Analysis of Classical Liberal & Socialist Thought

By Julianne Schmidt

 
Marked by the success of the American Revolution and the turmoil of the French Revolution, the nineteenth century was the setting for the birth of classical liberal thought. Out of these historical events emerged Wilhelm von Humboldt’s On the Limits of State Action and, later, Alexis de Tocqueville’s work, Democracy in America. Both of these works outline the basic principles of liberalism by emphasizing the importance of private initiative over the collective and advocating for the limited role of the state. A second derivative of political thought matured towards the middle of the nineteenth century amidst the height of the Industrial Revolution: socialism. Half a century after Humboldt’s text, Friedrich Engels published The Condition of the Working Class in England, a fundamental analysis of the life of the English proletariat as framed by their environment and the consequences thereof. Shortly afterwards, Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto detailed a structure for the proletariat’s shift to the ruling class. In contrast to liberalism, socialism prioritized the collective and embraced the role of the State as a sort of referee promoting the welfare of the commoner. The disparity between liberalism and socialism is rooted in their different levels of analysis—the individual versus the collective proletariat— their contrasting opinions on the role of the state, and their opposing conclusions on the future of European states’ societal and governmental structure.

 
The core of Humboldt’s text argues for liberalism’s prioritization of the individual over the collective society, and the role of the state to limit its actions to allow for this end. He argues that private initiative should be the foundation on which all states stand. The natural goal of life is to bring forth our individual personality, therefore the goal of the state should be to allow for the expression of each citizen’s individuality. The individual should be able to “enjoy the most absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies” (Humboldt 20). If states encroach upon the natural evolution of the individual, the result is an underdeveloped citizenry and the encouragement of passivity among the population. An overactive and overextended government will cause uniformity, destroy the vitality and sense of community among citizens, and ultimately undermine the efficiency of the state as a whole (23). Instead, Humboldt argues that the main function of the state should be more limited—it should maintain focus on just the protection of citizens from each other and from foreign invasion. This clearly delineated security function of the state allows freedom for the full development of the individual and provides an environment with a variety of stimuli to challenge people to further develop themselves (16). In this society, competition will exist among community members but this mutual competition will push each to their highest potential. Humboldt equates greater competition with an outcome of increased greatness of the civilization. He argues for the minimization of government and the maximization of freedoms given to the citizenry. This focus on the individual over the state will create a more efficient system comprised of self-motivated citizens that will expend energy on addressing only society’s necessities.

 
Whereas the liberal thought of Humboldt focuses on the individual himself acting to bring forth his unique personality, Engels specifically argues that the environment in which the individual finds himself is a crucial factor in determining his character, actions, and future potential. He discusses the inhumane living conditions of the working class, who are frequently piled together in overcrowded, unsanitary districts of towns that create an environment ripe for the spread of infectious disease and allow little hope for escape and improvement of condition. He writes that the proletariat lives in a “condition unworthy of human beings” and the entirety of the working class is “exposed to a similar fate without any fault of his own and in spite of every possible effort” (Engels 43). It is important that Engels notes this blamelessness of the working class man—the proletariat is incapable of reaching its “full potential” in liberal terms because the environment in which they find themselves is static and restricting of social mobility. As a result of the depressed living conditions, Engels notes the uptick in theft, prostitution, and drunkenness throughout England in recent decades. Living in squalor, the working men squander their money on alcohol because it offers them a brief respite from the reality of their condition (129). In this way, he notes how immoral actions are derived from the inhumanity that the proletariat finds themselves living in. These actions of the proletariat, being direct products of their condition, can only be improved by the creation and intervention of a collective welfare state.

 
Engels shows that it is impossible to isolate the individual from the conditions of his life, an analysis that Humboldt does not address. In his focus on each individual’s ability to reach his highest potential self, Humboldt does not confront the realities of the conditions of the lower class. Because he writes before the complete fast-paced onset of the Industrial Revolution, Humboldt’s argument lacks the acknowledgement of the inescapable abject poverty that defines working class life. Engels makes a point in his description of working class conditions to include an excerpt from a contemporary liberal thinker, who is “amazed that it is possible to maintain a reasonable state of health in [the proletariat’s] homes” (Engels 76). The liberal thinker shares in essence the same astonishment at the working class living standards as Engels. In this way, both sides of the political theory acknowledge the destitution of the proletariat as a product of the Industrial Revolution. However, liberals and socialists fundamentally differ in their approach of the role of the state in alleviating these conditions.

 
For Marx and Engels the purpose of the state is to ensure the welfare of its citizens, departing from Humboldt’s emphasis on the separation of welfare programs from the role of the state. Socialists deny liberal thinkers’ necessary focus on individual development for the good of both the individual and the nation as a whole. Instead, they argue that priority should be placed on the collective, because the best results for all come when you put the good and equality of the whole of society first. In their manifesto, Marx and Engels argue that capitalism destroys the egalitarianism of society by pitting people against each other (Marx and Engels 479). It drives workers to compete with workers, resulting in an unproductive and disjointed society. The cohesive organization of the proletariat into a class is constantly disrupted by this internal competition spurred by capitalist influence (481). It is through class struggle and conflict, however, that the proletariat gains a sense of itself and its potential as a whole unit of society, for, “with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows” (480). From this accumulating strength comes labor unions, the natural first step in the formation of the collective working class state. Once firmly established, these unions form the basis for the future organization of the proletariat as the ruling class. Empowering the workers as equal leaders of the collective state ensures that systems will be put in place to check competition, since Marx and Engels believe capitalist competition is contrary to human nature. This results in a banding together to protect the collective interests and common welfare. Contrary to liberal thinkers, Marx and Engels believe the pooling together of resources increases efficiency. Therefore, this collective society governed by the proletariat with the interests of the proletariat at heart will resolve the current plight of the working class.

 
By contrast, Tocqueville argues that democratic governments may naturally further concentrate and expand their powers, but measures must be put in place to ensure that these governments do not turn into benign paternalistic or despotic states. In this way, Tocqueville opposes the socialist favor of a strong central state as the promoter of unity and collective welfare. He argues that the “extreme centralization of political power ultimately enervates society and thus…weakens the government too” (Tocqueville 677). Therefore, states must avoid the expansion of bureaucracies and the destruction of secondary powers while promoting civic engagement and the direct election of government officials. Although these measures of limiting the state’s power contradict socialism, Tocqueville does recognize some pieces of information that Marx and Engels touch upon. He realizes that the “noble has gone down in the social scale, and the commoner gone up”, quasi-relating to the socialists’ perception of the ultimate rise of proletariat power and fall of bourgeoisie influence (11). He acknowledges the fact that the old regime that has dominated France and Europe as a whole for centuries cannot be brought back. However he does not see the future overthrow of the bourgeoisie class by the commoners. Instead, he discusses the concept of the “equality of conditions” or the equal opportunity of individuals to succeed and move upward in society (9). Inextricably tied to this equality of conditions is the “great democratic revolution” that is crossing the Atlantic from America (9). There are two possible outcomes of democracy, one being based on liberty, as in the United States, and the other being based on democratic despotism. In an overly centralized and powerful state, there is a fear of tyranny of the majority and the quiet despotism of a paternalistic government (675). In order to prevent this result, Tocqueville argues for the citizenry to be cautious of an overly expansive government and to support the limited role of the state and the maintenance of individual freedoms.

 

A link between these liberal and socialist texts can be found in the common discussion of the impact of post-revolutionary America on the political and economic framework of Europe. The influence of the newly democratic America is the foundation of Tocqueville’s work and is also referenced by Engels. For Tocqueville, America is the basis for his argument that freedom, knowledge, and prosperity can result from the equality of conditions in a successful democracy (Tocqueville 705). Engels, however, approaches the state of America through an economic lens. In his discussion of the “Attitude of the Bourgeoisie”, he states that the English capitalists are woefully underestimating the potential of the newly independent nation. For Engels, it is clear that America has a seemingly limitless capacity for economic progress with its “inexhaustible resources…[and] energetic, active population” (Engels 299). The new democracy has a more invigorated population than the beaten down English working class, which could be problematic for England in maintaining its leading position in the global economy. This discussion of American influence shared by the two modes of political thought reflects the different conclusions they derive from common analysis of a working democracy. For Tocqueville, it is America that forms the starting point for the wave of democracy that will inevitably hit Europe (Tocqueville 9). Simultaneously, Engels argues that it is America that poses a threat to the tenuous supremacy of English manufacturing—a threat that could hasten the proletariat’s destruction of the English bourgeoisie because it would potentially ruin the English economy and cause a recession, making the livelihoods of the working class economically unsustainable, thereby inspiring a united uprising (Engels 300). In this way, liberalism and socialism are connected in their acknowledgement of America’s indelible impact on the European continent. For liberals this impact will lead to the establishment of similarly structured democracies built on individual freedoms, free trade, and limited interference of the state. For socialists this impact is evidence of England’s impending economic struggles and is a harbinger of the proletariat revolution that rests on the horizon.

 
Ultimately, socialist policies differ from those of liberals because the theorists hold contrasting views on the future of the proletariat, societal structure, and the role of government. For Humboldt, the future of human history is centered on the individual and his efforts to attain his full personality. Sharing in this liberal thought, Tocqueville sees human history as being pushed by the current wave of equality of conditions and democracy coming from its origins in the United States. He believes this influence will inevitably envelope Europe as “the nations of our day cannot prevent conditions of equality from spreading in their midst” (Tocqueville 705). Humboldt and Tocqueville envision a future rooted in the freedoms of the individual and argue that the state should remain small so as not to disrupt or encroach on these freedoms. Marx and Engels do not see the existence of the “equality of conditions” discussed by liberals. The proletariat is viewed as being currently barred into a destructive capitalist environment whose continual oppression will trigger a revolt against traditional class divisions. Once at this stage, the “proletariat can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression, and class struggles” (Marx and Engels 472). The result is the foundation of a collective welfare state that will abolish the roots of inequality and oppression. Therefore, socialist policies differ from those of liberals because they disagree with the ability of man to develop and reach his highest potential of his own accord in the capitalist world. The foundation of liberal thought is in the individual, but for Marx and Engels the cruel environment perpetuated by capitalism has prevented the individual from reaching this stage, and so the future is in the unity of the proletariat and the overturning of capitalism.

 
Socialist and liberal thought diverge in their prioritization of the collective versus the individual, the welfare role of the state versus the limited role of the state, and in their view of the future of the European state and the proletariat. Humboldt and Tocqueville see the future of democracies as balancing individual freedoms with some centralized state powers. Marx and Engels argue that the future lies with the proletariat as the ruling class, overturning the oppression of capitalism with the establishment of a collective welfare state. Both the socialist and liberal texts look to America as influential in determining aspects of the political and economic future of Europe. For liberals, America is the successful result of democracy. For socialists, America and its rising economic prominence represents a possible trigger of recession resulting in the final overthrow of the English bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels conclude their manifesto with “working men of all countries unite!”. By contrast, Tocqueville and Humboldt’s concluding lines are comprised of more wary warnings of the possibility of either a successful democracy or a despotic one. The aggression of the socialists’ tone is counterbalanced by the liberals’ cautioning one. Despite the impassioned tone of the Communist Manifesto, it is the cautionary tone of the classical liberal works that holds fast on the European continent and in the minds of citizens for decades to come.

 

 

Works Cited

de Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. Harper & Row, 1988.

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Robert Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (second edition: Norton, 1978).

Von Humboldt, Wilhelm. The Limits of State Action. Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Limits of Realism in Understanding Chinese Land Reclamation

By Joy (Zhiruo) Wang

Written for Prof. Steven David’s Contemporary International Politics class

Prompt: Realism was arguably the dominant approach in international relations during the Cold War. But is it still relevant in today’s world? Select an issue that threatens world stability today (e.g. terrorism, the spread of nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, the rise of China) and discuss how relevant Realism is in understanding that issue. Where Realism falls short, what other approaches would help?

 

Throughout human history, territory has remained one of the most fought over assets by nations and individuals alike. Indeed, nearly all warfare involves some form of territorial dispute or adjustment. The Thirty Years’ War, a religious war at its core, can also be viewed as a struggle for territorial domination between Protestant and Catholic states; the Cold War, though not a war in the traditional sense, to a large extent consisted of a race for incorporating unaligned territories into established spheres of influence. Thus, given the political significance of territory, it is not surprising that, after China initiated its land reclamation projects in the South China Sea in 2014, the international community reacted with great anxiety and protest. According to the US Department of Defense, between early 2014 and mid-2015 China had reclaimed around 3,000 acres in the South China Sea.1 The large scale of China’s reclamation efforts not only exacerbated existing regional tension, as China, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines lay overlapping claims to the islands in this area, but also provoked American objection on grounds of violation of international law.2 Considering the volumes of their GDPs, any conflict between China and the US has the potential to wreak havoc on global economy. In addition, if China engages in territorial wars with its neighbors, particularly the Philippines, the Mutual Defense Treaty may drag the US into war with China; the consequences of such a confrontation would be unimaginable given both countries’ conventional and nuclear capabilities. Therefore, China’s island building activities in the South China Sea pose a great threat to world stability. The following essay seeks to address the situation in a theoretical framework. I shall use realism to analyze the rationale behind China’s recent land reclamation and then offer alternative approaches where realism falls short. I shall conclude that while realism accounts for a large portion of China’s motivations, first and second level analysis, constructivism and feminism help explain the timing, magnitude and issue of alternatives of this event.

 

Since realism is an important analytical tool in this paper, I shall first introduce the basic tenets and assumptions of realism. Virtually all realists believe that humans live in a bleak world where might equals right—human nature is rotten and morality means little more than hypothetical naivete. According to Mearsheimer, realism has five fundamental assumptions about the international system: (1) the international system is characterized by anarchy (2) all states have some sort of offensive capabilities (3) states can never be sure of each other’s intentions (4) survival is the ultimate goal of states (5) states are rational.3 In a realist world interest is defined in terms of power, so regardless of their leaders, cultures, or internal structures, states facing the same power distribution will react the same way to the same stimulus. Because the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no such thing as a world government to arbitrate injustice, states can only rely on themselves for help, so security always remains their top priority.

 

Offensive realism sheds light on China’s mentality behind island construction. Offensive realism, as set forth by John Mearsheimer, argues that states will always seek to increase their power because only primacy guarantees security.4 It predicts that states will never cease to expand where expansion is possible since power is a zero-sum game. From an offensive realist perspective, China sees all other countries as potential threats as it can never be sure of their intentions and can only depend on itself. Thus, the best way for China to ensure its survival would be to become the most powerful state on the global stage, thereby both deterring and preempting attacks by hostile states. In this case, China does not pursue a limited regional goal but the ambitious aim of global hegemony. Empirical evidence attests to the validity of the offensive realist view. After the completion of land reclamation in the Spratlys in 2015, China claimed to have ended its island building activities in the South China Sea. However, recent satellite photos of the Tree Island and the North Island, both disputed territories, clearly demonstrate China’s unwillingness to curb its artificial island construction.5 Therefore, despite China’s official rhetoric of having concluded land reclamation three years ago, it still secretly seeks to enlarge its land holdings in the South China Sea and has shown no sign of ending such efforts. In addition, China’s continued expansion southward corresponds to its attempts at increasing its economic influence westward, as symbolized by the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and at projecting its power in Latin America and Africa through loans and infrastructure building. One can argue that China’s continued push into the South China Sea is simply part of its grand scheme of global domination, which also fits the developmental trajectory prescribed by offensive realism. Thus, offensive realism offers insights into China’s continuous land reclamation by examining its fundamental insecurity in an anarchic world.

 

Defensive realism shares many of the same beliefs as offensive realism, but believes that excessive power will bring about the fall of the expanding state; the rationale, according to Kenneth Waltz, is that if a state becomes too powerful, other states would feel threatened and would band together to either destroy the aggressor state or restore it to its original power capacity.6 In this case, states do not expand unprovoked, but rather as a response to changing distribution of power since acquiring too much power and thereby upsetting the balance of power would only threaten their security more. Therefore, based on defensive realism, China’s push into the South China Sea was not self-initiated but simply a reaction to escalating security challenges in the region; it will cease expanding once it feels that it has gained enough power to counterbalance the new security threats. Broader historical context of the South China Sea disputes proves defensive realism to be on the side of truth. Contrary to popular assumption, China is in fact the latecomer to the land reclamation game. The Philippines had reclaimed on the Palawan Island and Vietnam has added to Sand Cay and West London Reef 21,000 and 65,000 square meters respectively since 2010.7 Increased territories in the South China Sea means increased military outposts and increased ability to claim more islands in disputed areas, which threatens China’s sovereignty. Therefore, given Vietnam’s island building in the disputed Spratly Islands, China perceived a rise in the relative power of its competitors and had to increase its own power in the region. Defensive realism predicts that China will eventually stop its expansion even though China has yet to slow down land reclamation. This is because as China builds up more capabilities in the region through the construction of airstrips and marine bases on the new artificial islands, so too do its hostile neighbors. Thus, China still feels insecure and will continue to expand until it restores the perceived balance of power to the previous status quo.

 

Omnibalancing, as developed by Steven David, agrees with realism on the prominence of interest and power, but argues that in a developing country the balance of power occurs not on the international level but on the state level. In the developing world, sometimes the biggest threats to the government are not from other states but rather from domestic dissent and unrest (e.g. military coup d’etat or riots). Therefore, to stay in power, countries leaders may choose foreign policies that are not in the best interest of the state but diffuse domestic tension.8 In the case of China, omnibalancing would contend that China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea is merely a diversion from domestic discontent with the government. China is an authoritarian regime without free election, so the only source of government legitimacy comes from its ability to keep the people satisfied. In a survey conducted by Pew Research Center in 2015, government corruption tops the list, with 84% respondents considering it a big problem and 44% a very big problem; more than 50% of people believe that air/water pollution, food safety, and income inequality will stay the same or get worse over the next 5 years.9 In 2010 alone, China witnessed 180,000 protests, demonstrations, and riots.10 These data reveal a low level of confidence for the government, so diverting domestic discontent with battling foreign encroachment on sovereignty — that is, the territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines — through island building would allow the Communist leadership to recover its image among the public. A survey in 2013 further confirms the validity of the omnibalancing argument: around 60% of people pay attention to China’s maritime disputes and the majority think that China’s claims are absolutely correct.11

 

However, despite its immense explanatory power, realism cannot account for the full story of China’s land reclamation. First, it does not explain the timing of the reclamation. Territorial disputes and “island squatting” have existed since the 1970s while Vietnam started land reclamation in 2010, so why did China suddenly decide to build artificial islands in 2014 as opposed to, say, 2011? Second, realism does not fully explain the magnitude of China’s reclamation efforts. Granted, China felt the need to catch up with its competitors, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, in the game of artificial island construction, but the scale of China’s project dwarfed that of all the others combined: 100 acres over 45 years compared to 3,000 acres over 2 years.12 Defensive realism justifies China’s rationale for initiating and continuing land reclamation, but it does not tell us why China perceives such a big threat from its adversaries’ expansion of a mere 100 acres. Third, island building was not the only viable response for China; negotiations, binding treaties, UN arbitration, or international law were all possible alternatives. Admittedly, omnibalancing necessitates the creation of a common enemy, but asserting national sovereignty does not entail escalating tension; victory over the Paracel Islands in an international court would rally as much national sentiment as would through military buildup. Therefore, in the face of land reclamation by hostile states, why did China decide to resort to the traditional tools of power politics instead of the modern norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts? In the following sections, I shall explain how first and second level analysis, constructivism and feminism answer the questions that realism evades.

 

First level analysis focuses on the natures of individual leaders as the cause for historical events. In this case, it explains the timing of China’s island building activities. In 2013, China witnessed the ascension of Xi Jinping, arguably the most authoritarian and reactionary leader after Mao, to the presidency. Both a “princeling” and a “second-generation red” by birth, Xi Jinping had a very unusual upbringing that greatly shaped his view of China. Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was among the first generation of Communist revolutionaries that fought alongside Mao and later became the vice premier of the PRC and secretary general of the State Council. As a result, Xi grew up in the exclusive “Zhongnanhai” with the children of other first-generation Communist leaders and with countless tales of the revolution.13 However, in 1962, Xi Zhongxun was purged on grounds of “acting counterrevolutionary.” At the height of the Cultural Revolution, the charge “counterrevolutionary” was such a taboo that the young Xi Jinping was automatically ostracized by virtue of his lineage. Thus, given his childhood immersion in Maoist ideals and teenage experience with brutal politics, it is not surprising that Xi Jinping later became the most authoritarian president after Mao. Foreign policy under Xi has been markedly more assertive than under previous leaders, especially in regards to Sino-Japanese relations and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.14 Therefore, Xi’s “election” to the presidency in 2013 explains why China suddenly turned to land reclamation, a gesture of increased assertiveness in the region, in early 2014.

 

Second level analysis posits states at the center of causation, citing states’ internal culture and structure as the reason behind particular outcomes. It addresses the issue of magnitude in both China’s island building activities and its perception of threat. It is true that the construction of artificial islands would strengthen China’s ability to project its military power at sea, thereby thwarting its adversaries’ attempts to occupy more disputed territories, but reclaiming over 3,000 acres of land seems to be somewhat of an overreaction given the comparatively insignificant size of the other countries’ reclamation projects. So, the question is, why did China perceive such a disproportionate threat from the small increase in territory by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines? China, or in its native language the “Middle Kingdom,” had always been the absolute dominant power in East Asia until the 19th century. For many Chinese people, the memory of humiliation at the hands of foreigners is still fresh and evokes a strong sense of patriotism. A traditionally nationalist society, the Chinese people to this day still mourn the massive land concessions granted to foreign powers under the Qing Dynasty; a survey from 2013 showed that 83% of people in China see the South China Sea disputes as a continuation of the “Century of Humiliation.”15 As one can see, the Chinese people attach a special emotional significance to the concept of sovereignty, making them inflate the value of territory in an age where territory has been rendered less important by the advancement of technology. Thus, even though land reclamation itself may not carry so much strategic value as to be worth risking international condemnation and spending billions of dollars, the historical and cultural importance of upholding sovereignty makes the Chinese government willing to go the extra mile when it comes to territorial integrity.

 

According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism is an approach to world politics from a social perspective and has two fundamental claims: (1) the structures of international politics are social rather than purely material (2) these structures influence not only states’ behaviors but their identities and interests as well.16 Stripped to its essence, constructivism argues that states with different values and ideologies will perceive, or “socially construct,” the same reality differently and will therefore act differently. This explains why China resorted to land reclamation instead of other more peaceful alternatives when confronted with hostile expansion. China is an authoritarian regime that does not endorse liberal values such as tolerance, rule of law and peaceful resolution of conflicts in its domestic policies; rather, Chinese politics is characterized by purge of dissidents, forceful repression of demonstrations, corruption, abuse of power and ostracization based on lineage or association. The elements of violence, intolerance, distrust, and ruthlessness inherent in Chinese domestic politics shape the lens through which Chinese politicians see the international system, portrayed as a grim world where only old-school Realpolitik provides means of survival. Therefore, the pessimist values fostered by China’s domestic political system translate into its disbelief in modern liberal norms that advocate for international cooperation and resolution of conflicts through negotiation and compromise; the fact that China rejected completely the Hague Tribunal’s ruling on South China Sea disputes testifies the dominance of power politics over liberal international norms in Chinese foreign policy. Thus, given China’s realist ideology, expanding China’s military capability in the region would be the best response to its neighbors’ rise in relative power and land reclamation was deemed a viable option.

 

International relations is arguably a man’s world, dominated by masculine modes of thinking. This is certainly true given that in the US women had been barred from entry until very recently and sex discrimination still abounds.17 Feminist theory believes that women tend to define power in terms of the ability to cooperate (as opposed to the masculine definition of control over others) and discern more opportunities for toleration and coalition-building in spite of differences; this is because females often rely on persuasion and shared understanding in solving domestic disputes and are therefore socialized into a more contextual, narrative-based mode of analysis.18 As a result, feminists argue that global politics would look much different if women were national leaders. This feminist interpretation explains the magnitude and aggressiveness of China’s land reclamation. Despite its communist egalitarian ideals, China is in fact a deeply sexist society. Structurally, the mandatory retirement age for female government workers, including those employed in state-owned enterprises and public universities, is 50 or 55 while the male equivalent is 60.19 This differential treatment not only impedes women’s ability to achieve high leadership positions as most government officials only reach the highest ranks in their 60s, but also perpetuates the gender stereotype that women are less physically vigorous than men. As of now, there are no women in the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-making unit in China, and only one woman in the 25-member Politburo, the next rung after the Politburo Standing Committee.20 Therefore, the lack of female contribution to policies can be construed as the reason why China chose to pursue a more militaristic response (island building) instead of seeking cooperation and a larger scale of operation since males tend to perceive more threats than females and to think in terms of sheer strength as opposed to persuasion.

 

Overall, realism explains a significant part of China’s rationale for land reclamation as relative power and military capability did factor heavily into its calculation. However, first and second level analysis, constructivism and feminism elucidate components that realism fails to incorporate: (1) land reclamation itself as a viable strategy (2) its timing in 2014 and (3) its tremendous scale. This is because realism fails to acknowledge the influence that a state’s culture, structure and history exert on shaping interests and identities and the lenses through which it receives and interprets external realities. Therefore, to fully understand the issue of land reclamation in the South China Sea, a simple look at the balance of power would not suffice; meticulous attention must be paid to the particular circumstances of the countries involved. Peaceful resolution of this conflict depends on an impartial synthesis of different approaches and one day we may hope to see a South China Sea characterized by tranquility and cooperation.

 

 

References

1. Terri Moon Cronk, “Pacom Chief: China,” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, July 24, 2015, , accessed December 08, 2017.

2. ​Katie Hunt, “Showdown in the South China Sea: How did we get here?” CNN, August 02, 2016, , accessed December 08, 2017.

3. ​John J. Mearsheimer, ​The tragedy of Great Power politics(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 30-32.

4. John J. Mearsheimer, ​The tragedy of Great Power politics(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 21.

5. ​”Land reclamation photos show areas contested by China, Vietnam – Palace,” Cnn, , accessed December 08, 2017.

6. John J. Mearsheimer, ​The tragedy of Great Power politics(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 18-20.

7. Carl Thayer, “No, China Is Not Reclaiming Land in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, June 09, 2015, accessed December 08, 2017.

8. ​Daniel W. Drezner, “Perspective | Trump, Russia and omnibalancing,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2017, accessed December 08, 2017.

9. ​Richard Wike and Bridget Parker, “Corruption, Pollution, Inequality Are Top Concerns in China,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, September 24, 2015, accessed December 08, 2017.

10. ​Max Fisher, “How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day,” The Atlantic, January 05, 2012.

11. Andrew Chubb, “Nationalism and Chinese public opinion,” China Policy Institute: Analysis, February 03, 2015, accessed December 08, 2017.

12. Katie Hunt, “Showdown in the South China Sea: How did we get here?” CNN, August 02, 2016, accessed December 08, 2017.

13. Elizabeth Yuan, “Xi Jinping: ‘Princeling’ to China’s president,” CNN, March 14, 2013, accessed December 08, 2017.

14. ​Rush Doshi, “Analysis | Xi Jinping just made it clear where China’s foreign policy is headed,” The Washington Post, October 25, 2017, accessed December 08, 2017.

15. ​Eric Fish, “Why Does China Care So Much About Uninhabited Islands?” The Atlantic, July 11, 2016, accessed December 08, 2017.

16. ​Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” ​International Security20, no. 1 (1995): 71-72.

17. Ann Tickner, “Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation (1988),” International Theory, 1995, 429.

18. Ann Tickner, “Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation (1988),” International Theory,1995, 432-34.

19. ​Yazhou Sun, “Why China has so few female leaders,” CNN, October 25, 2017, accessed December 08, 2017.

20. ​Cheng Li, “China’s new Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee,” Brookings, November 28, 2017, accessed December 08, 2017.

A right to DREAM: The historical role of youth in the immigrant rights movement

Written by Heidi R. Woll

The movement to defend the rights of immigrants, particularly those of Latinx[1] undocumented immigrants, was spearheaded by youth in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of these youth, having arrived in the United States as children, found themselves in a precarious position when entering adulthood, when many of them discovered – either for the first time or not – that they would encounter significant difficulties when seeking employment or going to college, as well as when embarking on simpler tasks such as obtaining driver’s licenses or boarding flights.

Many of these same youth would also experience the childhood trauma of family separation, on account of the deportation of their parents and/or other family members. All of these distinctive issues ultimately led, and continue to lead, to many youth to be particularly conscious of their own “illegality” – especially when paired with the tangible hostility of many Americans, who view their existence on American soil, void of legal citizenship as “a threat to national sovereignty and the rule of law.”[2]

This essay therefore examines how a state of being formed a movement: How, by adopting the name of ‘Dreamers’ and exposing themselves to the country as a unified group, a vast number of undocumented Latinx youth reshaped their sociopolitical identities in the public sphere; from invaders to contributors, from ‘illegal’ to quintessentially American. This story is integral to the political movement to defend the rights of immigrants that underwent significant growth towards the end of the 20th century and is in full effect today. It also raises inherently difficult questions, particularly regarding the need to strike a political balance that accounts both for the economic viability of adopting a more open-border immigration system, and for the moral drive to hold true to the principles expounded by the founders of a country largely built by and for immigrants.

The role of these Latinx youth in the immigrant rights debate is, however, in a certain way, atypical. Walter Nicholls, author of The DREAMers: How the Undocumented Youth Movement Transformed the Immigrant Rights Debate, points out that the immigrant rights movement is exceptional to recent scholarship on immigration politics in the United States and Europe, which largely suggests that usually, “hostile environments would encourage undocumented immigrants to turn away from the public sphere of receiving countries.”[3] Following this behavioural trend, we would expect to find that DREAMers – the name often used to describe the undocumented youth referred to in this essay, along with non-Latinx undocumented youth – would become less politically active following Congress’s multiple failures to pass the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. This act would have facilitated the granting of conditional and, meeting certain requirements, permanent residency for undocumented persons brought to the United States as minors; therefore, its failure to pass dealt a major blow to the undocumented youth whose lives it would have improved. Contrary to the hypothesis outlined by Nicholls, however, the DREAMer movement – largely led by the children of Latinx immigrants and supported by non-governmental organizations – appears to have provided a safe environment for youth to ‘come out’ as undocumented in spite of the increased risk of doing so since the declaration of the war on terror.

Illegal immigration through the southern border of the United States accelerated in the mid-1970s and even more in the first half of the 1980s, with “apprehension at the Mexican border ([at the time] 98 percent Mexican nationals), arrests of deportable aliens, deportations, and visa overstays all showing an upward trend.”[4] The number of annually apprehended illegal immigrants first surpassed one million in 1977, and by 1986 it had reached 1,670,000.[5] Still, the actual amount of illegal immigrants during this period, as with any other, is however very difficult to precisely quantify, since the clandestine nature of the illegal alien population makes it extremely difficult to count.[6]

The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) apprehension and deportation figures and studies of visa abuse “indicated that the Central American countries, particularly El Salvador, [had] become the major source of illegal immigrants after Mexico” by the late 1980s. Moreover, The State Department in 1985 “estimated illegal immigration from El Salvador and Guatemala in 1977 at 25,000 and 15,000 a year respectively; with 350,000 Salvadorans already in the United States illegally by 1980 when civil strife in that country began spurring the outflow.”[7]

In the introduction to Dreamers: An Immigrant Generation’s Fight for their American Dream (2015), Eileen Truax holds that “There are about eleven million undocumented people living in the United States. You can’t tell who they are just by looking at them, but we know they are here […] While it’s impossible to pinpoint exactly who’s undocumented and who’s not by sight, we know one thing with certainty: our daily lives wouldn’t be the same without them.”[8] The book goes on to explore the positive impacts of undocumented immigrants on everything from the American economy to their more personal effect on the lives of everyday Americans – showing that any given American is likely to have a DREAMer as a friend, neighbor, lover, even a fellow student or co-worker.

Philip Kasinitz (2008) went on to argue that “the answer to the question of what large-scale migration will mean for American society […] lies less with the immigrants themselves than with their ambivalently American children. […] This new “second generation” – the children of at least one immigrant parent born in the United States or who arrived by the age of 12 – accounted for one out of six 18- to 32-year-olds in the nation and one out of four of all Americans under 18. In many ways, they will define how today’s immigrant groups become tomorrow’s American ethnic groups.”[9] He explains that

Before 1965, immigrants to the United States were overwhelmingly European. Since then, most have come from other parts of the globe. Given how the United States has historically constructed racial categories, they are not generally regarded as “white.” Yet they are not African Americans either. Since the cleavage between the “white” descendants of immigrants and the “black” descendants of American slaves has so strongly marked big cities, the emergence of a large and rapidly growing group that does not fit easily into either of these categories has enormous potential consequences.”[10]

One of these consequences was the Sanctuary Movement, which began in late 1981 when a small number of churches started sheltering Central American illegal immigrants. The motives of the movement’s proponents were usually of a humanitarian nature. Congregations would give sanctuary to Guatemalans or Salvadorans at risk of being detained and deported by the INS; additionally, movement members would bring Salvadorans and Guatemalans into the US, traveling to Central America to accompany displaced communities, organizing caravans to move Salvadorans and Guatemalans to other parts of the US, and enabling undocumented refugees to testify publicly about their experiences. They lobbied Congress, raised bail bond money for detained Central Americans, and helped detainees file for political asylum.[11] While the sanctuary movement at this time was led both by church congregations and nonprofit legal organizations, it would echo later in the discussion of the current sanctuary movement for Central American migrants.

A New York Times Retro Report video entitled “Safe Haven: The Sanctuary Movement” describes the history of Rev. John Fyfe, who explained how, upon attempting to help undocumented migrants from Guatemala and El Salvador file for asylum, ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) attempted to deport them on the grounds that they were economic migrants, rather than fleeing persecution. Seeing clear torture marks on their bodies, Fyfe hid them in the basement of his church. Though Fyfe and the many pastors that were involved in this initial movement were not youths, they displayed an interesting pattern of behavior, including a defiance towards authority that appears youthful in nature. “Afraid he might be arrested,” the report goes on to say, “Fyfe did something unexpected. He went public.” Fyfe goes on to explain, “if we went public with what we were doing, then maybe we would have a base of support.”[12]

The Central American youth that attended churches like Fyfe’s saw a supportive environment there, of a kind they had found nowhere else in the United States. Mario Rivas, for instance, was a young man that had been active in student politics back home in El Salvador. Growing up, he had worked with the local priest, who had organized “a kind of Christian base community for children” that played an integral part of the community in Ilopongo, Mario’s hometown, visiting the sick and elderly on Sundays to help with chores.

In contrast, Mario found that mass in the United States was “a cold place” and that the churches he attended lacked the social action commitment he associated with Christianity. He stopped attending until he found La Placita, a church founded by Fathers Olivares and Kennedy, the latter of which had met John Fyfe during his first assignment as a priest in a small parish in San Diego. Fyfe had asked him if that parish could be part of the Sanctuary network, and he accepted, though the refugee work needed to be kept covert since his superior worried about publicity. Years later, Father Kennedy, together with Father Olivares, formed the Centro Pastoral, which provided Central American refugees attending La Placita with somewhere to stay, medical care, legal services and other previously unmet needs.

For Mario, “the public declaration of sanctuary at La Placita in 1985” was a “historic moment,” since “it was a place where [they] could tell [their] own stories – a place from which [they] could challenge U.S. foreign policy toward Central America.”[13] La Placita also worked closely with the Sanctuary Committee of Southern California Inter-faith Task Force on Central America (SCITCA) to “coordinate speaking engagements by refugees in churches and other locations.”[14] Mario actively partook in the creation of the National Alliance of Sanctuary Committees, which promoted dialogue across the many Sanctuary communities across the U.S., emphasizing the link between the plight of refugees and U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Even more relevant to the role of youth in the Sanctuary movement was the decisive role that university student governments took in creating sanctuary campuses. By the end of 1985, the Sanctuary movement had spread to 10 colleges in California, with the Universities of California Berkeley, Irvine, and Los Angeles, California State University Northridge, and Pitzer and Pomona Colleges in Claremont pledging their support for the movement.

Pitzer and Pomona, as Chinchilla, Hamilton and Loucky note, were interesting cases. Several congregations in the Claremont area had already declared sanctuary beginning in 1982, with fifty Guatemalans and Salvadorans settled by May 1985. But unlike the other colleges, the Pitzer and Pomona student representatives themselves did not decide for the student body; instead, they cast a vote so that the student body could choose whether or not to make the colleges sanctuaries. The result was that more than 80% of the students at each college voted in favour.[15] The students invoked the Geneva Convention, as did the students at several other colleges, to defend their choice – as one Pomona student stated: “What we are doing is neither illegal nor an act of civil disobedience. We are upholding international law. We call upon our government to do the same.”[16] Following much debate, and spurred by the impetus of churchgoers and students all over the area, many cities started to issue resolutions supporting sanctuary: Berkeley issued such a resolution in February 1985, and the City Council of Los Angeles declared LA a sanctuary city on November 27th, 1985.[17]

The Sanctuary Movement was an essential precursor to the broader immigrant rights movement that developed in the 1990s and continues to develop into the 21st century. It helped to educate church congregations, college students and the general public about the plight of refugees, which may have also made them more ready to understand the issues of, for instance, Mexican and Central American migrants coming to the US out of economic necessity rather than immediate danger. This, accompanied with the progression of prior decades away from the heightened nationalism of the World Wars to a more global effort towards international cooperation, based on the prevalent shared socialist ideals of youth during and after the Vietnam War. The impression of a more globalized world, wherein the flow of people from one country to another is less a transgression and more a natural result of both economic and humanitarian necessity is emblematic of this new outlook.

Whereas the Sanctuary movement enabled the safeguarding of the undocumented immigrants and their children, spreading awareness about the injustice of their – and their countries’ – conditions, the immigrant rights movement took it one step further. While the first movement dealt mostly with the immigrants and their children, newcomers first coming to the United States, the 2000s, in particular, began to witness the unique circumstances of youth that had been brought to the United States at a very young age by their parents. As such, they were “undocumented involuntarily” – with no Social Security number, proof of residency or any document to legalize their presence in the country they had grown up in[18]. This situation carries on today for thousands of youth, referred to as the Dreamers – a reference, as previously mentioned, to the DREAM Act, a bill introduced in 2001 to the US Senate that, had it not failed, “would have granted undocumented youth conditional residency status and, after meeting a series of criteria—including graduating from college or serving in the military—[…] would [have made them] eligible for permanent residency.”[19]

A second group that the media has paid more and more attention to in recent years has been the unaccompanied minors arriving into the United States across the border with Mexico. Also undocumented, the treacherous journey north has become a risk that an increasing number of these minors are willing to take for the promise of a life free of violence, particularly at the hands of gangs like MS-13 and Barrio 18. But these youth and children are faced with an even higher threat of deportation than other illegal immigrants: As immigration attorney Nick Marritz explained to The Atlantic: “The government is trying to deport them as fast as it can. They’re putting them at the front of the line.”[20] The only legal support for unaccompanied minors is the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status law, or SIJS, which was enacted into law following a 1990 amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.

However, in 1997, a U.S. Senator from New Mexico claimed that the law was a “giant loophole,” telling Congress that “every visiting student from overseas can have a petition filed in a state court … declaring that they’re award and in need of foster care.”[21] An amendment was then passed that restricted the use of SIJS only to children that could prove that they were dependent upon the state because of “abuse, abandonment, or neglect.” This, Marritz argued, was not a problem, because most of the cases he dealt with did accurately fit that description. Still, this issue – including the broader debate over the failed passing of the DREAM Act – remains one of the immigrant rights movement’s biggest topics since it puts children with supportive parents or guardians at risk for deportation, although returning to their home country is not in their best interest.

The protests against unjust immigration legislation continued well into the 2000s. The year 2006, in particular, witnessed a number of massive demonstrations, specifically against the Sensenbrenner bill – a piece of legislation that would have criminalized assistance to undocumented immigrants in the U.S. that sought housing, food or medical services. On March 10, 2006, a crowd of over 100,000 protesters, filled Chicago’s downtown Loop with chants of “¡Sí se puede!” (translatable to ‘Yes we can!’ or ‘It can be done!’). Following this, demonstrations “cropped up in more than 140 cities in 39 states,” many of which naturally took place in Southern California. These manifestations also culminated in the May 1st “Day Without Immigrants,” when more than 500,000 rallied in Los Angeles to demand a pathway to citizenship, particularly for the immigrant youth that were in the foundation and the forefront of the movement.[22]

While it may not have prompted immediate legislative action, the 2006 protests triggered a change in the political climate regarding undocumented immigrants, especially among college students and youth who grew up with friends that were directly affected by the issues. Furthermore, many young people who “tasted political power for the first time in 2006” were then inspired “to promote the DREAM Act.” By 2010, regaining the attention of the country, they “mirrored LGBT advocates by broadcasting “coming out” stories about their status.” They also “organized marches, building occupations, and traffic blockades to keep their cause in the public eye.”[23]

All these images, arguments and the protests of undocumented immigrants in the United States point to an underlying notion that is highly convincing to youth in a globalized age: that the American Dream must apply to all. That the laws concerning undocumented immigrants, who often should qualify for asylum in the first place, are either outdated or morally unjust. That Central American and Mexican immigrants, undocumented and documented alike, have already demonstrated astounding contributions to American economy and society because their conditions meant that they needed to work harder to provide for their families.

For undocumented youth, the most important issues involve the constant threat of deportation, especially under the more severe Trump administration, and the barriers they face in obtaining higher education and employment. This past September’s rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) immigration policy has put further strain on the prospects of Dreamers to be eligible for work permits and to receive deferred action from deportation. This action, in the midst of Donald Trump’s descent into very low public support (with a 38% approval rate in September) prompted further rebuttal from Dreamers and their supporters alike, with Facebook profile pictures changing to include a filter demonstrating support for DACA, and protesters gathering in Washington D.C., Chicago, Los Angeles, and in front of Trump Tower in New York.[24] Many colleges continue to offer sanctuary to undocumented students in the age of Trump, yet protesters remain aware that the most vulnerable undocumented youth are those that cannot afford a lawyer to represent them – much less a college degree.

Still, those who document the immigrant rights movement today highlight that the discussion mostly poses the questions of what to do about the undocumented youth – from SIJS to the DREAM Act to DACA – and whether or not the United States has a humanitarian responsibility towards them, particularly due to past US foreign policy in Central America. Furthermore, as undocumented immigrants comprise not just newcomers, but also youth that have been in the country since their early childhood, the immigrant rights movement may be benefiting from the solidarity of not only the institutions that support undocumented migrants but their American peers as well.

While the opposition is undoubtedly vociferous, the undocumented youth that are ‘coming out’ appear to feel secure enough to do so, drawing this sense of security from the peer groups that support them and within the broader movement. They may also feel that coming out constitutes a sense of sacrifice for the movement since through this action, more people will find out how many of their most hard-working employees, closest friends, and nicest neighbors are – in fact – undocumented. This act of bravery on the part of these youth, and the support of their peers will hopefully continue to advance the movement towards better immigration legislation in the United States.

Bibliography

Print:

  •         Coutin, Susan Bibler. The Culture of Protest: Religious Activism and the U.S. Sanctuary Movement. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
  •         Kasinitz, Philip. Inheriting the City: the Children of Immigrants Come of Age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008.
  •         Nicholls, Walter. Dreamers: How the Undocumented Youth Movement Transformed the Immigrant Rights Debate. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013.
  •         Pallares, Amalia. Family Activism: Immigrant Struggles and the Politics of Noncitizenship. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2014.
  •         Simcox, David. U.S. Immigration in the 1980s: Reappraisal and Reform. Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988.
  •         Truax, Eileen. Dreamers: an Immigrant Generation’s Fight for Their American Dream.Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2015.

Web

[1] The use of the term ‘Latinx’ is flush with controversy, sparking discussion about ethnic and gender identity as well as privilege. I utilize it in this essay for the purpose of including more gender identities than the words ‘Latino’ and ‘Latina’ allow – namely, those individuals that identify as being transgender or otherwise outside the gender binary, but who still identify as ethnically Latinx. For more information, read Reyes (2017), in bibliography.

[2] Nicholls, 10

[3] Nicholls, 7-8

[4] Simcox, 23; for original source see “Surge of Illegal Aliens Taxes Southwest Towns’ Resources,” New York Times, March 9. 1986.

[5] Ibid, 24

[6] Ibid, 25

[7] Ibid, 24-25

[8] Truax, 1

[9] Kasinitz, 1

[10] Kasinitz, 3

[11] Coutin, 3

[12] Haberman, 5:05

[13] Chinchilla et al, 113

[14] Ibid, 114

[15] Ibid, 116

[16] Ibid, 117. Originally quoted by Valle (1985).

[17] Ibid, 117.

[18] Truax, 4

[19] Martinez (2015)

[20] Phippen (2015)

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid

[24] Meghan Keneally (2017)

 

Analyzing the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Through Realism

written by Elizabeth Goldstone on December 8, 2017

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNODA,  phrases the situation well: “Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth.”[1]

Though one can analyze this topic through constructivism and liberalism, realism is the most comprehensive theory of international relations through which one can understand the refusal by these nuclear states to sign the ban treaty. In this paper, a brief background on the recent ban treaty will be provided, and a discussion will follow on advantages and disadvantages of using realism to explain this phenomenon. Furthermore, I will elaborate on the disadvantages, and state whether constructivism or liberalism would be the better choice for analysis in these cases. Concepts of realism I will discuss in this paper are “states wanting survival,” “balance of threat,” “balance of power,” and “anarchy in the international system.”

While nuclear weapons have only been used twice throughout history at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “about 22,000 [nuclear weapons] reportedly remain in our world today.”[2] Midway through the Cold War, global citizens began to question why countries continued to keep and create nuclear weapons when world powers had largely accepted after World War II that nuclear weapons were dangerous. In 1968, the United States had 31,000 nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union had 6,000, Great Britain had 400, France had 30, and China had 5.[3] Never have more nuclear weapons existed at one time.[4] In response to this situation, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was created by the UN. The international community had concluded, “that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war.”[5] This Treaty is the only multilateral treaty of its kind aimed at the goal of disarmament, with all five nuclear-weapons states as signatories.[6]

Other treaties followed. This paper will focus specifically on the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (UNTPNW), signed on July 7, 2017. This treaty prohibits “nuclear weapons use, threat of use, testing, development, production, possession, transfer, and stationing in a different country.”[7] The analysis in this paper will show that realist theories of international relations best explain why nuclear powers did not sign this particular treaty.

The first realist concept I will analyze is that of “states wanting survival.” According to offensive realist, John Mearsheimer, states naturally strive to be hegemons – having power equals having security.[8] Mearsheimer summarizes this point of view in his 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. He writes that “given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power.”[9] I would argue that there is no greater form of power in our current world than having nuclear weapons; therefore, having nuclear weapons makes a state safe, and a country that wants to stay safe would not willingly sign a treaty that would reduce their safety.

The first and perhaps most obvious reason nuclear weapons would nearly ensure a state’s survival is that nuclear weapons are a deterrent.[10] Thomas Schelling, an International Relations professor and author of Arms and Influence, concisely defines deterrence as “preventing an action.”[11] In this case, that action is a nuclear strike. If a country has nuclear weapons, realist theory dictates that no other country will attack them, since there is risk that the country will retaliate and nuclear war would ensue, leading to world mass destruction. No country wants to risk their own destruction; therefore, neither a non-nuclear nor nuclear state would risk their own safety by attacking a nuclear state.[12] If a nuclear state signed the UNTPNW and was forced to give up their nuclear weapons, they would be relinquishing the main deterrent that ensures their continued survival. This leads to my next point: what if one nuclear state signs the treaty and another does not? The nuclear state that signed would be virtually defenseless against the latter nuclear power that refrained from signing. Quite simply, a country cannot protect itself from nuclear weapons with guns.

Furthermore, since states are primarily concerned with security and survival in the “dark brooding world of neo-realism in which states can’t trust one another,”[13] they “must always be prepared to gear up for conflict.”[14] It is reasonable to assume that since the nuclear states did not sign the treaty, they are unwilling to discount the possibility of future nuclear war.

Kenneth Waltz, a defensive realist, says, “states seek to ensure their survival” since “it is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have.”[15] A goal that nuclear states currently have is to prevent North Korea from gaining hegemony. Stephen Walt’s “balance-of-threat” realism asserts that nations form alliances based on perceived threat.[16] The issue of North Korean perceived aggression is relevant because together, nuclear states use deterrence tactics to protect themselves. Nikki Haley, the American ambassador to the United Nations, said, “We have to be realistic. Is there anyone who thinks that North Korea would ban nuclear weapons?”[17] It is illogical for nuclear states to sign the UNTPNW when they truly believe North Korea is a threat.

Differing from the type of relations the United States has with North Korea, Russia is at odds with America in a way similar to the Cold War. “Balance of power” realism explains at least why the United States and Russia would not sign the UNTPNW. Balance of power dictates that states will shift their foreign policies in order to keep one state from becoming a global hegemon and having more power than the other states.[18] Robert Jervis, a Columbia University professor, extrapolates upon this definition to discuss the current situation involving nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia. He writes that having nuclear weapons is preventing a war with Russia since the United States and Russia are evenly matched in present nuclear capability and therefore “balanced”. Presently, the only way the Russians would attack the United States would be if the “Russians are so highly motivated to expand that they would be willing to accept any level of destruction as long as they ended up ahead of the West and so were able to dominate the postwar world.”[19]

Even if one did not align with the realist theory of “states wanting survival” and one argued that Russia was indifferent about being destroyed in the process of United-States-takeover, “It is hard to have any sense of what the postwar world would look like, but geography alone should caution against believing that either the United States or Russia could easily dominate the other.”[20] By this logic, signing the UNTPNW would not make sense for America or Russia, for if nuclear weapons were out of the picture, one side could potentially start a conventional conflict in an attempt to win a conventional war. Furthermore, if a conventional war was sparked in the aftermath of nuclear weapons being destroyed and a side won this war, the distance between Russia and the United States would make control of one nation by the other impossible.[21]

The international system would also be affected if the nuclear states signed the UNTPNW. Kenneth Waltz discusses the anarchical international system in “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” when he writes, “For the purpose of developing a theory, states are cast as unitary actors wanting at least to survive, and are taken to be the system’s constituent units. The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy – the  absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force.”[22] New measures would need to be taken to ensure that all signatories follow each part of the Treaty. The treaty mandates that signatory states cannot “develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”[23] How could the international community be sure that the nuclear states, even if they signed the UNTPNW, were fully disarming?

It is my opinion that, in relation to the international system of anarchy, the nuclear states did not sign the UNTPNW because they are not willing to take the risk of fully disarming when there is no confirmation that the rest of the nuclear states are doing the same. To quote Mearsheimer, “Indeed, central wars are likely when there is an especially powerful country in the system. A preponderant power, according to this perspective, is a potential hegemon. It has the wherewithal to make a run at dominating the system, which is the best guarantee of survival in international anarchy. Therefore, it will not be satisfied with the status quo, but instead will look for opportunities to gain hegemony.”[24] I would argue that in the eyes of the state, it makes little sense to sign a treaty that cannot be enforced by any form of international government, and such a government does not exist in the current anarchical sphere of internationalism.

While realism provides the best lens through which to understand why the nuclear states did not sign the UNTPNW, there are disadvantages to using realism that can be explained better as seen through constructivist and liberalist ideology. First, I will discuss reasons the nuclear states refused to sign the UNTPNW best understood through constructivism. In brief, constructivists argue that “individual agents and social structures” matter in the explanations of international outcomes, and that the relationship between the two is “reciprocal and reflexive.” Constructivists are concerned with “norms, identity, and ideas,” and believe that agents’ conceptions of the world are shaped by “the intersubjective structures created and sustained by their activities.”[25]

Signing the UNTPNW, and therefore relinquishing all nuclear weapons, is unthinkable for some nations because to give up nuclear power would be to lose a part of those nations’ identities.[26] For example, I would argue that North Korea would have nothing of significance to their identity if they halted their nuclear tests since there would be no more socially constructed threat to other nations of a nuclear attack by North Korea. If North Korea no longer had nuclear weapons and was no longer considered dangerous, who would “care” about them on the global stage? Therefore, North Korea would never sign the UNTPNW, for their “nuclear identity” would be lost. In relating constructivism to the social relationship that develops between states, Alexander Wendt writes, “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons,”[27] even though North Korea has stated they do not intend to launch a first strike.[28] Only 5 nuclear weapons from such an unpredictable nation are enough to deter the rest of the world, including countries that have been on the world stage for centuries. This shows that great powers’ fear of North Korea and North Korea’s “nuclear identity” have been socially constructed by the numerous (sometimes exaggerated) threats, and historically constructed by the past decade of continued militaristic rhetoric coming from within North Korea aimed at the outside world.

Another constructivist interpretation explaining why the nuclear states did not sign the UNTPNW is Nina Tannenwald’s idea of the “nuclear taboo.” Tannenwald said in an interview, “a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has developed since 1945. [It’s] a normative prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. It is associated with a sense of moral opprobrium regarding such weapons.[29] Tannenwald argues that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 due to socially constructed moral concerns. There is clear historical and social significance here, as the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was traumatic for both the victims and the perpetrators.[30] Tannenwald theorizes that countries will not use nuclear weapons again, despite having the ability to do so. Signing the UNTPNW would be irrelevant for a nuclear state since using the weapons is unforeseeable anyway.[31]

A final way to view the refusal by nuclear states to sign the UNTPNW is through liberalism. Two tenets of liberalism are that international organizations and non-governmental actors are key in shaping state preferences and policy choices and that mutual benefits and international cooperation are necessary for global societal progress.[32] A prominent international organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was a pushback force during the creation of the UNTPNW. Powerful NATO countries urged less influential members along with non-NATO countries to boycott the signing.[33] In a statement released by the NATO council regarding the UNTPNW, it was explained that “Seeking to ban nuclear weapons through a treaty that will not engage any state actually possessing nuclear weapons will not be effective, will not reduce nuclear arsenals, and will neither enhance any country’s security, nor international peace and stability.”[34] NATO doubts that the treaty will effectively create peace, so NATO states (mainly those with nuclear weapons) pressured countries to refrain from signing. The Netherlands, the only NATO member that participated in the conference, wouldn’t sign.[35] This exemplifies liberalism since it is a time when NATO, an international organization, dictated a course of action that affected international policy choices.[36]

As for the principle that economic benefits and international cooperation are vital, many nuclear states did not sign the treaty for financial reasons. Free trade and transport, a concept that embodies mutual benefits, is limited in the UNTPNW. A signatory cannot allow “any stationing…or deployment of any…nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.”[37] Nuclear states (many of whom support free market trade) were not eager to sign a treaty that restricted trade in any sense.

Despite valid advantages of using constructivism and liberalism to explain the refusal by nuclear states to sign the UNTPNW, the advantages of using realism are more compelling and numerous. While it is true that constructivism and liberalism provide helpful theories of analysis, realism offers a broader, more comprehensive, and more applicable range of explanations. Moreover, a government’s primary job is to protect its citizens and keep the nation strong; this is exactly what realism stresses through the four realist tenets of wanting survival, balance of threat, balance of power, and international anarchy.

 

Bibliography

Dorell, Oren. “North Korea Won’t Strike U.S. First despite Inflammatory Threats, Experts Say.”

USA Today, November 17, 2017. Accessed December 8, 2017. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/

world/2017/11/17/north-korea-wont-strike-united-states-first-despite-inflammatory-threats/

872508001/.

Gladstone, Rick. “A Treaty Is Reached to Ban Nuclear Arms. Now Comes the Hard Part.” NY Times (New

York, NY), July 7, 2017, Americas. Accessed December 8, 2017.

Hurd, Ian. “Constructivism.” Oxford Academic, January 18, 2008. Accessed December 8, 2017.

http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/17-Smit-Snidal-c17.pdf.

ICAN. “UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (full text).” International Campaign to

Abolish Nuclear Weapons. http://www.icanw.org/treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, and Daniel H. Nexon. “Whence Causal Mechanisms? A Comment on Legro.”

Dialogue IO 1, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 81-101. Accessed December 8, 2017.

doi:10.1017.S7777777702000079.

Jehangir, Hamza. “Realism, Liberalism and the Possibilities of Peace.” E-International Relations.

Last modified February 19, 2012. Accessed December 8, 2017. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/19/

realism-liberalism-and-the-possibilities-of-peace/.

Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,

  1. Accessed December 8, 2017. https://ares.library.jhu.edu/aresCMS/

ares.dll?Action=10&Type=10&Value=333343.

Mearsheimer, John. Structural Realism to International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity,

by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 71-88. 3rd ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,

  1. Accessed December 8, 2017. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf.

———. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2001.

Norris, Robert S., and Hans M. Kristensen. “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2010.”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2, 2016. Accessed December 7, 2017.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2968/066004008.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” News release. September 20, 2017. Accessed December 8, 2017.

https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/news_146954.htm.

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. 2008 ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.

Shiraev, Eric B. “The Liberal Perspective.” In International Relations, by Eric B. Shiraev and

Vladislav M. Zubok. 2nd ed. N.p.: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Tannenwald, Nina. “The Nuclear Taboo.” Interview. Soka Gakkai International, no. 62 (October 2010):

8-9. Accessed December 8, 2017. http://www.sgi.org/resources/sgi-quarterly-magazine/

1010_62.html.

“The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” 2005 Review Conference of the

Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 22, 2005. Accessed December

7, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html.

United Nations. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” UNODA.

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.

———. “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.” United Nations.

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/.

Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security 9, no.

4 (Spring 1985): 3-43. doi:10.2307/2538540.

Waltz, Kenneth N. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History

18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 615-28. Accessed December 8, 2017. http://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/

Waltz.pdf.

———. Theory of International Politics. 2010. Reprint, Long Grove, IL: Waveland

Press, 1979.

[1] United Nations. “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.” United Nations.      https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Norris, Robert S., and Hans M. Kristensen. “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2010.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2, 2016. Accessed      December 7, 2017. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2968/066004008.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, May 22, 2005. Accessed December 7, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/
conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html.

[6]United Nations. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).”
UNODA. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.

[7]Gladstone, Rick. “A Treaty Is Reached to Ban Nuclear Arms. Now Comes the Hard
Part.” NY Times (New York, NY), July 7, 2017, Americas. Accessed December
8, 2017.

[8] Mearshiemer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W. W.
Norton, 2001.

[9] Ibid

[10] Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. 2008 ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1966.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13]Jehangir, Hamza. “Realism, Liberalism and the Possibilities of Peace.”
E-International Relations. Last modified February 19, 2012. Accessed
December 8, 2017. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/19/
realism-liberalism-and-the-possibilities-of-peace/.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. 2010. Reprint, Long
Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979.

[16] Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.”
International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3-43. doi:10.2307/2538540.

[17]Gladstone, Rick. “A Treaty Is Reached to Ban Nuclear Arms. Now Comes the Hard
Part.” NY Times (New York, NY), July 7, 2017, Americas. Accessed December 8, 2017.

[18] Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W. W.
Norton, 2001.

[19] Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1989. Accessed December 8, 2017.
https://ares.library.jhu.edu/aresCMS/ares.dll?Action=10&Type=10&Value=333343.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22]Waltz, Kenneth N. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” Journal of

Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 615-28. Accessed

December 8, 2017. http://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/Waltz.pdf.

[23] ICAN. “UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (full text).”

International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. http://www.icanw.org/

treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/.

[24]Mearsheimer, John. Structural Realism to International Relations Theories:

     Discipline and Diversity, by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith,

71-88. 3rd ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013. Accessed December

8, 2017. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf.

[25] Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, and Daniel H. Nexon. “Whence Causal Mechanisms? A

Comment on Legro.” Dialogue IO 1, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 81-101. Accessed

December 8, 2017. doi:10.1017.S7777777702000079.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Hurd, Ian. “Constructivism.” Oxford Academic, January 18, 2008. Accessed

December 8, 2017. http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/

17-Smit-Snidal-c17.pdf.

[28] Dorell, Oren. “North Korea Won’t Strike U.S. First despite Inflammatory Threats,

Experts Say.” USA Today, November 17, 2017. Accessed December 8, 2017.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/11/17/

north-korea-wont-strike-united-states-first-despite-inflammatory-threats/

872508001/.

[29]Tannenwald, Nina. “The Nuclear Taboo.” Interview. Soka Gakkai International, no.

62 (October 2010): 8-9. Accessed December 8, 2017. http://www.sgi.org/

resources/sgi-quarterly-magazine/1010_62.html.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32]Shiraev, Eric B. “The Liberal Perspective.” In International Relations, by Eric

  1. Shiraev and Vladislav M. Zubok. 2nd ed. N.p.: Oxford University Press,

2015.

[33]  North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “North Atlantic Council Statement on the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” News release. September 20,
2017. Accessed December 8, 2017. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/
news_146954.htm.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Gladstone, Rick. “A Treaty Is Reached to Ban Nuclear Arms. Now Comes the Hard
Part.” NY Times (New York, NY), July 7, 2017, Americas. Accessed December
8, 2017.

[36] Shiraev, Eric B. “The Liberal Perspective.” In International Relations, by Eric

  1. Shiraev and Vladislav M. Zubok. 2nd ed. N.p.: Oxford University Press,

2015.

[37] ICAN. “UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (full text).”

International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. http://www.icanw.org/

treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/.

The End of East Asian Pacifism: Nuclear Policy in Japan and South Korea

Written by Aaron Pultman and Sarah Rosenberg on November 17, 2017

Executive Summary

North Korea’s nuclear arsenal poses a monumental threat to its neighbors throughout Asia. South Korea and Japan, however, are in particular danger due to their proximity to the rogue nation and their ties to the United States. There are numerous possible solutions to resolve this danger, yet they vary in their efficacy, feasibility, and practicality. Two specific possibilities stand out from previous literature on the subject: Japan and South Korea can develop their own nuclear arsenals, or maintain the status quo by relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Both of these strategies carry just as many drawbacks as positive aspects, including cost and effectiveness. We propose a different solution: the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan and Korea. This solution rates the highest in its practicality and capability to truly deter North Korean aggression. We use speeches, polls, and articles to demonstrate that this solution would be met with favor in the two countries. This strategy will provide the region with a stable measure to counter North Korean nuclear hostility and maintain peace.

Introduction

            There are numerous security threats currently facing Asia, ranging from China’s desire to achieve hegemony in the region, Russia’s coziness with strongmen in the area like Xi Jinping, and, most significantly, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This rogue state has repeatedly demonstrated its nuclear capability and its constantly improving ballistic missile technology. Both Japan and South Korea lie in geographic proximity to North Korea, leaving them exposed to a variety of conflicts with the latter. Additionally, Japan and South Korea are both steadfast allies of the U.S. Consequently, tension between the U.S. and North Korea could also affect Japan and South Korea. Finally, conflict has occurred in the past and, given North Korea’s recent aggressive posture, it is a distinct possibility. One option for responding to the threat is through Japanese and Korean nuclear weapons. This paper seeks to answer the question of what, if any, nuclear measures should Japan and South Korea attempt.

Literature Review

Many scholars argue against the Japanese and Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons. Earlier literature focuses on China as the primary threat given its desire to attain regional hegemony. In addition, there was apprehension that if the Sino-American relationship improved, Tokyo and Seoul would feel isolated.[1] Some policy officials worry whether a cascade effect could occur if either country attained nuclear weapons; it could open the door for countries like Myanmar, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Australia to create their own programs out of fear of North Korea.[2] Lee Choon-geun of the Korean Institute for International Economic Policy claims that if South Korea obtained nuclear weapons, Japan would undoubtedly follow.[3] As such, if China wants to avoid this cascade in order to maintain its hegemonic position, it would be in its interest to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Notably, this stance aligns with that of the U.S. and the international community.[4]

With South Korea specifically, most scholarship focuses on developing a stronger relationship with the North and rolling back their nuclear program. Prominent national figures such as former President Park Geun-hye, have argued for trust building between the two countries in the past.[5] This perspective is maintained by numerous scholars and policymakers despite the ultimate failure of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy[6]. The biggest factor for many scholars is whether the U.S. can guarantee the security of South Korea given its proximity to the North.[7] There exists, however, contradicting opinions whether the U.S. can do so, particularly given its robust trade relationship with China, Pyongyang’s biggest ally. It is notable that the majority of scholarship on the South Korean nuclear question was primarily written in the early 2000s, as most modern academic literature focuses on the role of China as a mediator and the possibility of Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons.

This question of nuclearization of Japan and South Korea is particularly pertinent given the current regional dynamics. Opinion remains divided both in the academic community and among policymakers, with particularly stark differences between public opinion in these two countries. Many, however, focus on whether Japan and South Korea should manufacture their own nuclear weapons or merely strengthen the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Instead, both countries should consider stationing U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil in order to more effectively deter North Korea. U.S. security guarantees have failed to slow North Korea’s nuclear program; therefore new measures should be taken.

Analysis & Discussion

Given the importance of the Korean and Japanese governments’ official stance on the issue, documents from the Prime Minister’s or President’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and other related government institutions proved to be particularly valuable. In addition, documents from international organizations like the United Nations are relevant given Japan’s leadership in nonproliferation efforts. To gain a scholarly view on the subject, defense and international relations journals provided various literature, demonstrating how the academic world believed the issue could be solved. Finally, English newspapers in Japan and South Korea contributed information on the media and broader public’s view through reporting, polls, and editorials.

In Japan, members of the Liberal Democratic Party are more open to the idea of nuclear weapons. Despite Japan’s three non-nuclear principles — no possessing, manufacturing, or allowing nuclear weapons on its territory – some LDP officials propose reinterpreting the Constitution to permit some form of nuclear protection. Former LDP Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba suggested allowing U.S. nuclear weapons on Japanese soil to deter North Korea, though he condemned manufacturing their own weapons.[8] This position is still highly controversial in Japan: recent numbers show that fewer than one in ten Japanese citizens support nuclear armament, yet the LDP has continued to win elections.[9]

Most recently, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe received a stronger mandate after calling for snap elections in October 2017.[10] While LDP policies extend beyond North Korea, Abe campaigned on building up the Japanese military and revising Article 9.[11] With the new elections, Abe obtained the necessary majority to do so and plans to rewrite the constitution by 2020.[12] Despite the lack of popular support among Japanese citizens, they would likely be more inclined to accept nuclear armament if South Korea did so first. When discussing a nuclearized Japan and South Korea, many scholars speak of both acquiring nuclear weapons rather than simply one country. If the security situation becomes dire enough, Japan will have little choice but to allow nuclear weapons on its territory.

Japan and the U.S. cooperate closely on security, but as early as 2012 the LDP recognized Japan must do more to protect itself. When the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, lost to LDP in 2012, the ruling government issued a new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). It expressed the need to maintain and strengthen ballistic missile defense, in particular, to address the threat of nuclear weapons. The document explicitly mentions North Korea, China, and Russia as posing the greatest risks to Japanese security, though the government recognized that the likelihood of conflict remained low at that time.[13] While the NDPG states that Japan will play a “rigorous and active role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts,” it also recognizes that Japanese defense must be constantly reevaluated to ensure it is meeting the necessities of the current security environment.[14] Given North Korea’s recent antagonistic behavior, Abe will likely try to expedite the process of redefining Japan’s pacifist constitution in order to comply with the NDPG’s directive of changing defense to meet the security conditions.

Many in the international community have expressed concerns over Japan’s new defensive attitude, particularly at the UN. Every year, Japan submits a resolution to the UN General Assembly on nonproliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons. This year, however, delegates expressed apprehension about the wording of the resolution, raising the possibility that Japan watered down the language in order to justify the potential use of nuclear weapons.[15] Japanese officials claim, however, that they faced pressure from the U.S. to make this change.[16] In the text of the resolution, rather than acknowledging “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons,” the new resolution says, “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use.”[17] This small change in language contains drastic implications for Japan’s efforts in fighting North Korea because it no longer excludes the use of nuclear weapons against the regime. The resolution demonstrates that Japan is willing to risk its international image as the leader of the nonproliferation movement in order to counter North Korea. Perhaps the next step is to adjust its nuclear policy.

            In South Korea, the debate over a nuclear counter to the North dominates politics. With just under two hundred kilometers between Seoul and Pyongyang, South Korea has always sought ways to deter the threat from North Korea, yet early efforts primarily focused on nonproliferation. South Korea had a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, but the U.S. forced the government to abandon the project.[18] In 1991, President Roh Tae Woo said that South Korea would not, “manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.”[19] Only two months later, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In this agreement, both sides pledged not to “test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes; and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment.”[20] Implementation of the agreement’s inspection regime stalled in 1993 due to revelations about the North Korean nuclear program. Despite this setback, South Korea has not renounced its obligations under the treaty.[21] Given the North’s recent escalations of nuclear testing, attitudes towards Seoul’s obligation to the treaty are beginning to change.

While for decades it seemed unthinkable, Korean opinions on nuclear weapons have recently begun to shift. A poll conducted by Gallup Korea found that 60% of Koreans support nuclear weapons for their country.[22] Woo Yoo-chul, a senior figure in the then-ruling Saenuri Party, suggested last year that Korea should develop “peaceful” nuclear weapons to counter the North.[23] This recommendation is in part caused by a lack of faith in the continuing efficacy of the U.S. nuclear umbrella under President Trump. These concerns created broader support for a different proposal: the redeployment of American nuclear weapons to South Korea.

For many years, the U.S. maintained an arsenal of nearly one hundred nuclear weapons in South Korea. In 1991, however, President George H.W. Bush withdrew them under the condition that Moscow withdrew its own weapons from the Peninsula as well.[24] Recently, there has been a major push to bring the weapons back. A poll by YTN, a Korean cable news company, found that 68% of Koreans supported the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons.[25] Several months ago, Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo said that redeployment was an idea worth reviewing.[26] President Moon Jae-in has publicly opposed the idea while the opposition Liberty Korea Party strongly argues for redeployment.[27] These varying political positions demonstrate the gap between public officials’ opinions and the general public.

One of the obstacles that Japan and South Korea must overcome in deterring North Korea is the risk of international condemnation. Both countries signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and would risk sanctions if they violated its terms or withdrew. Although the international community may be reluctant to sanction two of the world’s largest economies, it would still cause international outrage and undermine the NPT.[28] Some nuclear weapons experts, however, argue that the treaty has been a failure for Asian democracies; thus these countries should not adhere to it. While Japan’s pacifist constitution is expected, it is no longer sustainable with the threats from North Korea.[29] Its acquisition or stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons may seem symbolic, but realistically neither Japan nor South Korea are aggressive powers. These proposals should not be taken lightly, but one should also be pragmatic about the security situation. In addition, the election of President Trump has complicated matters given his statements that he would not object to either country obtaining nuclear weapons.[30] It is unclear whether or not he will make policy based on that assertion, but it is likely that he would take a more favorable position to aggressive nuclear policies in both Japan and South Korea.

Conclusion

Under the current security situation, Japan and South Korea must seriously consider reevaluating their nuclear policies. Both governments are undergoing that process, though the Korean situation may change under Moon Jae-in. Rather than creating their own programs, stationing U.S. nuclear weapons would be the most effective way to deter North Korea. The world does not need more nuclear weapons, and deploying U.S. weapons instead would ensure security while not condoning increased proliferation. This move is unlikely to lead to a cascade effect, as Japan and South Korea are most threatened by North Korea, and other countries will feel more secure with weapons. Despite the stigma of this decision, current policies have failed; these countries must change their positions or face the threat of nuclear annihilation.

 

 

Bibliography

 

The Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, Japan). “Ex-defense chief Ishiba suggests change in anti-nuke

policy.” September 7, 2017. http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201709070030.html.

 

Chan, Melissa. “Here’s What Donald Trump Has Said About Nuclear Weapons.” Time. August 3,

  1. http://time.com/4437089/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-nukes/.

 

Corrs, Anders. “Japan: Go Nuclear Now.” Forbes. February 1, 2017.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan-go-nuclear-now/#e66345677459.

 

Geun-hye, Park. “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang.”

Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September/October 2011). http://www.jstor.org/stable/23041772.

 

Government of Japan. “Defense National Program Guidelines.” December 17, 2013.

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NDPG(Summary).pdf

 

Fifield, Anna. “South Korea’s defense minister suggests bringing back tactical U.S. nuclear

weapons.” The Washington Post. September 4, 2017. http://wapo.st/2wAKCzV?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.4024e80f663c.

 

The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan). “An idea buds in the U.S. that Japan should go nuclear.”

October 24, 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/10/24/commentary/world-commentary/idea-buds-u-s-japan-go-nuclear/#.WgyDqRNSyRu.

 

Kojo, Hirotaka. “40,000 protest Abe’s plans to revise Article 9 of Constitution.” The Asahi

Shimbun (Tokyo, Japan), November 4, 2017.

http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201711040033.html.

 

Lee, Dennis. “A Nuclear Japan: The Push for Weaponization.” Harvard International Review 35,

  1. 1 (Summer 2013). http://www.jstor.org/stable/42763538.

 

Lee, Michelle Ye Hee. “More than ever, South Koreans want their own nuclear weapons.” The

Washington Post. September 13, 2017. http://wapo.st/2y3N4zd?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.de0774d80a9d.

 

O’Neil, Andrew. “Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?”

International Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 2011). http://www.jstor.org/stable/41306998.

 

Osaki, Tomohiro. “Abe claims victory as powerful endorsement, may seek re-election next

month.” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), October 23, 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/23/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-claims-victory-powerful-endorsement-may-seek-re-election-next-month/#.WgG1ABNSyRs.

 

Ota, Masakatsu. “Japan waters down text of annual anti-nuclear resolution to imply acceptable

use of nukes.” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), October 21, 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/21/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-pressure-japan-waters-text-anti-nuclear-resolution/#.WfjBPBNSyRu.

 

Park, Ju-min. “Calls in South Korea for nuclear weapons as parliamentary poll looms.” Reuters.

February 15, 2016. http://reut.rs/1mCiqG2.

 

Sanger, David, Choe Sang-Hun, and Motoko Rich. “North Korea Rouses Neighbors to

Reconsider Nuclear Weapons.” The New York Times. October 28, 2017. https://nyti.ms/2iHZo5h.

 

“South Korea.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. December 2015.

http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/nuclear.

 

UN General Assembly. “Approving 18 Drafts on Disarmament Measures, First Committee Urges

General Assembly Call for States to Sign Nuclear-Weapon-Ban Treaty.” News release. October 27, 2017. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/gadis3590.doc.htm.

 

UN General Assembly, Draft Resolution L.35, “General and complete disarmament: United

action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” October 12, 2017.

 

Woo, Roh Tae. “President Roh Tae Woo’s Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace

Initiatives.” Federation of Atomic Scientists. November 8, 1991.

 

 

[1] Dennis Lee, “A Nuclear Japan: The Push for Weaponization,” Harvard International Review 35, no. 1 (Summer 2013): 8, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42763538.

[2] David Sanger, Choe Sang-Hun, and Motoko Rich, “North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weapons,” The New York Times, October 28, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2iHZo5h.

[3] “An idea buds in the U.S. that Japan should go nuclear,” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), October 24, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/10/24/commentary/world-commentary/idea-buds-u-s-japan-go-nuclear/#.WgyDqRNSyRu.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September/October 2011): 14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23041772.

[6] The Sunshine Policy was the name given to South Korea’s foreign policy stance towards the North from 1998 to 2008. It entailed greater communication with and economic aid to North Korea.

[7] Andrew O’Neil, “Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 2011): 1439, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41306998.

[8] “Ex-defense chief Ishiba suggests change in anti-nuke policy,” The Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, Japan), September 7, 2017, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201709070030.html.

[9] Sanger, Sang-Hun, and Rich, “North Korea Rouses.”

[10] Tomohiro Osaki, “Abe claims victory as powerful endorsement, may seek re-election next month,” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), October 23, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/23/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-claims-victory-powerful-endorsement-may-seek-re-election-next-month/#.WgG1ABNSyRs.

[11] Hirotaka Kojo, “40,000 protest Abe’s plans to revise Article 9 of Constitution,” The Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, Japan), November 4, 2017, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201711040033.html.

[12] Osaki, “Abe claims.”

[13] Government of Japan, “Defense National Program Guidelines,” December 17, 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NDPG(Summary).pdf

[14] Ibid.

[15] UN General Assembly, “Approving 18 Drafts on Disarmament Measures, First Committee Urges General Assembly Call for States to Sign Nuclear-Weapon-Ban Treaty,” press release, October 27, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/gadis3590.doc.htm.

[16] Masakatsu Ota, “Japan waters down text of annual anti-nuclear resolution to imply acceptable use of nukes,” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), October 21, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/21/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-pressure-japan-waters-text-anti-nuclear-resolution/#.WfjBPBNSyRu.

[17] UN General Assembly, Draft Resolution L.35, “General and complete disarmament: United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” October 12, 2017.

[18] “South Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 2015, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/nuclear.

[19] Roh Tae Woo, “President Roh Tae Woo’s Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives,” Federation of Atomic Scientists, November 8, 1991.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “More than ever, South Koreans want their own nuclear weapons,” The Washington Post, September 13, 2017, http://wapo.st/2y3N4zd?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.de0774d80a9d.

[23] Ju-min Park, “Calls in South Korea for nuclear weapons as parliamentary poll looms,” Reuters, February 15, 2016, http://reut.rs/1mCiqG2.

[24] Anna Fifield, “South Korea’s defense minister suggests bringing back tactical U.S. nuclear weapons,” The Washington Post, September 4, 2017, http://wapo.st/2wAKCzV?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.4024e80f663c.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Sanger, Sang-Hun, and Rich, “North Korea Rouses.”

[29] Anders Corrs, “Japan: Go Nuclear Now,” Forbes, February 1, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan-go-nuclear-now/#e66345677459.

[30] Melissa Chan, “Here’s What Donald Trump Has Said About Nuclear Weapons,” Time, August 3, 2016, http://time.com/4437089/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-nukes/.

Honduras’ Election Fraud: Are the U.S. & Canada to Blame?

 

Written by Allie McManus on December 11, 2017

Introduction

Latin America has a history of external influences proven to be detrimental to its society, from Spanish colonialism to U.S. fruit companies. Today, this pattern of economic extraction continues, but a surprising new agent engages in the same behavior– Canada. Fatigued by centuries of imperialism impeding true autonomy, Latin American countries today continue to struggle ineffective self-governance.

This paper will focus specifically on Honduras, where on November 26, 2017, protests broke out across the country in response to government manipulation and voter fraud in the re-election of President Juan Orlando Hérnandez. Protests continue internationally by organizations such as the European Union and the Organization of American States, who have questioned the legitimacy and transparency of the Honduran electoral commission. Squelching the voice of the Honduran populace either through the election of illegitimate political actors or the improper removal of legitimately elected officials by a series of military coups–as recent as eight years ago–Honduras remains a democratically fragile state.

Given the desire of international businesses to protect their interests in Honduras and other Latin American countries, it comes as no surprise that the propagation of illegitimate political actors and military coups would be fomented abroad. Each of the three Honduran military coups (1963, 1975, and 2009) was supported by international powers. A battle-weary populace jaded by the undue influence of foreign actors continues to yield a wavering democracy.

In this paper, I will argue that Honduras’ democratic fragility, and the current allegations of election fraud, are the result of centuries of economic imperialist intervention from Spanish colonialism to modern U.S. and Canadian economic imperialism.

History of ‘Imperialism’ in Honduras

Spanish Colonialism

The history of imperialism in Honduras began when the Spanish crown colonized San Gil de Buenavista in 1502 (Leonard 2011, pg. xxiii). The Spanish strategy for colonization was highly effective: they captured Limpera, the indigenous’ leader, to subdue the opposition. As the Spanish acquired the wealth of the indigenous peoples, they appropriated control of the existing methods of taxation, tribute, and forced labor, transferring power from the former leader to themselves, a new societal elite. It wasn’t, however, just the creation of a social elite that created a new order. The Spanish also created a web of institutions designed to exploit the indigenous population, such as encomienda, mitas, repartimiento, and trajin. These economic structures created a new subclass that turned the indigenous into indentured servants (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). The Spanish, at the inception of colonial rule, constructed institutions that centralized power for the interests of the new elite while marginalizing the indigenous.

“Banana Republic”

In 1821, Honduras gained independence from the Spanish crown (Leonard 2011) yet the small nation remained an economic colony of the industrial powers. Ellen Meiksins Wood, a prolific Marxist theorist, posits that today “capitalist imperialism has become almost entirely a matter of economic domination, in which market imperatives, manipulated by the dominant capitalist powers, are made to do the work no longer done by imperial states or colonial settlers” (Wood 2003). In particular, it is maintained that throughout the twentieth century, the world hegemon, the United States, used ‘market imperatives’ such as inexpensive labor in autocratic states to control the fate of Honduran politics in its favor.

U.S. economic imperialism began in Honduras at the dawn of the banana industry when major U.S. multinationals, like United Fruit Co. and Standard Fruit Co., took control of Honduran telecommunications and national newspapers (Bucheli 2008). United Fruit Co. financed the presidential campaign of Tiburcio Carias out of fear that emerging left-leaning worker’s policies would damage the growing industry. Carias was subsequently elected and his presidency led to a military dictatorship until 1949 (Bucheli & Kim 2012). Carias jailed and exiled his opponents, outlawed the Communist Party, and fortified the military, leaving a long-lasting impact that damaged any hope of developing democratic institutions (Leonard 2011, pg. 113). Meanwhile, the U.S. ratified the “Good Neighbor Policy” in 1933, agreeing to nonintervention in Latin America, while legislating certain trade agreements to decrease tariffs abroad to stimulate U.S. industry during the Great Depression (Leonard 2011, pg. 116). On paper, the U.S. claimed that they kept their hands out of Latin American politics, but the reality was much different: the United States supported General Carias dictatorship (Fenner 2012).

In the 1950’s, in response to imbalanced and unfair U.S. policies, several communist and populist organizations emerged in Honduras. In 1957, Ramón Villeda Morales, an anti-American, left-leaning physician became president on the platform for increased welfare for the country’s poor. Morales initiated a new national labor code that provided an increased minimum wage, improved working conditions, mandatory severance pay, vacations, workmen’s compensation, and maternity leave (Leonard 2011, pg. 144). These policies not only threatened profit margins for banana companies but also alarmed the U.S. government who was amidst the Cold War on an anti-communism ideology. In 1963, the United States was “decisive” in delivering a coup in Honduras — ousting President Morales weeks before an upcoming election and replacing him with Oswaldo López Arellano (Coatsworth 2017; Buceli 2008; Leonard 2011).

Just like with Carias, López Arellano’s dictatorship was fraught with human rights abuses and a buttressing of the foreign Banana industry. Under his leadership, United Fruit Co. and Standard Fruit Co. did not pay income tax on their gains in the country (Leonard 2011, pg. 151). Several years later, a number of Honduran press releases discovered that Arellano had received a $1.25 million bribe from United Fruit Company to lower a banana export tax (The New York Times, 1975). Displeased with his corruption, the military found it essential to overthrow Arellano, which only continued to weaken the leadership in Honduras and facilitated yet another military dictatorship.

The 2009 Coup

In the next fifty years, Honduras was unable to free itself from the shackles of external influence. Fast-forward to the twenty-first century and similar patterns of economic imperialism continue to persist. It is argued that the 2009 Honduran coup and subsequent international support was the product of U.S. and Canadian fears that their economic interests were in jeopardy.

On June 28, 2009, José Manuel Zelaya, the democratically elected President of Honduras was deposed by the military, forced into exile, and replaced by Roberto Micheletti (Leonard 2011, pg. 174). Five months later, in November 2009, a second election was managed by the pro-coup supporters and Porfirio Lobo emerged as the new leader. There are several problems with this Lobo’s administration. The first problem goes to the very structure of the administration, where many whom Lobo appointed initiated the undemocratic coup, an act that threatens democratic order. The second is the cessation of fundamental human rights and state-sponsored repression under Lobo’s administration. In 2010, Human Rights Watch released a report stating “at least eight journalists and ten members of the National Popular Resistance Front (FNRP) – a political group that opposed the 2009 coup and advocated the reinstatement of Zelaya – have been killed since President Lobo assumed power on January 27, 2010. There has also been a significant increase in threats against journalists and opposition members during this period” (Honduras: Ongoing Attacks Foster Climate of Intimidation 2010).

The U.S. Role in 2009 Coup

Despite the obvious threat to democracy and lack of protection for journalists and free speech, the Americans and Canadians have prioritized their economic interests above their democratic responsibility by supporting President Lobo.

The previously ousted President Zelaya created too much risk for U.S. business interests through his economic reforms to support small landowners, raising the minimum wage by sixty percent, and lowering interest rates (Valle 2013). He also sought to limit the monopolistic behavior of U.S. mining companies operating in the country by banning open-pit mining and the use of several toxic substances (COHA 2015). Zelaya’s policies are remarkably reminiscent of those of policies of President Morales who was ousted in 1963 for similar reasons.

Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State of the U.S., writes in her book Hard Choices that she admits her desire to prevent Zelaya’s return:  “In the subsequent days [after the coup] I spoke with my counterparts around the hemisphere, including Secretary Espinosa in Mexico. We strategized on a plan to restore order in Honduras and ensure that free and fair elections could be held quickly and legitimately, which would render the question of Zelaya moot” (Clinton 2014). Equally, in July 2013, four years after the coup, President Obama met with President Lobo at the White House and praised him for leadership and “restoration of democratic practices” in Honduras (“Obama Meets Honduran President Lobo” 2015). Yet, in contrast, and what might be most telling, is Honduran scholar Dona Frank’s opinion in Foreign Affairs magazine (2013) where he offers that U.S. support for coup loyalists opens the door for further “violence and anarchy.”
The Canadian Role in 2009 Coup

Canada has thirty-seven companies operating in Honduras totaling $26.8 million CAD a year in business volume (Honduras – Export Development Canada, 2017). Canada imports manufactured and industrial raw materials, fuels, machinery, and transport equipment, and food and animal products (Gordon & Webber, 2016). Most striking is that ninety percent of Canada’s foreign mining investment is limited to one country: Honduras (Escalera-Flexhaug 2017).

As Zelaya built ties with other center-left governments in Latin America, the Canadian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, sought to end Honduran protectionist policies. When Zelaya was ousted, the Canadian government made no effort to condemn those preventing the democratically elected president from returning. Rather, Peter Kent, the Canadian Minister of State for the Americas, stated in a CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Company) program that Zelaya’s “attempts to re-enter the country… [are]…very unhelpful to the situation” (“Rights Action Coup Alert #41” 2009).

Post-coup, Canadians positioned themselves as mediators between Zelaya’s forces and the dictatorship with the affirmation of the “Tegucigalpa-San José Accord.” This deal is particularly alarming because it affirmed “national unity” between Zelaya and the dictatorship. Post-signing, Neil Reeder, the Canadian Ambassador to Honduras, reported that “as a long-standing aid, trade, and investment partner with Honduras, we were delighted with this outcome,” (Reeder 2009), an explicit demonstration of Canadian powers to push for an unequal and unjust resolution to resume its trade and support its economic interests.

Neil Reeder, Canadian Member of Parliament, speaking to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, condemned Zelaya’s ousting but stated:

we should not deny the people of Honduras the opportunity to benefit from a free-trade agreement with us….There is a lot of potential for them to profit from Canadian markets, in that they can export their food products to Canada…We saw this with Costa Rica, for example, or in the small Central American countries that have huge export potential, which helps the national economy, creates jobs and attracts Canadian investments. This is already going on in Honduras, but I think that a free-trade agreement will increase confidence” (House of Commons Canada, 2011).  

Despite President Lobo’s relationship to the 2009 coup and gross human rights violations, House of Commons members and other Canadian officials were delighted with the new President because of his willingness to facilitate Canadian business interests. In 2011, President Lobo held an investment conference called “Honduras is Open for Business” attended by many Canadian investors (Escalera-Flexhaug, 2014). Former Canadian Ambassador to Central America Cameron Mackay published an op-ed piece in the Honduran Daily titled “Canada and Honduras, working together” where he says he is “pleased that Honduras is under the leadership of Porfirio Lobo” (Mackay, 2014).

Indeed Canadian political theorists Todd Gordon and Jeffrey Webber’s attack Canada’s veritable incongruity of words versus actions in their book “Blood of Extraction” (2016) where they the authors argue that “Canadian interests are fraught with contradiction and instability in Latin America and require state protection if they are not to be undermined. Providing such protection is the overarching goal of Canadian foreign policy in the region – whether it’s diplomatic, developmental, or security form—to ensure the successful expansion of Canadian capital in its relentless and insatiable drive for profit” (pg. 3). Herein lies the very essence of introverted political interests with little regard for the institutional development of marginalized nations.  

While approaching their extractive economic interests is different, both the Americans and Canadians have remarkably similar intents, particularly after the 2009 coup.

Election Fraud in 2017

This pattern continues into the present. This November 26 in a national election for the presidency, Salvador Nasrella (Kahn 2017) challenged incumbent Juan Orlando Hernández, who National Public Radio (NPR) calls “a close U.S. ally,” After the first partial results were released, Nasralla lead by 3.3%. Immediately counting stopped for 36 hours and then resumed with paradoxically with Hernández leading, causing suspicions since Congress, controlled by Hernandez’s party, appoints the election tribunal. (“Honduras election: Opposition candidate Nasralla rejects poll count”). The Organization of American States (OAS) released a statement that “irregularities, errors and systematic problems” with the election process meant they could not be certain of the results (“OAS says Honduran vote results in doubt due to ‘irregularities'”, 2017).

Thousands of protesters took to the streets in the capital, Tegucigalpa, to protest manipulation of the vote count (“Honduras Election”). Across social media, videos were shared of young protesters being killed or beaten by security forces. A ten-day curfew was imposed, but law enforcement ignored the curfew to join in the protest (Kahn 2017).

Despite the irregularities in the voting process, little mention is given to President Hernandez’s “Supreme Court Packed” group of individuals who overturned recent legislation on term limits enabling Hernandez to continue to remain in office (Kahn 2017). These actions were found to be egregious even to the countries that participated in this centuries-long paradigm, including the United States Department Official who advised Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. on Central America, Juan Gonzalez: “the electoral commission should find a way to be transparent and make sure that the O.A.S. and the E.U. have as much access as possible,” said that the final result should have “international validation,” he said (Malkin, 2017).

Equally, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, called for “all parties to resolve any disagreement peacefully, transparently, and in line with the highest democratic and human rights standards. Participatory, transparent, and credible electoral processes are cornerstones of democracy” (Government of Canada, 2017).

Conclusion

Centuries ago, Spanish economic structures in the name of commerce sapped economic and political potential among the Latin countries to create perpetual dependence, instability, and a permanent underclass. In North America, it was impossible for the British to coerce the indigenous to work and as a result, they were forced to complete the work themselves (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). The British realized that it’s only option was to create economically viable institutions that incentivized investment and hard work (ibid).

U.S. and Canadian involvement in Honduras served only to advance a centuries-old structure of instability in its political economy, creating the recipe for modern institutional failure. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) write in their book Why Nations Fail, contrary to the political and economic stability enjoyed in the developed world, these same foreign nations (to protect their financial interests in the developing world) create a different incentive for its political leaders. Their foreign policy towards Honduras for example, prioritizing economic interests, sets a precedent for further anarchy. The Spanish colonial regime created the institutions used to exploit those who lived in the colonies, and later in history, power shifted to U.S. and Canadian interests, who then capitalized on pre-existing institutions to perpetuate this dynamic.

For centuries, Honduras and its people have been denied political transparency, accountability, and political power of, by, and for the people.  As a result, these institutional weaknesses materialize into an unraveling democratic crisis. Despite their condemnation, the United States and Canada are responsible for the perpetuation of institutions that facilitate the present situation in Honduras.

 

References

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IR Theory & Aliens

Welcome to the first official podcast by the Hopkins Podcast on Foreign Affairs! Today we talk about the three fundamental theories of international relations and how we can apply these theories to an alien invasion.
The idea for this podcast stemmed from the book International Politics and Zombies by Daniel Drezner, go read it!