Starting in late 2025 through January 2026, Myanmar’s military junta held elections to transition to a formal government. These elections came after five years of bloody civil war defined by countless human rights abuses. In order to secure their victory, the junta banned opposing parties and jailed political dissidents. While many countries have decried the election results as illegitimate, establishing a formal government will give the military a false sense of legitimacy. China is the most dominant outside actor in the country, maintaining economic and political ties with both the junta and rebel groups. International law has failed to bring the perpetrators of war crimes to justice, and ASEAN’s non-existent enforcement mechanisms are unable to put pressure on the country to restore democracy. Myanmar’s government facade provides opportunities for economic investment and increases China’s influence in the country. Meanwhile, mass casualties and humanitarian catastrophes plague the nation. As China seeks to develop a trade corridor through the country, the humanitarian situation will worsen. For the junta’s attempt at legitimization to fail, and as a first step to restoring democracy, the international community must not leave Myanmar in the hands of China.

On February 1, 2021, a military junta in Myanmar overthrew the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and imprisoned party leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. In an initial response to the coup, tens of thousands of people joined a civil disobedience movement by refusing to go to work until the NLD returned to power. When peaceful disobedience failed, millions of people took to the streets to protest. On February 21 in Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar by population, the military opened fire on a crowd of protestors, killing 18 people and injuring 30 others.¹ Despite the violent repression, protests in the country raged on. In the city of Bago, coalitions of protestors formed barricades and improvised bunkers. By April, they armed themselves with makeshift weapons. During the day, tens of thousands of people were stationed at barricades, with smaller coalitions of medics stationed at night. Early in the morning on April 9, military vehicles entered Bago, and troops opened fire on the barricades. At least 82 people were killed.² Five years later, the situation remains largely the same. The military continuously kills civilians by deliberately targeting schools, hospitals, and displacement camps. Fighting between ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the junta continues to devastate villages.³ The junta has failed disastrously at stabilizing the country or gaining any credibility on the global stage.

To transition to a civilian government, the military junta held elections from December 2025 to January 2026. However, over one-third of Myanmar lacks the infrastructure to set up voting stations, millions have been internally displaced, and the junta banned more than 40 political organizations from running, including the NLD.⁴ The election results were effectively determined before it began. The junta’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won the parliament, and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing became president. During the election process, the military conducted 408 aerial attacks, killing at least 170 civilians.⁵ While neither ASEAN nor the UN has recognized the election results, forming a civilian branch will give the military government greater legitimacy. In early December, Min Aung Hlaing met with China’s Xi Jinping and India’s Narendra Modi, who both expressed support for the fraudulent elections.⁶ Min Aung Hlaing is further enabled to remain in power by a decline in international support for the pro-democracy movement. Additionally, a decrease in foreign aid from both the U.S. and Europe, often due to domestic concerns about budget deficits, has gutted humanitarian efforts in the country. The decrease in rights advocacy and foreign aid lowers the diplomatic costs of working with the military government.⁷ The veneer of a parliamentary government has already led the U.S. to believe that Myanmar is stabilizing. In November 2025, the U.S. removed Burmese refugees’ temporary protected status, with Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem stating that conditions in Myanmar had “improved enough that it is safe for Burmese citizens to return home.”⁸ The order prompted widespread criticism, with the director of Asia Human Rights and Labor Advocates Phil Robertson stating Noem will “literally be sending them back to prisons, brutal torture, and death in Myanmar.”⁹ The international community has failed in its commitment to democracy and restoring peace to Myanmar; instead, countries are prioritizing possible economic gain.

China is the most powerful outside actor in Myanmar, supplying both the junta and rebel forces with weapons, and being behind the creation of the election. The election was a result of an agreement between Xi Jinping and Min Aung Hlaing, with China, Russia, and Belarus acting as observers in a further attempt to legitimize the rigged results.¹⁰ China’s main economic interest in Myanmar stems from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a pipeline through Myanmar known as the Chinese Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). This corridor would give China direct access to the Indian Ocean without having to bypass the Malacca Strait.¹¹ China’s backing of the oppressive and bloody junta is enabling countless human rights abuses. Even countries that have been critical of the junta, such as Myanmar and other ASEAN states, are expected to mute their criticisms.¹² While the elections are widely agreed to be rigged, they still serve an important strategic purpose. It is easier for countries to work with and invest in Myanmar if it can claim to be working with an established government. Yet below the surface of a parliament and a president lies a brutally repressive regime with no regard for human rights.

The pseudo-civilian government is already bowing towards China’s interests. Following a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing pledged to advance the CMEC, with the Myitsone Dam project being a main focus.¹³ The dam’s primary purpose is electricity generation. While China claims this would benefit parts of Myanmar that frequently suffer blackouts, the majority of the country is not connected to an electrical grid, and anywhere from 60 to 90 percent of the energy produced is expected to go to China.¹⁴ The dam is located in Kachin State, which is not under government control but is controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The KIO has protested the dam on the grounds of the vast environmental damage it could cause. The dam would sit less than 18 miles from the Sagaing Fault, which last year produced a 7.7 magnitude earthquake that killed 5,000 people. If such an earthquake were to occur after the dam’s construction, it could collapse, causing a deadly environmental disaster in the downstream towns.¹⁵ The Myitsone Dam project highlights a clear example of how China benefits from the military junta’s expansion of its power. Prior to the coup, the dam project was suspended due to its disruptive environmental impact, and protests over most of the electricity and revenue generated leaving the country. China is utilizing its dominance over Myanmar’s government for its own economic gain at the expense of humanitarian and environmental disasters.

The sham elections have firmly placed Myanmar into China’s control. While outside observers have criticized the election, they have failed to act to prevent it or mitigate the damage. As China strengthens its ties to Myanmar on the false premise of working with a civilian government, Myanmese citizens continue to suffer. Analysts can expect China to continue pressuring Myanmar’s government to allow for more CMEC projects to develop. Such projects come at the expense of the people of Myanmar, who do not benefit from China’s economic investment. Additionally, as the government is not operating democratically but rather brutally oppressing its citizens, there seems to be little room for domestic change. The international community must not turn its back on Myanmar as the country falls further into China’s grasp.

Work Cited

1. Nachemson, Andrew. “Myanmar Security Forces Open Fire on Protesters, Killing at Least 18, According to U.N.” The Washington Post, February 28, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/02/28/myanmar-security-forces-open-fire-protesters-killing-least-5/.

2. Lee, Joyce Sohyun, Shibani Mahtani, Meg Kelly, and Atthar Mirza. “How Myanmar’s Military Terrorized Its People with Weapons of War.” The Washington Post. Accessed March 12, 2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/myanmar-crackdown-military-coup/.

3. “Myanmar: Junta Atrocities Surge 5 Years since Coup.” Amnesty International, January 29, 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/myanmar-junta-atrocities-surge-5-years-since-coup/.

4. “Myanmar’s Junta-Led Election Is Neither Free nor Fair.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 9, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/myanmars-elections-begin-laughable-their-face-deadly-serious-their-impact.

5. “Myanmar: 170 Killed in Air Strikes during Criticised Election, UN Says.” BBC News, January 30, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg5gl8grv66o.

6. Richter, Annabel, and Joshua Kurlantzick. “In Myanmar, the World’s Indifference to Authoritarianism Is on Full Display.” World Politics Review, December 10, 2025. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/myanmar-elections-international-legitimacy/.

7. Ibid.

8. Mancini, Ryan. “Lawmakers Urge Donald Trump to Reject Myanmar Election.” The Hill, November 26, 2025. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5623909-trump-administration-urged-reject-myanmar-elections/.

9. Ibid.

10. Kavi, Maung. “China Says Myanmar Junta Election Stems From Xi-Min Aung Hlaing Deal.” The Irrawaddy, December 30, 2025. https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/china-says-myanmar-junta-election-stems-from-xi-min-aung-hlaing-deal.html.

11. China-US Focus. “Wherefore China-Myanmar Relations in 2026?” March 2, 2026. https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/wherefore-china-myanmar-relations-in-2026.

12. Richter, Annabel, and Joshua Kurlantzick.

13. Lynn, Thurein. “Myanmar Regime Ramps Up Myitsone Push as China Pours On Support.” The Irrawaddy, April 27, 2026. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/myanmar-regime-ramps-up-myitsone-push-as-china-pours-on-support.html.

14. Frontier. “‘Stabbing the Heart’ of Myanmar: Junta Moves to Restart Controversial Dam Project.” Frontier Myanmar, March 12, 2026. https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/stabbing-the-heart-of-myanmar-junta-moves-to-restart-controversial-dam-project/.

15. Ibid.