Economic competition between the U.S. and China is at the core of 21st-century geopolitics. At the forefront of China’s economic expansion is a series of investments in overseas infrastructure projects known collectively as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s expanding influence abroad reshapes the balance of power and threatens U.S. global hegemony. In 2022, the U.S., along with key allies, launched its own investment campaign, the Group of Seven’s Partnership for Global Investments and Infrastructures (PGII). Both the BRI and PGII seek to expand their countries’ influence through infrastructure projects in developing nations, particularly in African nations. As economic investment in African countries continues to grow, there must be a critical analysis of development projects. This article will explore infrastructure projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to show how they are at the center of a great power rivalry and the humanitarian costs that accompany it.

Southern Africa’s natural resources are crucial to the manufacturing of electric vehicles (EVs), among other vital technologies. Together, Zambia and the DRC hold approximately 70% of the world’s cobalt, while Angola provides not only natural resources but also a key shipping port.¹ Much like battles over developing countries’ resources during the Cold War, Southern Africa has become a battleground for U.S.-China competition. In 2023, following a PGII meeting, the U.S. and EU released a statement announcing plans to partner with Zambia, Angola, and the DRC to conduct feasibility studies to revitalize the Lobito Corridor, a railway connecting Angola’s port of Lobito to southern DRC and northern Zambia.² The Lobito Corridor project would develop an existing rail line to facilitate the transfer of cobalt from mines to the western coast. The railway project is key to America’s efforts to counter China’s grip on natural resources in the DRC. Not only is cobalt crucial for EV manufacturing, but it is also essential for military technologies. According to the U.S. Army War College, China’s control of this mineral poses “direct and indirect implications for American national security.”³ The importance of the corridor project is further underscored by its exclusion from the Trump administration’s budget cuts.

Funding cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been devastating worldwide, but especially in the DRC. In 2024, the U.S. provided $1 billion in humanitarian aid to the DRC, making up the overwhelming majority of the $1.3 billion the country receives annually.⁴ The cuts to this foreign aid have had immense humanitarian consequences. Physicians for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization (NGO), reported an increase in maternal deaths, surges in monkeypox, malaria, and tuberculosis, and a shortage of treatments for victims of sexual abuse.⁵ While cutting USAID in the name of saving money, the Trump administration pledged $500 million to continue the Lobito project.⁶ The U.S.’s promise to continue funding the Lobito Corridor amid an administration that prioritizes budget cuts underscores the importance of infrastructure projects. Western funding of the project also marks a geopolitical shift, as China had been the active player in rebuilding the railway since 2006.

China’s renovations of the Lobito Corridor railway began in 2006 with a $2 billion loan to the Angolan government. Renovations of the railway started in 2006 and continued until 2014.⁷ The shift in Lobito Corridor funding came in 2023, when the U.S. outbid Chinese state-owned companies CITIC Group and China Railway 20th Bureau Group.⁸ Although the renovations to this railway will allow cobalt to be shipped more efficiently to the U.S. and Europe, they do not change the underlying issue of China owning 80% of the DRC’s cobalt output. In addition to developing transportation infrastructure, the U.S. is also interested in extraction projects.

Alongside cobalt, the mineral tantalum also plays a key role in technology development. The DRC and Rwanda hold heavily concentrated tantalum reserves. Rubaya, a town on the eastern side of the DRC, holds crucial deposits of tantalum. However, since April 2024, the mines in the city have been controlled by the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group. The U.S. is currently in the process of facilitating a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda while also engaging in talks with European companies Mercuria Energy Group and TechMet to grant them access to the mines once the countries establish peace.⁹ America’s interest in accruing financial capital demonstrates that its intervention is by no means altruistic. President Trump’s continued efforts to foster peace in the region depend on these companies being granted access to the DRC’s tantalum deposits. Alongside economic benefits, both the Lobito Corridor project and the desire to secure the DRC’s tantalum are attempts by the U.S. to bring the DRC out of China’s influence.

China is taking an active role against the U.S.’s continued efforts in the DRC. In January 2023, the Chinese consortium Sicomines agreed to a seven billion dollar infrastructure project in the DRC.¹⁰ This infrastructure deal stems from a push by the DRC’s President Félix Tshisekedi to renegotiate a 2008 infrastructure and mining agreement. However, the new deal does not appear to address many of the President’s concerns about imbalance, nor does it guarantee oversight to ensure that China fulfills its financial commitment. The latter here is especially notable: an auditor claimed that between 2008 and 2023, Sicomines only invested $833 million in infrastructure, despite promising to invest $3 billion.¹¹ Alongside continuing to mine in the DRC, China is in the process of revitalizing the TAZARA railway connecting Zambia to ports in Tanzania.¹² Although the original Mao-era railway currently ends in Zambia, China’s $1 billion investment could easily extend it into the DRC. The project, announced in February 2024, is a clear rival to the U.S.’s Lobito Corridor. The competing railways transport cobalt from the same region in opposite directions: Lobito heading west to the U.S. and Europe and TAZARA heading east to China. Looking ahead, the success of these two railways could predict who wins the battle for the DRC’s minerals.

American and Chinese statements about mining and infrastructure assisting the DRC’s development should not be taken at face value. There is a long history of child labor usage and inhumane conditions in the DRC’s cobalt mines that are often dismissed by international corporations. There are two forms of cobalt mining, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) and large-scale mining (LSM). ASM operates much more informally than LSM, and the lack of regulation often results in environmental degradation and the use of child labor. Although estimates vary, approximately 10-20% of cobalt mined in the DRC comes from ASM.¹³ Both China and the U.S. have faced accusations of sourcing ASM cobalt. In 2019, several U.S. tech companies, including Apple, Google, Microsoft, Dell, and Tesla, were named in a class-action lawsuit filed by International Rights Advocates (IRAdvocates) on behalf of the families of children who were killed or injured in DRC cobalt mines. The lawsuit claimed that these tech companies “aided and abetted” a supply chain that forced children into manual labor.¹⁴ Two years later, the lawsuit was dismissed because the court deemed the defendants were too far removed from the use of child labor to be directly implicated.¹⁵ This court case highlights a key issue that ASM cobalt is difficult to trace and often ends up in LSM supply chains. Manufacturers who claim not to use cobalt mined by children likely still do. Despite ongoing efforts to ‘formalize’ ASM production, which would grant miners legal status, many informal ASM producers still sell cobalt to markets called dépôts, who then sell it to LSM companies.¹⁶ Such a system results in all parties who use cobalt mined in the DRC benefiting from child labor. Since the Lobito Corridor and TAZARA railways are being built with the explicit intent to export cobalt, their development is likely to further perpetuate the use of child labor in cobalt mining.

Along with the criticisms about using child labor, China and the U.S. have also been critiqued for the form of their investments in the DRC. The U.S. and China’s investment contracts in the DRC often include different stipulations, demanding various degrees of influence in the country. The U.S. frequently offers conditional loans requiring the DRC to implement political reforms and anti-corruption measures, while China’s loans do not demand governmental changes.¹⁷ Both systems are subject to their own critiques. The U.S. system is often labeled as neocolonial, as many view it as an outside power interfering with the domestic sovereignty of another nation. There have also been empirical examinations of conditional loans. In a study published in the Journal of International Relations and Development, researchers evaluated conditional loans made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and found that the loans often make poverty worse while having a limited impact at best.¹⁸

Alternatively, China investing without demanding political reforms means it is willing to, and frequently does, collaborate with corrupt and abusive governments. As South African researcher Claude Kabemba puts it: “It is a contradiction for China to suggest that it is helping the DRC through commercial ties and not paying attention to the importance of building vital…institutions that are supposed to manage the benefits of the same commercial ties.”¹⁹ The critiques of both systems place the DRC in a lose-lose situation, since partnering with either the U.S. or China entails drawbacks. While the loan conditions vary, the Lobito Corridor and the TAZARA railway are also subject to the critique that they are infrastructure designed to benefit foreign powers without consideration for local needs. Arguably, the most beneficial form of foreign investment the DRC could receive would be the development of refineries.

Before a company can manufacture cobalt into batteries or other electronic devices, it must undergo a refining process. Currently, China owns the majority of refineries, and in 2019, it held a 67% global market share of refined cobalt.²⁰ China’s dominance in the market poses a challenge for both the DRC and the U.S. For the U.S., China’s dominance in cobalt refining makes it harder for American corporations to enter the global cobalt market. For the DRC, the vertical integration results in the majority of cobalt’s profits ending up in other countries. By building their own refineries, the DRC could break this cycle of dependency. The DRC has long been unable to increase its refining capabilities due to technical, economic, and energy requirement barriers.²¹ As it seeks to weaken China’s effective monopoly on refined cobalt, the U.S. could benefit from supporting the DRC’s investment in domestic refineries. If the U.S. were to assist the DRC in refining its own cobalt, it would reduce the DRC’s reliance on China and possibly open it up to preferential trade agreements with the US.²² Such investments could be mutually beneficial for both the U.S. and the DRC.

The U.S. and China are currently in an economically and geopolitically significant battle over the DRC’s natural resources in a race to develop new technologies. Infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor and TAZARA railway are the key projects of this decade. While examining these investments, it is crucial to remember the local impacts and the broader geopolitical rivalry. Developing domestic refining capabilities seems to be in both the DRC’s and the U.S.’s interest. If the U.S. stays aggressive in countering Chinese expansion, one can expect American involvement in the DRC to grow.

Works Cited

1. Maria Adele Carrai, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging US-China Rivalries in Africa: The Case of the Lobito Corridor,” Global Policy 16, no. 4 (2025): 739–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70055.

2. U.S. Embassy in Luanda, “Joint Statement from the United States and the European Union on Support for Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Commitment,” U.S. Embassy to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe, September 9, 2023, https://ao.usembassy.gov/usa-and-the-european-union-supports-angola-zambia-and-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-commitment-to-further-develop-the-lobito-corridor/.

3. Farrell Gregory and Paul J. Milas, “China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A New Dynamic in Critical Mineral Procurement,” US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute, October 17, 2024, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/3938204/china-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-a-new-dynamic-in-critical-mineral/.

4. Michel Kayomo Kaswa, Marcel Yotebieng, and Jean-Jacques Muyembe-Tamfum, “The Democratic Republic of Congo and Global Health Security: The Indispensable Role of the United States of America,” CMI Communications 2, no. 3 (2025): 105083, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmicom.2025.105083.

5. Physicians for Human Rights, Abandoned in Crisis: The Impact of U.S. Global Health Funding Cuts in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (July 2025), https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/PHR-Research-Brief-Aid-Cuts-DRC-2025.pdf.

6. Miguel Gomes, “US Committed to Funding Angola’s Lobito Rail Corridor despite Spending Cuts, Diplomat Says,” Reuters, April 3, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-committed-funding-angolas-lobito-rail-corridor-despite-spending-cuts-diplomat-2025-04-03/.

7. Carrai, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging US-China Rivalries in Africa.”

8. Carrai, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging US-China Rivalries in Africa.”

9. William Clowes and Michael J. Kavanagh, “Mercuria Sizes Up Congo Coltan Mine as Trump Pursues Peace Deal,” Bloomberg, November 10, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-10/mercuria-sizes-up-congo-coltan-mine-as-trump-pursues-peace-deal.

10. Gregory and Milas, “China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

11. Gregory and Milas, “China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

12. Gregory and Milas, “China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

13. World Bank, “Cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” June 2021, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099500001312236438/pdf/P1723770a0f570093092050c1bddd6a29df.pdf.

14. Harry Dempsey, “Tech Giants Sued over Child Deaths in DRC Cobalt Mining,” Financial Times, December 16, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/3ab6b934-202e-11ea-92da-f0c92e957a96.

15. Maria Piontkovska Nguenang Doriane, “US Court Dismissed Cobalt Mining Forced Labor Lawsuit Against Tech Companies,” Global Supply Chain Compliance, November 18, 2021, https://supplychaincompliance.bakermckenzie.com/2021/11/18/us-court-dismissed-cobalt-mining-forced-labor-lawsuit-against-tech-companies/.

16. World Bank, “Cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

17. Gauri Khanna, “China in the DRC: Fuelling Progress or Deepening Regional Conflict?,” The London Globalist, January 2, 2025, https://www.thelondonglobalist.org/post/china-in-the-drc-fuelling-progress-or-deepening-regional-conflict.

18. Glen Biglaiser and Ronald J. McGauvran, “The Effects of IMF Loan Conditions on Poverty in the Developing World,” Journal of International Relations and Development 25, no. 3 (2022): 806–33, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-022-00263-1.

19. Claude Kabemba, “China-Democratic Republic of Congo Relations: From a Beneficial to a Developmental Cooperation,” African Studies Quarterly 16, nos. 3 & 4 (2016): 73–88, https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/168/v16a6.Kabemba.HD_.pdf.

20. World Bank, “Cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

21. World Bank, “Cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

22. Gregory and Milas, “China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”