On January 26, 2026, news outlets around the world reported a surprising shakeup at the top of China’s government: there was an ongoing investigation for disciplinary and legal issues regarding Zhang Youxia,1 the second highest military authority in China besides Xi himself. It eventually resulted in his removal by Xi.2
The investigation into Zhang Youxia has been part of a wider purge within China’s Central Military Commission (CMC),3 the supreme leadership institution for all the armed forces under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s formal military, alongside the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Militia of China.4 With such a shakeup of the CMC, people reasonably fear the implications for Xi’s foreign policy, especially regarding those where military force is applicable – namely regarding Taiwan and Xi’s desire to see it return to the fold of the mainland.
Taiwan is a central pillar within what Xi has described as his project for the so-called ‘national rejuvenation’ of the Chinese nation. For Xi, ‘national rejuvenation’ means the return of China back into global prominence as a great and respected power as it was in antiquity. He has increasingly used the term to justify expanding government control over the Chinese economy with the goal of molding it into a weapon to wield against its detractors on the international stage and a way to promote Chinese interests.5 However, in regards to Taiwan, it strikes deeper to the dream of international prominence, and represents a cornerstone of legitimacy for not only China, but for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as well. For China to be a great power as the CCP intends, it cannot allow the existence of what the party sees as a rogue, breakaway province; and for the CCP to survive, it cannot allow dissenting separatists to show that an alternative system could work within their logistical grasp.6
Between the focus on Taiwan and the internal instability within the CCP under Xi, it is reasonable to worry about whether a turn towards war is possible or business is likely to go on as usual within the party. The promotion of ‘yes-men’ and loyalists that may feed into Xi’s own dreams and decisions without pushback and rational decision-making seems to make any military action he wants to pursue, such as an invasion of Taiwan, more imminent.7 As I will argue, however, those fears are based on two misconceptions. First, that Xi is getting rid of people he sees as political enemies; second, that Xi is onboarding more people who are loyal to him and therefore securing his position.
To discuss both, we must first begin with why authoritarian regimes are so enamoured with getting rid of possible political enemies. For authoritarian regimes, what the leadership fears the most is their possible deposition. Steven R. David outlined in his work that for such regimes, the consequences of the end of their rule is, if not violence and brutality, at least punitive for the deposed leader.8 This reality is especially applicable for Xi, who has used both open and coercive tactics to get rid of his political opponents within both the party system the military commissars.9 Having wielded the power of the state to punish according to his own will, he is aware of the realistic outcomes of giving others an opportunity to do the same to him.
That fear may explain the purges in many other regimes, as well as Xi’s previous ‘corruption’ crackdowns.10 However, the most recent round of purges is different. The central figures within the CMC are the core of his administration and political life, which is especially true of the most public of the recent purges: Zhang Youxia. Zhang is considered one of the closest and most trusted members of Xi’s inner circle,11 with the two having spent most of their lives together rising through the ranks of the CCP since they were children.12 Bringing us back to Dr. David’s theory regarding regime security, authoritarian leaders like Xi will only put his most trusted confidants, meaning those with connections beyond the CCP, in such high positions of power – the very positions he is purging currently. For Xi, the most recent round of high-profile purges in the CMC involves getting rid of the people who he was able to trust the most closely. There are few others with whom he has built the history and trust he has developed with them.
The second point is that, with these people gone, Xi has little recourse in terms of trust in his new round of leadership despite his emphasis on loyalty above all within his government.13 Loyalty and sycophants may be found within thousands of officials ready to swoop in and take the spot, but without a deep-seated and historical sense of trust, they will be hard pressed to have any significant influence on Xi’s policies outside his own existing aims. They will most likely have an actively detrimental effect in Xi’s desire or sense of security in executing risky plans such as an invasion of Taiwan,14 and especially with the looming prospect of its failure as he looks towards Ukraine, Venezuela, Palestine, and Iran.
Furthermore, in terms of actual capabilities, what legacy officials such as Zhang Youxia offered to Xi, especially in a possible invasion of Taiwan, was vital real-world commanding experience.15 Zhang Youxia sat as a Vice Chairman of the CMC not only due to his political connections, but also due to his experience in the Vietnam War.1617 Getting rid of figures which offer both trust and experience in exchange for ‘loyalty’ is not merely trying to get people who he can trust, it is to say that he does not fully trust anybody.
Xi is not naive. He may want yes-men, but not to convince him that the risk is worth taking, but to simply bolster his position and empower his loyalists within the state apparatus.
His campaign of ‘national rejuvenation’ has the reunification with Taiwan as a central but not immediate goal. Policy aims that seek to drive nationalism remain stable as long as it remains a reachable goal. A failure to capitulate the government of Taiwan and reintegrate it would be an undeniable failure for a central pillar to his claimant to rule both China and the CCP, within the party and among the people.18 The nationalist rhetoric Xi has promoted to gain support for this policy aim has further backed him into a corner where he may even lose popular support if such an objective fails, making the consequences that much greater.19
This is not to say that Xi will not launch the invasion regardless. It is clear that, above all, Taiwan is the thing that Xi sees as his clearest shot into the books of Chinese history.20 As with dealing with and trying to predict the behaviors of any single person, it is difficult to exactly know what they value more, and what is the level of risk they are willing to take. To invade Taiwan is a risky and constitutive move for keeping himself in power, but if Xi’s desire for glory outweighs the risks, it can still occur and be perfectly rational according to himself. While the prospect of an irrational actor acting in their own interest may frighten observers and invite either pessimism or hawkish backlash, the bottom line is that Xi knows the risks involved, and hopefully that staves him off.
Work Cited
1. Buckley, Chris. “In Xi’s China, Top General’s Fall Shows Precariousness of Power.” The New York Times, January 26, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/26/world/asia/china-xi-zhang-youxia-military.html.
2. Martina, Michael, Trevor Hunnicutt, and Mei Mei Chu. “Fall of Top Chinese General Stirs US Uncertainty about China’s Military.” Reuters, January 28, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/fall-top-chinese-general-stirs-us-uncertainty-about-chinas-military-2026-01-28/.
3. Christensen, Thomas J. “What Does Zhang Youxia’s Arrest Mean?” In Assessing Xi’s Unprecedented Purges of China’s Military: Key Developments and Potential Implications, CSIS, February 24, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-xis-unprecedented-purges-chinas-military-key-developments-and-potential.
4. Yang, Zi. “China’s Fast-Shrinking Central Military Commission: Implications for the PLA.” The Diplomat, July 21, 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/chinas-fast-shrinking-central-military-commission-implications-for-the-pla/.
5. Associated Press. “China Warns Countries against Making Trade Deals with the US Unfavorable to Beijing.” AP News, April 21, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/18b3da9bed1aa1b3ee3a79e91c197730.
6. Feng, Zhu. “Why Taiwan Really Matters to China.” Jamestown, September 30, 2004. https://jamestown.org/why-taiwan-really-matters-to-china/; Yeung, Jun Tao. “Why Is Taiwan so Important? The Manipulation of Nationalism in Legitimizing One-Party Rule in China.” The Yale Review of International Studies, October 29, 2019. https://yris.yira.org/asia/why-is-taiwan-so-important-the-manipulation-of-nationalism-in-legitimizing-one-party-rule-in-china/.
7. Martina, Hunnicutt, and Chu; Christensen, Thomas J.
8. David, Steven R. “Explaining Third World Alignment.” World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 233–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010472.
9. McDonell, Stephen. “Xi Jinping’s Never-Ending Hunt for Corruption in the Communist Party.” BBC News, February 12, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68213161.
10. Ibid.
11. Ellis, Nathaniel. “Xi Jinping’s Military Purge: Centralisation of Power, Institutional Risk, and Strategic Implications.” Atlas Institute for International Affairs, February 19, 2026. https://atlasinstitute.org/xi-jinpings-military-purge-centralisation-of-power-institutional-risk-and-strategic-implications/.
12. Yang, Zi. “The Purge of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli: Why and What’s next for China’s Military.” The Diplomat, January 26, 2026. https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/the-purge-of-zhang-youxia-and-liu-zhenli-why-and-whats-next-for-chinas-military/.
13. Ellis, Nathaniel.
14. Christensen, Thomas J.
15. Lin, Bonny. “Xi’s Purges Undermine the PLA’s Near-Term Readiness for Taiwan.” In Assessing Xi’s Unprecedented Purges of China’s Military: Key Developments and Potential Implications, CSIS, February 24, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-xis-unprecedented-purges-chinas-military-key-developments-and-potential.
16. Martina, Hunnicutt, and Chu.
17. Ellis, Nathaniel.
18. Christensen, Thomas J.
19. Yeung, Jun Tao.
20. Christensen, Thomas J.
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