What started as a surprise full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 has now persisted for over three years, with an estimated cost of 40,000 civilian casualties and 12.7 million people in need of humanitarian aid. Russia’s escalation of aggression in Ukraine was meant to only last ten days and lead to Ukraine’s annexation by August 2022. However, Ukraine’s resilience – despite its conventional military disadvantages in manpower and artillery – has reshaped the conflict into a war of attrition and endurance. 

Before we can assess the strength of Ukraine’s position, it is important to understand how it leverages its weaponry against a larger enemy. With a manpower shortage of roughly 400,000 active-duty personnel and a fraction of Russia’s tanks, artillery, and surface-to-air missiles, Ukraine’s asymmetric defense strategy relies on the use of developing military technologies. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are their most prominent instruments and play a major role in gathering intelligence, intercepting enemy drones, destroying enemy targets, and bypassing Russia’s air defenses. Ukraine’s new unmanned sea drones have also inflicted damage to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, forcing its ships away from the Crimean Peninsula. 

While artillery and armored vehicles are still relevant, combat power has decreased: Ukraine’s deployment of drones to create defensive corridors makes large-scale offensive operations by the enemy difficult due to a multilayered defense known as the “drone wall.” Russian soldiers increasingly employ more mobile forms of transport, such as motorcycles, to achieve smaller advances and create smaller-value targets. In 2024, Ukraine manufactured 2.2 million first-person view (FPV) drones and 100,000 long-range UAVs. Russian President Vladimir Putin has called to match Ukrainian production, and this technological arms race has created a battlefield that doubles as a laboratory for modern warfare innovation. 

 During Russia’s initial annexation of Crimea in 2014, the most commonly used drone was the Chinese DJI Mavic. The Mavic was efficient and effective for reconnaissance, but the cheaper FPV drones have become the new standard for both sides. Contemporary drones also have the advantage of fiber-optic cable data links as opposed to a radio-controlled system, which makes signal jamming more difficult and enables them to evade electronic warfare systems—an asset exploited by Russia to overcome Ukrainian defenses before launching attacks with help from trade with Chinese manufacturers. 

In addition to the FPVs, which have a typical range of up to 15 kilometers, Ukraine has a fleet of long-range drones capable of making deeper strikes into Russian territory, as well as “kamikaze” drones that serve a similar function to land mines, latently hovering over the battlefield and self-destructing when a target appears. Meanwhile, Russia employs the highly accurate Shahed drone, imported from Iran, in conjunction with missiles and glide bombs to launch attacks with a range of up to 1,500 kilometers. The Shaheds have an estimated production cost of $50,000-70,000, a stark contrast to the hundreds of thousands of dollars necessary to produce a missile. In essence, modern warfare is shifting toward the use of accessible and cost-effective technologies that level the playing field for smaller powers.

These investments by the belligerent countries in UAV development are not going to waste. An estimated 70% of casualties on both sides are inflicted via drones, and a February 2025 study by the Royal United Services Institute states that drones account for 60-70% of damaged or destroyed Russian military systems. Long past are days when humans faced each other directly on the battlefield; today, the routine of warfare is depersonalized, with expendable machines delivering devastation with precision and detachment. On June 1, 2025, a fleet of 117 smuggled Ukrainian FPV drones damaged 40 of Russia’s military aircraft, including strategic long-range bombers critical to Russia’s campaign of missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The success of the drones, valued at $600-$1,000 per unit, is another indication of the shift towards mass-produced and cost-effective technologies in land wars.

Additionally, one of the largest innovations in drone warfare is the use of artificial intelligence, which was likely instrumental in the aforementioned Ukrainian attack. FPV drones are AI-integrable, and Ukraine increasingly uses semi-autonomous target guidance to evade Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities and overwhelm its defenses. Ukraine also uses AI to process drone data and identify targets on a map; according to the country’s deputy defence minister, Yuriy Myronenko, the military “gets more than 50,000 video streams [from the front line] every month which are analysed by artificial intelligence.” Both sides employ AI integration technology, allowing drones to lock onto a target and complete their mission even if the operator loses signal. The lack of a human element is worrying in two respects: AI does not possess the moral and emotional checks that might otherwise prevent unnecessary loss of life, and it is unclear whether human or AI is accountable for scenarios where a strike harms civilian lives.

However, despite the risks, the quest for the strongest and smartest UAV marches on. New drone software further allows for the automatic detection of enemy targets. Ukrainians have intercepted a Russian drone thought to be invulnerable to jamming because it neither sends nor receives signals; the drone had the potential to find and identify targets autonomously. AI-powered Ukrainian interceptor drones, such as those built by former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt, have also played a role in detecting and neutralizing Russian Shaheds. There are hopes of the eventual development of fully autonomous drones: In the words of Yaroslav Azhnyuk, the chief executive of Ukrainian robotics autonomy company The Fourth Law, “All a soldier will need to do is press a button on a smartphone app…the drone will do the rest.”

However, the use of AI in target recognition and navigation presents significant dangers; indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned against the AI arms race. In September of 2024, a semi-autonomous Russian Shahed kamikaze drone struck a medical facility in Sumy, Ukraine. Such an attack violates international humanitarian law (IHL), which mandates the distinction of civilians from combatants, but it is unclear whether AI or human intervention is to be blamed. Meanwhile, AI-enabled drone swarms, such as those deployed by Ukraine, which are able to decide independently of the operator to strike first, pose a threat to the transparency and accountability of warfare. As military technology and autonomous weapon systems (AWS) continue to advance, deterrence strategies will also need to evolve in order to prevent vertical escalation that intensifies levels of violence and has the potential of igniting nuclear war. 

Historically, deterrence by denial and by punishment have represented two main defensive strategies used by the United States. The latter threatens unacceptable, large-scale devastation for the enemy and the direct risk of vertical escalation, while the former asserts the ability to repel an enemy attack. In addition, the traditional nuclear triad consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers ensured mutual second-strike capability, allowing for retaliation to nuclear attacks even when a part of the triad is destroyed.  

Nonetheless, the advancement of drones and new weapons-targeting technology, bolstered by AI integration, puts into question the continued reliability of these traditional deterrence structures for multiple reasons. As evidenced by the June 1 attack, the accuracy, low cost, and relative speed of drones make them ideal for disarming strikes. Precedent exists for these tactics—in 2020, Azerbaijan’s drone fleet destroyed Armenia’s air defense and weapons systems in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, other initiatives such as China’s hypersonic missile development program, seen as far ahead of that of the United States, have produced delivery systems capable of traveling at five times the speed of sound. If accurately targeted at national command centers, they have the potential to neutralize second-strike capability. In order for the United States to maintain credible deterrence by denial, some have proposed a shift to a “nuclear pentad,” incorporating layered missile and air defense systems.

Additionally, drones are often seen as precursors to larger attacks and can trigger preemptive strikes by the opposing side. AI-boosted attacks promise to carry even greater speed, increasing the attractiveness of preemptive first-strike strategies and heightening the risk of escalation. The accessibility and affordability of drones also increases their potential for use by non-state actors such as terrorist groups. This makes the threat of deterrence by punishment harder to execute, as such actors may welcome escalation of violence and often lack specific assets that can be targeted in retaliation. Though AI does have the potential to strengthen deterrence by providing a more effective counter for disarming strikes, but an autonomous aerial defense system can also increase the likelihood of accidental escalation. In addition to their greater susceptibility to cyberattacks, algorithmic errors may lead to miscalculations that trigger a nuclear response.

While the military effectiveness of drones and other recent technological advancements such as AI have been made clear in the Russo-Ukrainian war, their true impacts may not be clear until deterrence itself is tested. In the meantime, such technology opens both new vulnerabilities and unprecedented offensive capabilities, changing the nature of warfare and challenging traditional deterrence strategies.

Work Cited

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