United Nations 1993, “Staffing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping”). Peacekeepers from countries like China and Finland were deployed to prevent escalation, supervise the armistice, and monitor the ceasefire. This operation, considered a success, led to the launch of 71 subsequent peacekeeping missions (United Nations 2024, “Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet”). Initially acting as buffers between conflicting nations, peacekeepers’ roles evolved as political landscapes changed, beginning with the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) monitoring electoral processes in Namibia. By then, peacekeepers had shifted from enforcers of international law to guides in a nation’s democratic transition (United Nations 1993, “Staffing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping”). Today, with over 120 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) providing personnel for global missions, UN peacekeepers represent not only the United Nations but also a diverse array of nationalities (Lacroix 2024, “Multilateralism in Action”).

Although peacekeepers carry a noble title, they are far from perfect. Arguably, a lack of accountability has exacerbated poor behavior abroad. While this is not to say all peacekeepers are criminals, it is to highlight why a select few perpetrators have evaded the consequences of impropriety. The UN receives thousands of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers, despite its 2003 “zero-tolerance policy” towards SEA (Bah 2023, “The Worst-Kept Open Secret”). Most cases result in little punishment, and prosecutions are rare, as seen when a Senegalese soldier convicted of raping a child in 2016 was merely sent home without facing trial (Askin 2016, “Ending Impunity”). Sexual violence by peacekeepers has been reported globally, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, and the Central African Republic. The situation worsened despite the publication of the Zeid report in 2005, which recommended reforms that have not been effective (Askin 2016, “Ending Impunity”). 

Unfortunately, it is a fact that some peacekeepers intentionally commit transgressions; however, there are also unique instances where UNPKs unintentionally harm the host population. In 2010, after a devastating earthquake, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was retrofitted to assist with relief and reconstruction, but the arrival of 1,075 Nepalese peacekeepers coincided with a cholera outbreak that spread rapidly across the country (Pillinger et al. 2016, 71). Despite initial denials by the UN, investigations later confirmed that the peacekeepers were the source of the epidemic, caused by contaminated sewage from their base. The 2011 UN investigative report argued that multiple factors, including poor sanitation, contributed to the outbreak, and thus did not hold the UNPKs fully responsible for the epidemic (Pillinger et al. 2016, 79). UNPKs’ role has led to calls for accountability, but legal challenges by Haitian citizens for compensation have faced hurdles due to UNPKs’ immunity under international law. Thus, the immunity-impunity conundrum not only generated impropriety, but also stripped victims from the reparative justice they sought. 

According to the European Court of Human Rights, immunity is a “long-standing practice established in the interest of the good working of these organizations,” which helps legitimize the mission of international bodies like the UN (2013, “Mothers of Srebrenica”). This definition operates under the assumption that those protected by immunity are all Good Samaritans with the best of intentions. By granting peacekeepers—representatives of the UN—immunity in situations where there was an unintentional consequence, the UN as an institution is stripped of accountability. The cholera epidemic during MINUSTAH is demonstrative of the UN itself being negligent with its peacekeeper screening process and public health standards. By sweeping the epidemic’s impacts under the rug, the UN absolved itself and the internal institution of all accountability that might have prevented such a disaster from occurring again. Nations with PKOs are often post-conflict societies with weakened public infrastructure. While the blue helmets may arrive to support a nation’s “transition” to peace, like in the case of Haiti, they can leave these nations worse off. 

Peacekeepers’ categorization as military personnel provided by TCCs, police, or civilians determines their level of immunity. According to the UN TCC Guidelines, UNPK officers hold the legal status “accorded to troops” (2008). As such, they have “functional immunity” while carrying out any mission-related task (2008, “General Guidelines”). Immunity is not full or absolute—it only protects peacekeepers from legal implications as long as the wrongdoing they committed was during a mission-related task. Historically, what is considered a mission-related task has been unduly generous. In 2015 the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) found a local peacekeeping staffer allegedly “spying” for Israel and turned the individual to Lebanese authorities (Sheva 2015, “UN hands over ‘Israeli spy’”). Since the Lebanese government, as the host nation, did not have the jurisdiction to try or investigate, they turned to the UN headquarters. According to the UN, since the alleged “spying” did not occur during the individual’s official functions, legal proceedings would not apply. Police forces and civilian UNPKs, often contracted by states directly or through third-party private companies, have the same functional immunity as military personnel. The only difference is they can be tried within the host state’s judicial system, as only military personnel are protected through the TCC Memorandum of Understandings.

The legal protections of peacekeepers and the responsibilities of TCCs to peacekeepers are outlined in Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs). These largely bilateral agreements have a range of obligations, from allowing troops to shop at military stores to describing how a host nation’s laws apply to personnel abroad. A key part of SOFAs is the principle that peacekeepers must follow the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is further emphasized by the Secretary-General’s Bulletin of 1999 (Macura 2013, 145). The bulletin sets out basic IHL rules for UN peacekeepers, like protecting civilians, treating detainees properly, and following “proper” methods of warfare. Enforcing these rules is challenging, because it depends on the countries that contribute peacekeepers and their own national legal systems to uphold them. TCCs typically retain exclusive jurisdiction over their personnel, limiting the UN’s ability to conduct independent investigations (United Nations 1990, “Model Status-of-Forces Agreement”). While the UN can launch fact-finding missions when TCCs are “unwilling or unable” to investigate, there are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. On one hand, the Secretary-General can waive immunity for “serious crimes” and have UNPKs tried in the host country (Askin 2016, “Ending Impunity”). On the other hand, PKOs are typically in nations with failed judicial systems. It would be difficult for this exception to result in valid or consistent results, not to mention the Secretary-General has yet to utilize this tool to date (Razza 2020, 7). 

The reliance on national jurisdiction for UNPK accountability is hindered by both political and practical challenges. States are often reluctant to prosecute their military personnel, particularly for serious crimes like sexual exploitation, abuse, or IHL violations. Hesitation stems from political concerns such as protecting national interests and military autonomy. Governments fear that prosecuting their troops could set a dangerous precedent, jeopardizing their ability to protect forces abroad or exposing them to legal risks in foreign jurisdictions. Furthermore, acknowledging UNPK crimes may raise concerns about potential misconduct by national troops outside of peacekeeping operations. The flexibility of SOFAs, coupled with the national interest in shielding citizens from prosecution, weakens the bilateral agreement system for holding UNPKs accountable, especially where immunity is granted.

The UN has attempted to address the lack of legal repercussions through administrative means. In 2019, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations established “Standards of Conduct” to ensure that UNPKs “adhere to the highest standards of behavior” (United Nations 2024, “Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet”). The initiative was coupled with a three-pronged strategy that included training, “awareness-raising campaigns,” and investigations. Although the standards and strategy laid out a clear blueprint for identifying and addressing misconduct in the long run, it relies on the same legal processes outlined in SOFA agreements between TCCs. Although the UN would play a more active role in investigating claims of misconduct through a “fact-finding assessment” and publicly announcing the verdict of the investigation, UNPKs “remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of their national government” after that point (United Nations 2024, “Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet”). Reliance on national governments for legal jurisdiction undermines the effectiveness of the UN’s efforts, as it results in inconsistent and insufficient legal action against misconduct.

Most international legal scholars agree the legal immunity granted to peacekeepers bars them from international legal prosecution and, as a result, accountability. It is widely accepted that the first step towards ensuring UNPKs are not abusing their role is eliminating their immune status. An incremental approach is required, beginning with the alteration of SOFAs between TCCs that determine the rights and responsibilities of nationals abroad. Since SOFAs are bilateral and mutual agreements between states, terms made within them protect the sovereign equality of states – legitimizing the rule of international law. Within SOFAs, immunity and privileges for peacekeepers are categorized into two types: procedural or functional immunity which blocks adjudication or enforcement jurisdiction, and substantive immunity which blocks legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction (Worster 2008, 297). Without a SOFA, peacekeepers are not automatically granted any of these legal immunities. That is not to say SOFAs should be eliminated—after all, they help secure peacekeepers’ day-to-day privileges outside of legal immunity. However, a reevaluation of the immunity provisions within SOFAs is necessary to strike a balance between protecting peacekeepers’ operational effectiveness and ensuring accountability for any violations of international law. 

In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) developed a “model” SOFA to be used between TCCs and host nations. Under the “jurisdiction” portion of the SOFA, it is clearly stated that “all members of the United Nations peace-keeping operation…shall be immune from legal process” (United Nations 1990, “Model Status-of-Forces Agreement”). 

This language has been incorporated into numerous PKO SOFAs since the 1990s, establishing the concept of immunity as opinio juris for states over the past three decades. As a result, immunity for UN peacekeepers became normalized through “soft law” in the form of these bilateral agreements, eventually leading to the recognition of immunity clauses as customary international law. José Alvarez argues that international organizations bypass traditional state consent requirements in international law through their “hierarchically superior norms” (2018, 81). Therefore, if the UNGA were to pass a model SOFA without immunity protection, they could work toward new customary international law through the creation of these “superior norms.” Although Alvarez’s point that international organizations have a unique role in the creation of soft law is true, state consent is equally as important. If one state were to consent to the reformed UN SOFA, it would lead to others following suit. The eventual acceptance of the new model SOFA would result in a process of “norm creation” incrementally and over time, as seen with the original model. 

SOFAs should be used as a tool to gradually phase out the immunity granted to UN peacekeepers. This approach would ensure that peacekeepers are held accountable for their actions through the UN’s judicial system, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court for criminal offenses, rather than being immune from prosecution due to their position. Róisín Burke argues that the primary justification for granting immunity to military contingents is the concept of “functional necessity,” which is intended to allow peacekeepers to carry out their mission without interference (2011, 80). However, immunity should not be justified purely on this basis. Coupled with the UN’s plans to raise public awareness and implement training programs, these changes would lead to a more just and transnational peacekeeping framework.

The issue of peacekeeper immunity represents a significant obstacle to holding UN personnel accountable for misconduct. Despite the UN’s efforts to address this through various administrative measures, the current state of bilateral agreements and reliance on national jurisdictions has led to insufficient legal action and a culture of impunity. The persistence of immunity in these agreements is a key factor preventing the prosecution of peacekeepers who commit serious crimes while deployed. To foster true accountability, the immunity granted to peacekeepers must be reevaluated, starting with the gradual modification or removal of immunity clauses in SOFAs. By shifting towards a system of qualified immunity with complementary jurisdiction at the international level, the UN could ensure that peacekeepers are held accountable for their actions while still safeguarding the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.

Work Cited:

Alvarez, José E. 2018. “Legal Perspectives.” The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, no. 2. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803164.013.4. 

Askin, Kelly. 2016. “Ending Impunity for Crimes Committed by UN Peacekeepers.” International Bar Association. https://www.ibanet.org/article/cebc5f69-a238-49bb-b85a-5e8d878fe485.  

Bah, Tamara. 2023. “The Worst-Kept Open Secret: Sexual Abuse Crimes Perpetrated by UN Peacekeepers: We Need Criminal Accountability, Not Guidelines, and Blind Eyes.” Harvard Kennedy School Policy Review, (September 11). https://studentreview.hks.harvard.edu/the-worst-kept-open-secret-sexual-abuse-crimes-perpetrated-by-un-peacekeepers-we-need-criminal-accountability-not-guidelines-and-blind-eyes/#:~:text=The%20recognition%20of%20SEA%20by,and%20Pakistani%20peacekeepers%20and%20Oxfam.  

Burke, Róisín. 2011. Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional Immunity, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 16, Issue 1, (Spring). 63–104. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krq022. 

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Macura, Tomas. 2013.  “Accountability and Protection of UN Peacekeepers in Light of MONUSCO.” Die Friedens-Warte 88, no. 3/4: 143–56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23774053. 

Pillinger, Mara, Ian Hurd, and Michael N. Barnett. 2016. “How to Get Away with Cholera: The UN, Haiti, and International Law.” Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1. 70–86. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592715003230. 

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Worster, William Thomas. 2008. “Immunities of United Nations Peacekeepers in the Absence of a Status of Forces Agreement.” The Military Law and the Law of War Review 47, no. 2 (December 2008). 277–365. https://doi.org/10.4337/mllwr.2008.02.03.