This article was originally included in our Fall 2024 edition.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a large-scale global infrastructure project launched by China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013. The span and ambition of the BRI is truly global, with a staggering 147 countries involved in joint projects or expressing interest in participating.¹ With cost estimates of the BRI going as high as $8 trillion, ² the motives behind China’s grandiose investments in this project are called into question. Some actors view this initiative as a strategic ploy to establish a Chinese-centered international trade network, with a few scholars going as far as labeling the BRI as a form of neocolonialism. ³ Other experts see the BRI more positively, viewing the infrastructure projects part of this initiative as being mutually beneficial economically for both China and partnering states.⁴Whether positive or negative though, scholarly analysis of the rationale behind the conception of China’s BRI is often dominated by explanations of material factors. Ideational factors, especially relating to Chinese history, and their influence on China’s contemporary political identity are often overlooked when considering the motives behind the formulation of the BRI. By utilizing a constructivist theoretical approach, this paper will examine how historical ideational factors have shaped China’s national identity and subsequently influenced the conception of China’s One Belt One Road.

In theories of international relations, constructivism emphasizes the importance of ideas, norms, identities, and social interactions in shaping state behavior. ⁵ This theory offers a unique outlook on the international system as it considers ideational factors in contrast to the dominant schools of realism and liberalism that tend to prioritize material factors in their theoretical analyses. Constructivist theory examines the influence of these ideational factors on global actors and how they shape the interests of said actors. Particularly with the behavior of state actors, it is important to consider the ideas and norms that formed their national and social identities. From a constructivist perspective, identities are representations of an actor’s understanding of who they are, which in turn signals their interests.⁵ Ideas, beliefs, and values shape the identities and interests of states, which then manifest in the policy preferences and behaviors of the states within the international system.

The influence of these ideational factors on state behavior in the international system is particularly evident when examining the impact of Chinese history on the country’s modern-day national and social identity. According to official state narratives, Chinese civilization extends back to 5000 years in the past. ⁶ While this origin date perpetuated by the Chinese government is contested by some historians, there is a general consensus that a unified Chinese identity has existed throughout millennia. The longevity of Chinese history, along with the myriad of technological and societal achievements associated with ancient Chinese civilization, produces a sense of “historical greatness” that vindicates state narratives of national pride.⁷ This feeling of pride derived from China’s “historical greatness” has contributed to a belief of exceptionalism surrounding the Chinese identity that Senior Researcher Andreas Forsby from the Danish Institute for International Studies characterizes as: “a belief that Chinese civilization constitutes a unique culture in some senses superior to that of other civilizations.” ⁷ This belief in Chinese exceptionalism surrounding its history is heavily present in the formulation of China’s national and social identity, as evidenced by the veneration of ancient Chinese civilization by the state.

However, the notion of Chinese historical greatness was greatly diminished during a period between the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries referred to by Chinese popular culture as the century of humiliation. This period was characterized by a sharp power decline of the Qing Dynasty from a variety of factors beginning with a defeat against the British in the First Opium War (1839-1842).⁷ From Western powers divvying up Qing China into spheres of influence to the encroachment of Imperial Japanese forces deep into Chinese territory, China was forced into an unequal and “humiliating” relationship with its intrusive imperial powers. It took until the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 for a Chinese state rid of foreign intrusion to be established, though the nation was left in an incredibly weak and impoverished state. ⁷ The major decline of the Chinese state during the century of humiliation instilled a sense of shame and embarrassment that Dr. Forsby describes as an “inferiority complex that has mostly manifested itself as revanchism directed at the Western powers.”⁷

The significant national demoralization from the century of humiliation coupled with a sentiment of historical greatness and exceptionalism elicits both feelings of inferiority and superiority, respectively, relative to other world powers. These ideational beliefs, when combined, create an attitude within the Chinese government aimed at reviving Chinese civilization to its former historical glory. ⁷ This attitude is especially apparent within Xi Jinping’s administration, as evidenced in a speech made by the Chinese president where he asserted “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people.” ⁸ National rejuvenation is a cornerstone of Xi Jinping’s ideological doctrine, and this rejuvenation includes China reasserting itself within the international system. Xi Jinping’s ideological vision for China, often referred to as Xi Jinping Thought, is a set of Ten Definites that characterize key points of his political doctrine, with the eighth “definite” being “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics should promote the building of a new type of international relations and the building of a community of common destiny for mankind.”⁹ As evidenced by this clause in Xi’s Ten Definites, establishing and maintaining a dominant and influential role in the international sphere is paramount to his vision of a Chinese national rejuvenation. In the eyes of Xi’s administration, reviving the Chinese nation to its so-called historical greatness from its embarrassment during the century of humiliation requires China to exert its influence on the global stage.

Sentiments of exceptionalism derived from the prosperity of ancient Chinese civilization and feelings of inferiority from unequal treatment during the century of humiliation have deeply transformed China’s national and social identity. As evidenced by pervasive state narratives of national rejuvenation, these historical influences have heavily shaped the Chinese state’s perception of itself and its interests. The belief in China’s “historical greatness” instills the idea that China should be respected as a great power, though the memory of shame from the century of humiliation creates a sentiment that the state must reclaim its position as a central actor in the international system to gain said respect.⁷ As previously established, constructivist theory asserts that identities represent an actor’s understanding of who they are which in turn signals their interests. ⁵ Therefore, China’s historical experiences indirectly influence the interests of the Chinese nation via its transformation of the state’s national and social identity, resulting in the formulation of a national interest bent on reasserting itself within the international world order. This interest is reflected in Xi’s ideological commitment to national rejuvenation, which has subsequently manifested in the domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese state.

 One of the most prominent examples of the manifestation of China’s identity-driven interests from its history is the BRI. Launched by Xi Jinping in 2013, China’s Belt and Road (also known as One Belt, One Road) Initiative is a large-scale global infrastructure project to create a modern iteration of the overland Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road. ¹⁰ The influence of the ideational concept of Chinese “historical greatness” is incredibly overt in official state documents on the BRI, with a myriad of references to the historic Silk Road. The ancient Silk Road arose as a result of the Han Dynasty’s westward expansion into Central Asia, spurring trade between Western powers and China.¹⁰ Due to its contribution to the economic prosperity of the Han Dynasty, the Silk Road is highly venerated within Chinese popular culture. The official text of the BRI’s action plan outlines a so-called “Silk Road Spirit” that for two millennia has fostered “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.”¹⁰ From the very concept of an overland trade route to the various mentions of the ancient Silk Road in state documents, Xi’s vision for the BRI very much draws inspiration from this cultural hallmark of China’s history. 

However, one of the main driving factors of the ethos behind the conception of China’s BRI is China’s identity-based interest in reasserting itself on the international stage. As previously established, ideational factors rooted in history have shaped the national interests of the Chinese state to prioritize the revival of the nation to its former historical glory, as evidenced in the prevalent state rhetoric surrounding national rejuvenation. The BRI is an integral component of Xi Jinping’s vision for said rejuvenation, which he calls the “Chinese dream.” ⁸ More specifically, the BRI is the policy manifestation of the eighth “definite” in Xi Jinping Thought that is focused on great power diplomacy to create an international “community with a shared future for mankind. ¹¹ This is demonstrated in the rhetoric of the “Silk Road Spirit” of mutual understanding and economic benefit in the BRI’s official action plan that mirrors Xi’s vision for the eighth “definite” of “building a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness, inclusiveness.” ¹¹
Thus, the BRI is a brainchild of Xi Jinping Thought and a keystone of the Chinese president’s vision for national rejuvenation in terms of foreign policy. The large-scale global infrastructure investments through the BRI are one of the key avenues the Chinese state hopes to utilize to regain the influence and respect on the international stage that it lost during the century of humiliation. The BRI contributes to the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation not only through its domestic economic benefits but also by bolstering China’s reputation and power in the international sphere. 

The amelioration of China’s soft power via the BRI can already be easily observed. As mentioned before, an astounding 147 states are involved in BRI-affiliated projects or have expressed interest in joining the initiative. ¹  With around three-quarters of the world’s countries expressing interest in or actively participating in the BRI, the Chinese government wields a large amount of leverage and influence among these states. Having already spent $1 trillion on this initiative, the opportunity to be on the receiving end of this enormous investment by the Chinese government is attractive to many state actors.¹² Through this exorbitant spending and investment via the BRI, China has been able to gain favorable standings among many governments and regimes around the world, even among states that would traditionally not have aligned with the Chinese government. For example, the successful partnership on the revitalization of the Port of Piraeus in Greece heavily improved China’s respect and favor with the Greek state. ⁴  However, public opinion on Chinese investment doesn’t always reflect the sentiment of the regime in the host country, as it tends to be more negative compared to government narratives. For example, while the Greek state government is very favorable towards Chinese investment, the public perception of China in Greece is more of a mixed bag with only around half of the populace viewing China favorably. ¹³  Nonetheless, there are still countries with ongoing infrastructure projects funded by the BRI where the general public shares the same positive sentiments of their state’s government towards Chinese investment. In Laos, public opinion regarding the BRI-funded Vientiane-Boten Railway is overwhelmingly favorable, with some commenting the railway is “transforming peoples’ lives,” while in Ethiopia four-fifths of the citizens see the Chinese as “friendly development partners.”^14,15 On aggregate, even among non-participant countries, the perception of the BRI is generally positive in most regions of the world (though there is considerable variation on the individual state level).¹⁶ From this data, it can be inferred that the BRI has, to some extent, succeeded in fulfilling China’s national interests in regaining respect and extending the state’s influence on the international stage. 

While ideational factors heavily influence the BRI, the significant role material factors have played in its conception cannot be ignored. Despite the prevalent ideological rhetoric of cooperation and benefit in the BRI’s official action plan, the primary goal of the BRI is to increase China’s material and economic power. If the BRI wasn’t economically beneficial for the Chinese economy, there would be little reason to justify the exorbitant spending and allocation of resources by Xi’s administration to this initiative. Additionally, many critics of the BRI question the motives of the project, rejecting the altruistic state narrative of the “Silk Road Spirit” of mutual understanding and win-win cooperation. These critics cite potentially exploitative practices employed by Chinese investors in the BRI, such as debt-trap diplomacy, and argue that the idea of “win-win cooperation” in some infrastructure projects is nonexistent, equating the initiative to a form of neocolonialism. ¹⁷ From a realist perspective, China’s BRI would be seen solely as a product of great power competition within an anarchic international system as China attempts to increase its relative material power via strategic foreign investment. ⁵

While material factors have admittedly played a considerable role in the BRI’s formulation, reducing the rationale behind China’s BRI to solely material explanations erroneously ignores the deep-rooted ideational factors that have shaped its conception. From the influence of a perceived Chinese “historical greatness” on Xi’s vision for national rejuvenation to the direct inspiration drawn from the ancient Silk Road, ideational factors shaped by China’s history have had a profound influence on the inception of the BRI. From a constructivist theoretical approach, identities are representations of an actor’s understanding of their own self, which in turn signals their interests. The ideals of Chinese exceptionalism and humiliation derived from history have indubitably altered China’s national and social identity, thereby transforming the Chinese state’s perception of itself. These ideational influences on China’s identity shape the state’s interest in reclaiming its ‘historical greatness’ by restoring the power and influence lost during the century of humiliation. The Chinese state’s identity-based interests have manifested in its rhetoric of national rejuvenation, which has translated into its behavior and policies on the international stage, most notably with the BRI. Even when accounting for material factors, the core ethos behind the BRI is a widely popular normative desire among the Chinese public and government to reacquire its former historical glory. The prevalence of ideological motives behind China’s BRI affirms the importance of ideas, norms, identities, and social interactions in shaping state behavior, thus vindicating the validity of the constructivist theoretical approach. Specifically with examining the role of historical norms and ideas in shaping state behavior, China’s BRI serves as an optimal case study due to the notable influence of historical ideational factors in the initiative’s conception. Overall, the role of history in shaping the BRI highlights the profound impact that historical narratives and ideational factors can exert on state behavior within the international system.

Work Cited:

1. Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated January 28, 2020.

2.Gaines, Jeremy. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Heightens Debt Risks in Eight Countries, Points to Need for Better Lending Practices.” Center For Global Development. Last modified March 4, 2018.

3. Kleven, Anthony. “Belt and Road: Colonialism with Chinese Characteristics.” The Interpreter. Lowy Institute. Published May 6, 2019.

4. Varoufakis, Yanis. “China is the Real Deal.” Speech, October 27, 2017. Project Syndicate. 

5.Steven L. Lamy et al., essay, in Introduction to Global Politics, 7th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2022), 84-133, 126.

6. Jinping, Xi. “Speech by Xi Jinping at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China.” Transcript of speech delivered at Tiananmen Square, Beijing, China, July 1, 2021.

7. Forsby, Andreas B. “The Non-Western Challenger? The Rise of a Sino-Centric China.” (Danish Institute for International Studies, No. 16, 2011).

8.Jinping, Xi. “Achieving Rejuvenation Is the Dream of the Chinese People.” Transcript of speech delivered at the “The Road to Rejuvenation” Exhibition, Beijing, China, November 29, 2012.

9. “Ten Definites 十个明确.” China Media Project. April 12, 2022.

10. State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. June 20, 2017.

11.  China Aerospace Studies Institute. Basic Issues of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. 2023.

12. Wei, Lingling. “China Reins In Its Belt and Road Program, $1 Trillion Later.” Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2022.

13. Stroikos, Dimitrios. “China’s Engagement with Greece under the BRI: Economics, Politics, and International Imperatives.” In Rising Power, Limited Influence: The Politics of Chinese Investments in Europe and the Liberal International Order, edited by Indrajit Roy and others. Oxford University Press, 2024.

14. Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, and Zikri Rosli. 2023. “Laos-China Infrastructure Cooperation: Legitimation and the Limits of Host-Country Agency.” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 12 (1): 32–58.

15. Yan, Hairong, and Barry Sautman. “China, Ethiopia and the Significance of the Belt and Road Initiative.” The China Quarterly 257 (2024): 222–247. 

16. Xu, Jianwei and Alicia Herrero. “Countries’ Perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Big Data Analysis.” Bruegel. February 6, 2019.

17. Kleven, Anthony. “Belt and Road: Colonialism with Chinese Characteristics.”